South Carolina
Department of
Corrections

HENRY McMASTER, Governor
BRYAN P. STIRLING, Director

December 18, 2019

Mr. Edward R. Tallon, Sr.
South Carolina House of Representatives
Post Office Box 11867
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

RE: Response to Follow-up to October 23, 2019 & November 25, 2019, Subcommittee meetings

Dear Representative Tallon:

Please see attached responses to your follow-up from the meeting on May 29, 2019.

Inmate Health - General
1. Why are inmates not required to take their medication in front of SCDC staff?
   - Inmates are generally required to take their medication in the presence of SCDC nursing and security staff. There are two (2) ways that medications are administered in SCDC facilities:
     o Keep on Person (KOP) distribution is utilized for medications that are determined as unlikely to be abused (e.g., analgesics, antibiotics) the inmate may be distributed up to a thirty (30) day supply of medications for self-administration. In this method, the nurse is still required to positively identify that the correct inmate is receiving the KOP medications and document that they were distributed to the patient.
     o Dose-by-Dose administration is where nurses administer a single dose of medication to an inmate at either a pill call window, or at the inmate's cell door if the inmate is in a Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) or other cell where his/her movement is restricted. In either of these examples, the nurse is required to positively identify that the inmate is the person that should receive the medications being administered, and then observe the patient taking the medication at the time of administration, in the attendance of a Correctional Officer. The nurse then documents the medication administration in the health record.

2. Do inmates request medical treatment primarily in electronic or hard copy format?
   - Inmates request to be seen for medical treatment using paper request forms. Inmates do not use the site inmate kiosks to make medical requests because the kiosks are not encrypted in a way to protect patient confidentiality (Protected Health Information or PHI) under the HIPAA Act.
3. What does SCDC see as the pros and cons of having an electronic system that tracks inmate requests for medical treatment and provides the ability for medical staff members, who already have authority to review inmate medical records in hard copy, to access the following information:
   a. medical supervisors pull reports of medical requests by type of request, facility, and time of year, to help determine trends and have more information about when more or less medical staff may need to be available and at which locations;
   b. medical supervisors pull reports by individual subordinate's name to determine how each handled request received, including disposition and length of time to reach disposition, to improve employee evaluations and determine additional training that may be helpful to each employee; and
   c. medical staff members pull reports by inmate name to provide the inmate as a way to build confidence for inmates, and their families, that medical requests are not going unheard or being disregarded.
   - The pros of having an electronic system for this purpose are many and are described in good detail by items "a, b, and c" above. The current system for storing and filing inmate requests is not automated. Rather inmate requests are scanned and kept in a shared drive on the SCDC server. In this manner, for medical staff members to review the requests it is very labor intensive as it requires staff members to open each request and conduct a retroactive study.
   - SCDC does not perceive any cons to having an electronic system for tracking and sorting inmate requests as described in item #3.

   Are there any other ways tracking the information may be helpful in improving the safety, efficiency, and effectiveness of the agency's operations?
   - In addition to the actions cited in "a, b, and c" (above) the designated quality improvement staff can use this data to determine whether health outcomes are optimal based on timeliness and quality of services rendered. In addition, it would be useful in looking forward toward grievance issues and anticipating complaints and response areas.
4. Can SCDC currently track inmate requests for medical treatment through the database it has that maintains inmate medical records? If not, how much would it cost to update the system to make it capable of tracking this type of information or add a system that would work in conjunction with the current system?
   - No, however, Resource Information Management is researching the feasibility of making the NextGen Patient Portal (SCDC's Electronic Health Record Database) available for inmate access using the Inmate Kiosk and/or tablets. The Virginia Department of Corrections recently sent a survey through the Correctional Leaders Association regarding requests for medical appointments. The responses are due December 17, 2019 and SCDC will provide them to the HLOC when available.

5. Please provide a summary of the typical needs (e.g., adequate beds) for treating mental health patients. Then, please list different options to address the need and, for each, please explain the typical availability, costs, and limitations.
   - SCDC mental health level of care classification and coding system is hierarchical, ranging from (L5), representing inmates who are able to function with minimal assistance from mental health staff, to (L1), representing hospitalization and the greatest need for mental health care. Inmates not requiring current mental health care are classified as NMH (Non-Mental Health).   Therefore, inmates with the *highest Mental Health acuity* in need of psychiatric hospitalization are placed at the following locations:

Male (L1s)	Female (L1s)
Gillian Psychiatric Hospital (Kirkland)	Wellpath Recovery Solutions (Columbia)
Number of Beds= 82	Number of Beds= 10
Occupancy= 60-70%	Occupancy= 100% (Consistent Wait List)
Cost = state dollars	Cost per bed= Contract ($312- $395) daily rate

   - Residential mental health services are provided for inmates with moderate to severe symptoms who need frequent, ongoing mental health care and services in a therapeutic environment. Inmates going into Residential Mental Health Care Programs will have a L2 classification. The bed capacity for the various programs are listed below:

Male (L2s)	Female (L2s)
Intermediate Care Services –Kirkland Number of beds= 175 Occupancy = 100%	Intermediate Care Services- Camille Graham Number of beds -85 Occupancy- 52% (48% utilized for Area Mental Health patients)
CHOICES- Kirkland Number of beds= 96 Occupancy= 35-40% (Due to staffing)	N/A
High Level Behavioral Management Unit (HLBMU)- Kirkland Number of beds= 24 Occupancy= 100% (Wait List)	N/A
Low Level Behavioral Management Unit (LLBMU)- Allendale Number of beds= 46 Occupancy= 50% (Due to staffing)	N/A
Diversionary Housing Unit (DHU)- Broad River Number of Beds- 20 Occupancy- 65%	N/A

Crisis Stabilization Unit – Broad River Number of beds- 32 (+ 4 CI in RHU) Occupancy 100%	Crisis Stabilization Unit- Camille Graham Number of beds- 12 (+ 2 in RHU) Occupancy- 100%

- The Mental Health Lawsuit Implementation Panel recommended that our residential bed capacity covers at least 10-15% of the number of mental health caseload inmates ($N=4500$). Therefore, SCDC's bed capacity to provide adequate residential treatment services should be at a minimum of 450 beds. See current breakdown of residential beds:

Program	Number of Beds
Intermediate Care Services – Male	175
Intermediate Care Services – Female	85
CHOICES- Male	96
High Level Behavioral Management Unit – Male	24
Low Level Behavioral Management Unit- Male	46
Diversionary Housing Unit (DHU)- Male	20
Crisis Stabilization Unit – Male	32
Crisis Stabilization Unit- Female	12
Total	489 (10.8%)

- Current limitations include not having adequate psychiatric beds for females needing hospital level of care. Additionally, behavioral management beds are needed for females to be consistent with services that are offered to the men. The above capacity numbers are based on programs being fully staffed to properly manage the designated number of mental health caseload inmates. All programs listed above are in need of additional clinical and security staff. A budget request in the amount of $6,767,816 for additional 80, these additional positions would fully staff this area, clinical staff (e.g. Psychiatrist, Psychologist, Qualified Mental Health Professionals, Mental Health Officers, Activity Therapist, & Addiction Recovery Specialist has been requested for 2021-2022.)

6. In regards to the situations (e.g., care of mentally ill inmates) about which Dr. Pamela Crawford testified during the October 23, 2019, Subcommittee meeting, please provide the following:
   a. actions taken, including any policy changes, to address the specific situation; and
   b. actions taken, including any policy changes, to prevent and catch similar type situations in the future.

- **<u>Restriction of items to select patients on CSU status by mental health order</u>**
  The intermittent use of Nutraloaf as a behavioral modification by mental health staff over the last year or so was immediately eliminated when Dr. Crawford identified the practice on July 2, 2019 (met July 2, written submission July 9). An order went out to all of the mental health staff at Camille Graham on July 3 to cease and desist and all mental health managers statewide were polled to ensure that it was an isolated practice, which it was

verified to be. All Camille and statewide mental health staff were directed NOT to restrict mattresses, blankets or smocks, verbal communication, feminine hygiene or incontinence products in writing and in meetings. On August 23, 2019, the Deputy Director of Operations and the Deputy Director of Health Services jointly sent a memo to all Wardens, Associate Wardens, Majors, Health Care Authorities, Head Nurses, Mental Health Administrators, and Psychiatrists. In this memo, they reminded staff of several SCDC policies and procedures related to the issues raised by Dr. Crawford. They once again reminded staff that Nutraloaf could only be ordered in accordance with SCDC Policy OP-22.38 Restrictive Housing Unit, which states that placement on a Nutraloaf diet must be approved by the Warden and a qualified medical professional. They also reminded recipients that mattresses, blankets, and smocks are not to be restricted during crisis placement, that orders for constant watch of a patient should not restrict communication with the patient, that level of care elevations ordered by psychiatrists must be followed, and that hygiene items for menstruation and incontinence are to be provided to patients in crisis.

- **Corrective actions taken – continuous quality improvement initiatives**
  In order to ensure that the raised issues were isolated to Camille and were not a system-wide problem, the Division of Health Services conducted additional reviews of records related to crisis placements during May, June, and July 2019 from all other SCDC institutions. Reviews set out to identify any Nutraloaf orders and denial of mattresses, blankets, or smocks. The Quality Monitor for Behavioral Health completed a review of all M-120s (after crisis stabilization order) identified at 17 institutions in that period. Three institutions had no such placements during that time. Of the 637 M-120s, they reviewed, only one contained a denial of a mattress. None contained an order for Nutraloaf or a denial of a blanket or smock.

  The Chief of Psychology then reviewed additional records of a randomly selected sample of those 637 crisis placements. The sample reviewed consisted of 287 crisis placements and included between 41% and 60% of the placements from each institution except Broad River Correctional Institution (Broad River). Because of the large number of such placements at Broad River, only 33% of such placements from this institution were included in the sample. For these 287 placements, the Chief of Psychology reviewed clinical notes by the Qualified Mental Health Professional (QMHP) from the date of the crisis placement, up to three subsequent QMHP notes, and, where possible, the initial clinical note from the psychologist, psychiatrist, or nurse practitioner from the crisis episode. None of the records reviewed contained any of the policy violations being measured. These reviews were completed and provided to Health Services leadership on August 23, 2019. Two orders from Kershaw were identified for Nutraloaf orders prior to this period, by one QMHP on one date, as a verbal order from a psychiatrist; however, they were determined to be a miscommunication of an order for finger foods (also identified as "alternative meal" by policy, while on crisis status.)
    - Investigation initiated July 9, 2019. The Mental Health Manager, Lead Counselor, and a third QMHP were reassigned to other SCDC facilities, pending corrective

action. Corrective action was issued to remaining Camille clinical MH staff (3 resignations, 2 extended medical leave). A new management team was assigned to Camille Graham August 2019.

- The Deputy Director of Health Services conducted community meetings on units with inmates including Blue Ridge and ATU as well as other housing and continues to maintain a weekly presence.
- The newly assigned Management Team carried out "Mental Health Days" which included seeing inmates confidentially for counseling and psychiatry sessions to ensure Mental Health Lawsuit guidelines complied with inmates being seen in a timely manner.
- The Deputy Director of Health Services reassigned/reallocated positions to Camille Graham to provide additional support to the residential program and crisis stabilization unit. Two new QMHP have now started at Camille Graham.
- Four additional Mental Health Officer positions are being assigned (3 at present as well) specifically for the CSU, to enhance crisis management and response.

- **<u>Lack of Acute Psychiatric Beds for Mentally Ill Female Patients</u>**
  SCDC has continued to work diligently to meet the need for inpatient psychiatric care for female inmates. The Deputy Director for Health Services and other leadership staff met with staff at the Columbia Regional Care Center in late October to discuss increasing the number of beds in that facility available to SCDC patients. Patients from SCDC currently occupy approximately 13 to 15 beds at the Columbia Regional Care Center at any given time with at least 7 of those being inpatient psychiatric women. The Division of Health Services is working towards having 25 dedicated beds but has run up against two main obstacles. The first is a lack of funds and the second is a lack of open and available bed space. In its budget request for the 2020-20221 fiscal year, the Agency requested money dedicated to providing inpatient psychiatric beds.

- **<u>Continuous Quality Improvement</u>**
  Continuous Quality Management process for Mental Health was recently staffed for implementation. Policies governing this process were written some time ago but the program was not effectively staffed until just a few months ago. Continuous Quality Management staff complete periodic audits of mental health records at all SCDC institutions in order to identify areas in the mental health care delivery system that are in need of improvement. They produce a written report of all audits. SCDC Policy HS-19.07 Mental Health Services – Continuous Quality Management requires that they audit each institution at least once every six months. They are currently monitoring a few institutions, including **Camille, on a monthly basis.** Camille mental health leadership staff on-site actually review the CI documentation weekly to ensure compliance. These monthly audits are going to be an asset to the Agency in ensuring that these issues never recur. ALL institutions are required to load critical documents in a shared file that is reviewed internally by the Divisions CQI Team monthly (See Grid on next page).

Date to Be Uploaded	Form Type	Explanation	CQM Staff Member Point of Contact
10th of Each Month	Safe Cell Inspections Log M-209	We are looking for the current month Safe Cell Inspections. Those cell inspections should be done and uploaded the between the 1st – 10th of each month.	Devina Codes
10th of Each Month	M-120- Crisis Stabilization Orders	We are looking for all documentation from the previous month.	Devina Codes
10th of Each Month	M-135- Crisis Logs	We are looking for all documentation from the previous month.	Devina Codes
10th of Each Month	Treatment Team Documentation	We are looking for all documentation from the previous month.	Robin Olds or Chantal Johnson

Suicide Attempts

7. Please provide the number of suicide attempts for each of the last five years. If organizing these numbers by different categories based on how the medical field classifies different types

of attempts may provide additional insight, please do so and include an explanation of each category.

- The data generated below is gathered from RIM (Resource Information Management). The data below reflects all documented Suicidal Attempts in SCDC via the MINS (Management Information Note) reports for the time of FY2015 to 2019.

Year	Average per month by Fiscal Year
2015	34
2016	16
2017	18
2018	25
2019	28 (11 months)

Electronic Tracking

8. As a way to more easily determine and track the actions/treatment of inmates, including, but not limited to, the amount of recreation time, opportunity for showers, and individuals involved in sexual and/or other assaults, has SCDC researched utilizing global positioning system (GPS) tracking devices on each inmate which could automatically populate a database with information on the location of each inmate within the prison at all times? If not, would SCDC be willing to research options and costs related to this type of tracking?

- Yes, but GPS is not believed to be a viable option due to the construction of the institutions limiting the accuracy of the location information. A similar technology, active Radio-Frequency Identification tracking, has been deployed in some correctional facilities in the US, but it is very expensive to implement. See attached report from the U.S. Department of Justice titled "Tracking Inmates and Locating Staff with Active Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID): Early Lessons Learned in One U.S. Correctional Facility" published in June 2010. Based on this report, the cost to equip one correctional institution with this technology was $3.3 million. An active RFID product vendor (Radianse) gave a presentation to SCDC in 2015 but the cost for active RFID bracelets and the required infrastructure was still cost prohibitive. The Pennsylvania DOC recently sent a survey regarding this topic to the Correctional Leaders Association. The responses are due by December of 2019 and SCDC will provide them to the committee when available.

Costs related to Inmates

9. Is the agency able to provide the average daily cost for inmates diagnosed with mental disorders separate from the average daily cost of all inmates? If so, what is that cost?

- No.

10. Please list other categories of inmates the agency is able to provide an average daily cost for outside of the average daily cost of all inmates and that average daily cost (e.g., inmates in maximum security facility; inmates in minimum security facility, etc.).

- SCDC provides the average cost for an inmate. The agency does not break it down in different categories as there are too many variables.

Inmate Release Dates

11. SCDC has notified the subcommittee of various prolonged incarcerations and early releases. Please provide the number of inmates whose release dates were impacted by SCDC audits or information SCDC obtained from other sources ("information"). Please include inmates held past their release date and inmates who, because the information allowed SCDC to catch an error before it was too late, were released on time. With each inmate, please provide the following information in an Excel spreadsheet:
    a. Applicable audit or information obtained;
    b. Max out date in the computer prior to obtaining information;
    c. Max out date in the computer after obtaining information;
    d. Actual release date;
    e. Number of days incarcerated past release date, if any;
    f. Number of days of incarceration saved by obtaining the information (e.g., max out date prior to obtaining information minus actual release date); and
    g. Cost per day to house an inmate.
    - Please see attached Prolonged Incarceration spreadsheet.

12. Please provide two flow charts, one which shows each of the items below:
    a. SCDC's process for entering data related to inmate release dates prior to the LOC study process; and
    - Please see attached Entering Data Prior to HLOC.
    - Prior to March 2019:
        o Inmate admitted to Reception and Evaluation Center
        o Commitment Orders entered by Records Analyst
        o Record then sent to Inmate Records Office to have Commitment Order entries audited by assigned staff
        o Commitment Orders reviewed by institutional classification staff upon arrival at assigned institution(s)
        o Commitment Orders audited by Inmate Records staff 60 days before release from SCDC
    b. SCDC's process for entering and auditing data related to inmate release dates as of November 2019.
    - Please see attached Timeline Inmate Record Audit.

Inmate Education

13. How does SCDC rank in General Educational Development (GED) passage rates compared to other states?
    - The South Carolina Department of Corrections tied for 3rd place in the nation for the pass rate on the 2018 GED test within a correctional setting. Data recently released by the GED Testing Service indicated that South Carolina's 90% GED pass rate for the 2018 test ties with Nevada, Oregon, and Utah corrections units. Only three other correctional education units in the nation—South Dakota, Illinois, and Nebraska—have higher rates

of passing the GED. South Carolina was also the only Southern state in the top 10. The 2018 national pass rate for corrections rose to 80% in comparison to 78% in 2017.

- South Carolina Department of Corrections has established a record of excellence with the GED. In 2017, South Carolina also tied for 3rd in the nation. With a 90% pass rate in 2017, South Carolina was one of 10 states that surpassed the national GED® pass rate of 79%.
- Education continues to be one of the most important factors affecting successful reentry and reducing recidivism. The RAND Corporation has issued multiple studies on the value of correctional education, finding that inmates who participated in correctional education programs were 28% less likely to recidivate. By decreasing recidivism rates, correctional education saves $4 to $5 for each dollar spent.
- For the South Carolina Department of Corrections, inmate education, including adult education, is provided through the Palmetto Unified School District. This district was created by the General Assembly in 1981 to ensure that inmates receive educational programs leading to vocational certificates and training as well as a high school degree or its equivalent. Congratulations to all students, teachers, and staff who work so hard to make the GED a successful experience.
- The number of GEDs awarded has dramatically increased in recent years. The chart below details that growth. Last year, we averaged 90 per quarter, and we are on track for that again. For the first quarter of the 19-20 school year, we had 93 GED passes.

GEDs

School Year	GEDs
14-15	75
15-16	194
16-17	259
17-18	327
18-19	360

Accreditation

14. Did SCDC cancel their accreditation contract with the American Correctional Association? If so, why and has SCDC adopted an alternative in-house evaluation process?

- Due to a fiscal crisis in 2003, SCDC instituted several emergency measures, including a significant Reduction in Force. Elimination of the arrangement for contracting with the American Correctional Association (ACA) to handle accreditation was another of the actions taken. The Agency then developed an alternative in-house evaluation process

known as the Management Review Program, which was implemented in 2004. That program was suspended in 2011 due to budget and staffing constraints. However, in October 2018 SCDC resumed the practice of conducting the Security Audit portion of Management Reviews and is continuing to perform this monitoring function on a consistent basis. It is anticipated that the remainder of the Management Review Program will also be reinstituted as soon as the supporting positions needed are funded and filled.

15. Do any other states have an in-house evaluation process? If yes, please list which ones.
- SCDC has submitted a survey request to the Correctional Leaders Association to gather this information from other states and will share the results with the committee as soon as they are available.

Employee Training
16. Please list the training provided to each type of SCDC employee and when the training is provided (e.g., when hired, before interaction with inmates, annually, etc.)
- Please see attached 2019 Training and Staff Development Curricula.

Classification System
17. Based on testimony from Dr. Austin (SCDC classification consultant) during the October 23, 2019, Subcommittee meeting, please provide an updated breakdown of how the new classification will operate, including the two components, anticipated number of inmates moving from higher to lower levels, discretionary options and how much discretion is expected, and partnership with the parole board.
- Attached are the classification instrument instructions and the classification instruments (initial classification and reclassification). These documents describe how the new classification system will be operationalized. Please note that Level 1 is minimum security, Level 2 is medium security and Level 3 is maximum security. Below are the current and anticipated numbers of inmates in each custody level:
- Current – 3,884 Level 1; 8,343 Level 2 and 4,887 Level 3 as of November 25, 2019.
- Anticipated – 4,272 Level 1; 10,738 Level 2 and 2,104 Level 3 as of November 25, 2019. *These numbers do not include those inmates housed in RHU's or unclassified inmates in R&E's.
- Discretionary overrides are included in the classification instructions/instruments. The general standard is that 5–15 percent of a prison population's custody levels are based on discretionary overrides rather than the original initial classification or reclassification scores.
- The partnership with the parole board is a future initiative for the agency.
18. Please list the statutes that may need analysis by the General Assembly to assist the new classification system in working at an optimal level. Please include potential changes, impact without those changes, and impact with those changes.
- RESPONSE: No statutes need analysis with regard to the new classification system. However, please note that SCDC is already proposing a change to S.C. Code 24-13-230 to add "SCDC validated rehabilitation programs" to the list of activities in which

inmates may participate in order to receive a reduction in their sentences via work credits. (See Law Change # 1.)

19. Please provide information on other states that have made similar changes to their classification systems, as well as changes those states made in legislation related to classification and/or the parole board (e.g., information the board reviewed, etc.)

- With respect to inmate classification systems, the most recent state Dr. Austin developed a similar system is Illinois which implemented its system in 2018. There were no needed legislative changes to implement this system. Dr. Austin is now working with the state of Maryland to adjust their classification system, so it does not negatively impact the female inmates. This is being done, as is the case in Illinois and South Carolina by adjusting the scale and cut-off points for the females.
- Prior to their appearance before the parole board the inmate's compliance with the case plan would be assessed by the SCDC and the risk level adjusted accordingly.

20. Please provide the following related to the new classification system:

a. specific outcomes sought from it;

- The size of the Level 3 and now called close custody will decline by about 2,000 inmates. The size of the Levels 1 and 2 now called minimum will increase by about 1,500 to 2,000 inmates. These changes in size for each population will allow for a defined management strategy for prison operations between close custody and medium custody institutions that did not exist between Level 3 and Level 2 institutions.
- The number of inmate on inmate and inmate on staff assaults should decline.
- Inmates with an increased risk or threat to the safety and security of staff and the public are better identified and managed appropriately at an institution with a security designation that matches the custody of the inmate.
- Improved management of female inmates given the gender responsive classification instrument.
- Economic benefit from the ability to place larger proportions of the inmate population to lower custody levels without jeopardizing inmate, staff, or public safety

b. potential example events which may impact progress toward the desired outcomes;

- The risk, needs and case planning system has not been developed in coordination with the Parole Board. Meetings are being planned to begin the process. It should be emphasized that this system is separate from the inmate classification system.
- Rapidly changing population sentenced to SCDC (inmate age, needs (medical, mental health), increased length of sentences)
- Significant increase in gang population – gangs disrupt well managed prisons
- Increase in inmates sentenced to SCDC – current numbers will allow management strategies mentioned above. Significant increases could hinder this.
- The risk, needs and case planning system has not been developed in coordination with the Parole Board. Meetings are being planned to begin the process. It should be emphasized that this system is separate from the inmate classification system.

c. data SCDC is going to track to determine progress toward desired outcomes; and

- The SCDC will be able to develop a monthly report of the inmate population to show the aggregate level population counts by each classification level disaggregated by gender.

The SCDC can also compute inmate on inmate and inmate staff assault rates per 100 inmate population.

   d. current baseline data from which data, collected after implementation of the system, can be compared.

- As indicated above, the SCDC will be collecting the population counts by classification level and assault rates per 100 inmate population going forward. These statistics can be compared to the statistics that that have already been computed for 2019 (pre-new classification system).

21. Since SCDC already posts certain information about each inmate online, when the new classification system is implemented, would it be possible for SCDC to add to each inmate's information online, the basis for how the inmate is classified and breakdown of the inmate's score (e.g., X number of points for conviction, X number of points for completing program ABC, etc.)

- No, due to staffing shortages this is not possible at this time; however, the inmate may request the information from their caseworker.

22. Please explain the following pertaining to the audit of SCDC programs, which Dr. Austin mentioned in his testimony during the October 23, 2019, Subcommittee meeting:

- Dr. Austin recommended that the Agency audit all the existing programs and concentrate on those that are currently available and achievable. Having programs for the sake of having programs with little or no participation is unproductive.

   a. what it will address;

- The new classification system will include a "risk" and "needs assessment" for each inmate. The risk assessment will evaluate the inmates risk to recidivate. The "needs assessment" will identify areas the inmate needs to improve upon to reduce their risk (i.e. substance abuse, education, work). The assessment will then be transferred to inmates in the form of a "case management plan". The "case management plan will prescribe what the inmate should participate in. The audit is essential in order to ensure that each program being offered has a curriculum, is being administered appropriately, and has a test to ensure information has been comprehended. Once each program is audited and certified, SCDC shall create an "SCDC Program Book" for all staff and inmates to know what certified programs are offered and where they are located.

   b. what SCDC hopes to accomplish through the audit, and

- SCDC hopes to reduce violence and encourage good behavior in our institutions and to further support the successful transition of inmates to the community by providing programs designed to ensure that inmates have the skills necessary to succeed upon release. We believe this entire process (classification, risk assessment, and needs assessment) will enhance public safety through the offering of certified programs designed to ensure that inmates have the skills necessary to succeed upon release. We will in essence begin "reentry at entry" by identifying an inmate's risk to recidivate, his/her "needs", and then prescribing programs that will offer the opportunity to improve themselves and become productive members of South Carolina.

   c. timeline of when the audit will occur.

- This will be a lengthy process as we will have to gather information and analyze each program being offered. This audit will require a number of disciplines to participate as we have many programs across the agency (education, mental health, substance abuse, volunteers, food service, and programs staff). The audit will begin soon.

Staff Incident Reports

23. Please provide a flow chart that shows where incident reports go, from submission to resolution, within each division and facility. Please note how each submission may be made (e.g., electronic or hard copy form).
   - Please see attached flow chart. Incident reports at the intuitions are submitted by staff and provided to their supervisor. Reports are then provided to the Major of security for disposition. The Major reviews the incident reports and determines actions to be taken. For incident reports dealing with inmates, the Major may conduct an administrative hearing or refer to a formal hearing dependent upon the circumstances of the incident. For incident reports dealing with inappropriate behavior by staff under their purview the Major may address the issue informally or may refer to the Warden for formal corrective action. For incident reports dealing with inappropriate behavior by staff not under their purview, e.g. non-uniformed staff, the Major shall refer the incident report to the Warden for appropriate action. For incident reports received concerning security related issues or other matters submitted by staff, the Major will either address the concern themselves or refer the incident report to the appropriate authority.
   - If an incident occurs in a division, it is completed by the employee and forwarded to their supervisor for review and recommendation and then provided to the Division Director for appropriate action.
24. What does SCDC see as the pros and cons of having an electronic system that tracks incident reports and provides the ability to access the following information:
   a. staff members access incident reports they submit, view name of the last individual who reviewed the incident report, and decision made on it as a way to build employee confidence that incident reports are taken seriously and reviewed;
   b. supervisors, up to deputy directors, pull reports by subordinate's name to determine how each subordinate handled reports they received, including how fast reports were reviewed and how they were addressed, to improve employee evaluations and determine additional training that may be helpful to each employee;
   c. supervisors, up to deputy directors, pull reports of incident reports which allege improper action by their subordinates to utilize during annual employee evaluations; and
   d. supervisors, up to deputy directors, pull reports of incident reports submitted by facility to determine if there are any trends in certain facilities that need to be addressed.

Are there any other ways tracking the information may be helpful in improving the safety, efficiency, and effectiveness of the agency's operations?
   - SCDC does not see any negatives with an electronic system for submission and tracking of incident reports. This technology would certainly improve accountability in the incident

reporting process for employees and supervisors and ensure corrective actions are taken to address issues.

- The only con SCDC sees is the expense of making the equipment available to enter the reports on site.
- After the Classification System is updated this is the next priority for Resource Information Management.

25. Are incident reports reviewed as a way to determine if, based on the facts of a situation reported, personnel from the employee critical incident program may need to reach out to an employee to offer assistance? If not, does SCDC believe this may be beneficial?

- There are a variety of ways the Critical Incident Stress Management Program works to insure staff who need support receive it, in a timely manner. Yes, staff within the Critical Incident Stress Management Program are copied on emails regarding critical events and reviewed to proactively determine when support services may be needed. Management Information Notes are also reviewed periodically to follow up on situations that may have otherwise been missed. Additionally, peer team members working at their institutions may hear about a situation before reports are even done and respond immediately. Peers, including team member "Flossy" the trauma dog, are activated to provide individual, one-on-one support, group debriefings and/or attend shift briefings or other meetings to be available following traumatic events. This helps insure that, while staff may certainly reach out for support from the Critical Incident Stress Management Peer Team at any time, to the extent possible, team members also provide a general presence following events that may have been traumatizing for staff. This is definitely beneficial in our attempt to provide effective support services for employees.

Ombudsman

26. Please provide the following as it relates to the recommendation in public testimony for state government to have an independent ombudsman appointed to investigate complaints related SCDC:

- Entities, including, but not limited to, non-profits that currently contact SCDC on a regular basis with complaints from inmates or inmates' families. Beside each entity, please describe what access, if any, they have at SCDC to investigate the complaint;
- For reporting of allegations of sexual abuse, SCDC has agreements with 10 Rape Crisis Centers who permit inmates or family members to make reports of sexual abuse/sexual harassment. These entities contact SCDC's Prison Rape Elimination Act Coordinator with permission from the victim to give the report to the agency. Additionally, as presented on the SCDC public website, private citizens can make reports to the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) to make complaints of sexual misconduct. SCDC's Police Services Division investigates all allegations of sexual abuse within SCDC.
- United States Department of Justice, Disability Rights Section, Civil Rights Division. The U.S. Department of Justice enforces ADA regulations governing state and local government services (Title II). SCDC allows full access to investigate and we cooperate fully.

- Protection & Advocacy for People with Disabilities, Inc. Protection & Advocacy (P&A) was established in 1977 as the protection and advocacy system for the state of South Carolina. P&A is authorized by state and federal law to protect the rights of people with disabilities in South Carolina. P&A is independent of all agencies which provide treatment or other services to people with disabilities. SCDC allows full access to investigate and we cooperate fully.
- S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control and S.C. Labor, Licensing and Regulation are outside entities from which SCDC sometimes receives complaints. In many cases, those agencies will determine in advance which aspects, if any, they should handle and will then refer the remaining or non-applicable portions of complaints to SCDC for information and appropriate action.
- Legislators submit complaints to SCDC's Legislative Liaison.
- Inmate's attorneys send complaints to SCDC's General Counsel's Office and other SCDC offices such as, Central Classification for transfers and/or safety concerns, and Inmate Records Office for sentencing or release information.
b. Existing offices/individuals that outside entities/individuals can contact with complaints who then, based on their review of the complaint, can choose to conduct further investigation (e.g., State Inspector General, S.C. Office of Ombudsman). Beside each existing office/individual, please describe what access, if any, they have at SCDC to investigate a complaint;
- Inmates, inmates' family and/or entities may contact SCDC's Office of the Ombudsman to report a complaint.
- Inmates, inmates' family and/or entities may contact SCDC Inmate Grievance Branch regarding the status of inmate grievances provided their inquiries do not require the disclosure of private and/or confidential information related to an inmate. Much caution is taken in responding to e-mails and telephone inquiries since persons or persons representing entities may have a reason, other than the inmate's interest, as the basis for such inquiries. Information is given to persons and/or persons representing entities that desire to know how SCDC's Inmate Grievance System works. Instructions are provided as to where that information can be found on SCDC's website at www.doc.sc.gov.
- For reporting allegations of sexual abuse, entities/individuals can contact SCDC's Prison Rape Elimination Act Coordinator to make complaints, and based on the review of the complaint, will ensure the complaint is forwarded and investigated by the proper authority. For all complaints of criminal actions, SCDC's Police Services Division investigates and forwards credible allegations for prosecution. For allegations of less than criminal sexual misconduct, the Institutions Prison Rape Elimination Act Compliance Manager is authorized to investigate, and disposition based on preponderance of the evidence.
- United States Department of Justice, Disability Rights Section, Civil Rights Division. The U.S. Department of Justice enforces ADA regulations governing state and local government services (Title II).We allow full access to investigate and we cooperate fully.
- Protection & Advocacy for People with Disabilities, Inc. Protection & Advocacy (P&A) was established in 1977 as the protection and advocacy system for the state of South Carolina. P&A is authorized by state and federal law to protect the rights of people with

disabilities in South Carolina. P&A is independent of all agencies which provide treatment or other services to people with disabilities. SCDC allows full access to investigate and we cooperate fully.

- SCDC Agency Hotline (monitored by SCDC Police Services) – tip line operated by SCDC in which the public and inmates may leave tips regarding criminal activity within or involving the SCDC. SCDC Police Services opens investigations if warranted or refers tips to appropriate area for handling of issues that do not rise to the level of warranting a criminal investigation.
- Crime Stoppers–complaints referred to Police Services who reviews, addresses, and provides Crime Stoppers with disposition. Crime Stoppers does not conduct investigations.
- SLED – complaints can be investigated directly by SLED or referred to SCDC to investigate. Police Services will assist with whatever information or access is needed if SLED chooses to investigate.
- State Office of Inspector General (OIG)-complaints can be investigated directly by OIG or referred to SCDC for investigation. Police Services will assist with whatever information or access is needed if OIG chooses to investigate.
- Outside Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA)–complaints can be investigated directly by the outside LEA or referred to SCDC to investigate. Police Services will assist any outside LEA with whatever information or access is needed if they choose to investigate.
- State Ombudsman - complaints can be investigated directly by State Ombudsman Office or referred to SCDC for investigation. Police Services and SCDC will assist with whatever information or access is needed if they choose to investigate.

c. SCDC personnel whose sole job responsibility is to address complaints submitted by outside entities/individuals and work to resolve them, if any;

- For allegations of Sexual Abuse, SCDC's Prison Rape Elimination Act Coordinator is responsible for addressing allegations from outside entities/individuals and to ensure it is properly resolved.

d. SCDC personnel whose sole job responsibility is to analyze inmate requests for medical treatment to determine if there are any trends or areas in which treatment is lacking;

- There are not currently any SCDC personnel who have this as their sole responsibility.

e. Explanation of SCDC's current process, if any, to analyze inmate requests for medical treatment to determine if there are any trends or areas in which treatment is lacking;

- Currently the process for analyzing inmate requests is through the inmate grievance process where if an inmate files a grievance about medical treatment, the inmate's requests and subsequent medical treatment rendered are reviewed to determine the appropriateness of care delivered. Responses to grievances are generated by Health Services staff appropriate to the issue identified by the Inmate. Level 2 grievances are signed by the Deputy Director of Health Services.

f. SCDC personnel whose sole job responsibility is to analyze inmate requests and complaints to determine if there are any trends or areas in which policy (or implementation of policy) is lacking;

- There are not currently any SCDC personnel who have this as their sole responsibility; however, the Automated Request to Staff System statistical report is able to show percentages on the number of requests received for each request type.
- Currently there is no staff member whose sole job is to analyze inmate requests; however, we do have a branch, Inmate Grievance Branch, which receives formal grievances from inmates. They do track trends and identify areas in which policy is lacking.

g. Explanation of SCDC's current process, if any, to analyze inmate requests and complaints to determine if there are any trends or areas in which policy (or implementation of policy) is lacking; and

- SCDC does not currently analyze inmate requests to determine trends; however, the Automated Request to Staff System statistical report is able to show percentages on the number of requests received for each request type.
- SCDC does not analyze inmate requests; however, Inmate Grievance Branch provides a quarterly report to each Warden.
- The Inmate Grievance Branch through its Inmate Grievance Coordinators, who are located at every correctional institution at SCDC, prepares a Monthly Grievance Statistical Report by the fifth of each month that displays the number of inmate grievances filed by dorm and type. The issues/complaints raised by inmates in grievances are often indicative of personal and/or institutional concerns. The data generated from the grievances are discussed at Warden's Monthly Dashboard Meetings. The data is also used by the Warden and his/her staff to address issues so that remediation and preventative measures can be implemented.

h. SCDC's position, if any, on the recommendation.

- SCDC believes the agency needs an additional position to employ an ombudsman whose sole responsibility is to address inmate concerns; however, we feel this staff member should work directly for the Director or under the Chief of Legal and Compliance.
- The South Carolina Office of Ombudsman and the South Carolina Office of Inspector General already have the capability and responsibility to accept and pursue complaints against SCDC. There is no need to create another external agency for the sole purpose of handling complaints involving one existing agency. SCDC has assigned some key staff to deal internally with forwarded complaints for the time being, and a full time Ombudsman has been requested in the budget for next year. Filling that position will do more to improve the thorough and timely handling of complaints than any other option.

Human Resources

27. Which employees at SCDC are at-will?
- The following employees are at-will: Agency Director, Deputy Directors, Working Retirees, and Temp/Temporary Grant.
28. In regards to demotions of SCDC employees (at-will and non at-will), please provide the following:
a. Circumstances under which it can occur;
- During the corrective action process.
- Interested employees may request a voluntary demotion.
- Employees can be demoted during their trial status.

b. Personnel who have authority to do it (e.g., does it have to be the immediate supervisor, or can it be someone above the immediate supervisor); and

- Charging Party-refers to the supervisor making the initial charge allegation. (If a Warden, Division Director, or an appropriate member of the Director's staff is the charging party, s/he may also serve as the Reprimanding Authority. If s/he does not wish to serve as the Reprimanding Authority, s/he will consult with his/her supervisor, who may serve as the Reprimanding Authority or may select another Warden, Division Director, or appropriate member of the Director's staff, or higher authority to serve as the Reprimanding Authority.)

- Reprimanding Authority-refers to an individual occupying a position who has been empowered to impose corrective action upon employees in accordance with the procedures outlined in these guidelines. Individuals temporarily filling these positions may administer corrective action commensurate with the position during their tenure. The following positions are designated as Reprimanding Authorities:

- The Reprimanding Authority should consult Employee Relations before demoting an employee.

- The direct supervisor such as a Branch Chief or Division Director can demote an employee. Ideally, the direct supervisor is the person who would demote the employee because he/she is familiar with the employee's work performance and behavior. If a Warden, Division Director, or appropriate member of the Director's staff is the charging party, s/he may also serve as the Reprimanding Authority. If s/he does not wish to serve as the Reprimanding Authority, s/he will consult with his/her supervisor, who may serve as the Reprimanding Authority or may select another Warden, Division Director, or appropriate member of the Director's staff, or higher authority to serve as the Reprimanding Authority. The Reprimanding Authority can be the Deputy Director of the employee's area but is normally the employee's immediate supervisor. In the institution, the decision to demote a correctional officer is handled by the Warden.

- Employees under dual supervision are demoted by the appropriate Division Director. If the employee violates a rule unique to the institution, the charging official would be the Warden and the Reprimanding Official would be the appropriate Division Director of the area. At any time, the appropriate Deputy Director can be the Reprimanding Authority and demote the employee.

c. Ways in which the employee's annual Employee Performance Management System report is utilized in the decision, if at all.

- During an unsatisfactory job performance period.

29. In regards to promotions of SCDC employees (at-will and non at-will), please provide the following:

a. Circumstances under which it can occur;

- Employees interested in a promotional opportunity would have to apply for vacant positions.

b. Personnel who have authority to do it (e.g., does it have to be the immediate supervisor, or can it be someone above the immediate supervisor); and

- Selecting Official-refers to the official/authority who is responsible for appointing screening and selection panel members and for selecting an individual to fill a specific position within the Agency.
  c. Ways in which the employee's annual Employee Performance Management System report is utilized in the decision, if at all.
- Per SCDC policy ADM 11.28, Applicant Selection Process, As of January 2018, with the approval from the HR Director, Employee Performance Management Systems can be utilized during the screening, interviewing and selection process.

30. In regards to termination of SCDC employees (at-will and non at-will), please provide the following:
    a. Circumstances under which it can occur;
- Corrective Action Process.
- Arrest, depending upon the charges.
- Probationary employees can be terminated for unsatisfactory performance during their probationary period without the use of corrective action.
    b. Personnel who have authority to do it (e.g., does it have to be the immediate supervisor, or can it be someone above the immediate supervisor); and
- Please see definition of charging party and reprimanding authority in 28b.
- The Reprimanding Authority should consult Employee Relations before terminating an employee. Employee Relations is responsible for coordinating through the Staff Attorney responsible for employment law.
- The immediate supervisor such as a Branch Chief or Division Director can recommend the termination of an employee. Ideally, the Branch Chief or Division Director of the area is the person who would recommend termination because he/she is familiar with the employee's work performance and behavior. If a Warden, Division Director, or appropriate member of the Director's staff is the charging party, s/he may also serve as the Reprimanding Authority. If s/he does not wish to serve as the Reprimanding Authority, s/he will consult with his/her supervisor, who may serve as the Reprimanding Authority or may select another Warden, Division Director, or appropriate member of the Director's staff, or higher authority to serve as the Reprimanding Authority. At any time, the Reprimanding Authority can be the appropriate Deputy Director but is normally the employee's Branch Chief or Division Director. In the institution, the recommendation to terminate institutional personnel is made by the Warden.
- Employees under dual supervision are recommended for termination by the appropriate Division Director or Deputy Director. If the employee violates a rule unique to the institution, the charging official would be the Warden and the Reprimanding Official would be the appropriate Director, Division Director, or Deputy Director.
    c. Ways in which the employee's annual Employee Performance Management System report is utilized in the decision, if at all.
- Unsatisfactory job performance.
- Probationary employees with a substandard job performance should be terminated.

31. Under what circumstances can SCDC terminate an employee immediately (at-will and non-at-will)? Who can terminate an employee immediately (e.g., does it have to be the direct supervisor, or can it be someone above the direct supervisor)?
   - Refusal to submit to drug test; failed drug test; Employee/Inmate Sexual Misconduct; Arrest for DUI, CDV and Assault/Battery, all other arrests the General Counsel is consulted prior to termination.
32. What suggestions, if any, does SCDC have for changes in statutes or regulations related to state employee human resource decisions and what does the agency believe may be the pros and cons to each change?
   - No suggestions at this time.
33. In what decisions, if any, does SCDC utilize an employee's annual Employee Performance Management System report(s)?
   - Unsatisfactory job performance for termination; demotion during trail status or a Reduction in Force.
34. Please provide the ranks within SCDC institutions, from the position of warden down.
   - (JD60) Warden (JD55) Associate Warden, (JD55) Deputy Wardens, (JD50) Major, (JD50) Captain, (JD40) Lieutenant, (JD35) Sergeant, (JD35) Corporal, (JD30) Correctional Officer, (JD30) Cadet.

Housing - Separations (Inmate from Inmate and Inmate from Employee)
35. Please describe the situations in which an inmate's housing may be changed to separate the inmate from another inmate or from an employee, and the process to implement the separation (e.g., is a request required, if so, who has to complete a form and who decides if the separation occurs, etc.
   - Prison Rape Elimination Act- Allegation of Sexual Abuse or Sexual Harassment; Substantiated Case of Sexual Abuse or Sexual Harassment.
      o When an inmate submits, or the institution is notified of an allegation of sexual abuse, the security officer who is notified ensures that the alleged victim is separated from the alleged perpetrator for the duration of the investigation (Staff or Inmate). If the case is substantiated through an investigation, the Prison Rape Elimination Act Compliance Manager will submit an SCDC Form 19-141 "Separation/Caution Memorandum" to classification to review.
   - Please see below excerpt from SCDC Policy 21.04 Inmate Classification Plan responsive to this question:

   18. SEPARATIONS/CAUTIONS: To establish guidelines to flag the records of inmates for whom special caution must be taken for certain actions involving these inmates.
   18.1 *The Central Classification Separation Committee is* responsible for issuing the official caution to be placed in the inmate's records when conditions or circumstances exist that would potentially jeopardize the safety and security of the inmate, employee(s), or other persons. SCDC Form 19-141, "Separation/Caution Memorandum," will be submitted to *Central* Classification *(CC)*.
   18.2 The reasons an inmate may be identified with a Separation/Caution include:

- The inmate has testified against another inmate, and this is verified through court documentation, solicitor's office, or law enforcement.
- *Co-defendants are assessed on a case-by-case basis. Known hostility must exist or inmate must have a separation order from an appropriate law enforcement agency.*
- The victim, victim's family members, or known associates are incarcerated or employed at the inmate's assigned institution, and this is verified through court documentation, solicitor's office, law enforcement, victim/witness office, or employee.
- There are known strong hostilities between inmates, and this is verified by MINs and/or SCDC Form 19-29, "Incident Report."
- The inmate has physically assaulted and/or caused serious injuries to an SCDC employee who works at an institution, and this is verified by MINs and/or SCDC Form 19-29.
- The inmate makes written or verbal threats against an employee(s) or other inmate(s) that are found to be credible by institutional or Agency personnel.
- *Relatives* of an inmate employed at the institution or with the SCDC *will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine if potential concerns exist between the inmate and the employee.*
- *Parent, child or current spouse of the inmate. Siblings will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.*

18.3 When an employee determines that circumstances warrant the placement of a separation in an inmate's record, s/he will complete SCDC Form 19-141, "Separation/Caution Memorandum," verify the information, attach any documentation, and forward it to the Warden/Duty Warden for approval. The Warden/Duty Warden will sign the SCDC Form 19-141 and forward it to *Central Classification* if approved. Documentation of the Warden Duty Warden's disapprovals will be noted on the staff memorandum and filed in the institutional record, central record, and maintained in the Warden's office.

NOTE: For Kirkland R&E Center only: The R&E Manager can sign the 19-141 as would a Duty Warden. The R&E Manager will also determine if the 19-141 is invalid due to insufficient evidence and disapprove the Separation Request at that time instead of forwarding it to *Central* Classification. Documentation of disapproved request will be noted on the staff memorandum and filed in the institutional record, central record, and maintained at the Kirkland R&E Center.

18.4 Upon receipt of SCDC Form 19-141, "Separation/Caution Memorandum," *the Central Classification Separation Committee* will review for approval or disapproval. When a separation is approved, the information is entered into the automated system and SCDC Form 19-141 and documentation will be filed in *Central Classification automated* separation files. Temporary placement of SCDC Form 19-141 in Section 2 may be permitted only until the automated form is returned. An automated form (golden rod copy) will be printed and filed in the inmate's Central Record and Institutional Record. This copy will be placed in Section 2 of both records with nothing being filed on top of

the Caution (golden rod). When *the Central Classification Separation Committee* disapproves a Separation/Caution, a return memo will be forwarded to the institution with an explanation as to the reason for disapproval. *Classification staff will file it in Section 3 of the Inmate Record.*

18.5 All active cautions will be reviewed for accuracy and applicability once every two (2) years. The Division Director of Classification and Inmate Records will be responsible for establishing a review schedule and procedures. If modifications to the Caution are necessary, a written request must be forwarded to the Division Director.

18.6 Cautions will not be removed from any record unless the original conditions causing the placement of the Caution are no longer a factor. When it is determined that a Caution is no longer necessary, the appropriate employee will request removal of the Caution by completing SCDC Form 19-141, "Separation/Caution Memorandum," with the Warden's approval and signature. When forwarded to *CC* for removal, an explanation must accompany the request. The Division Director of Classification and Inmate Records or designee will make the final decision to approve or disapprove removal of the Caution. If approved for removal, *CC* will be responsible for dropping the Caution from the automated system and for notifying Inmate Records via CRT message to remove it from the Central Record. The appropriate staff at the institution will be notified to remove it from the Institutional Record. (Note: A hard copy will be maintained by *CC* for historical information.)

18.7 When an inmate is released or paroled from the SCDC, any Caution information will remain in his/her records and will not be purged. In the event the inmate is reincarcerated, the Classification Coordinator at the Reception and Evaluation Center will review the inmate's record for Caution information when s/he is readmitted. If the inmate has previously had a designated Caution, the Classification Coordinator will ensure that both the manual and the automated records are properly flagged. If necessary, SCDC Form 19-141 will be completed and forwarded to *CC*.

18.8 When an initial or scheduled review is conducted by the ICC, the Classification Caseworker/Community Programs Supervisor will be responsible for checking the inmate's record for Cautions to verify that the manual and automated systems coincide. If they do not match, *Central* Classification will be notified to initiate any necessary corrective actions. If it is discovered that two (2) or more inmates housed in the same institution have Cautions against each other, an immediate transfer request should be made to *Central* Classification.

18.9 It is the responsibility of the Institutional Operations Section at both the sending and receiving institutions to carefully check the inmate's Institutional Record and automated system for placement of a Separation/Caution.

18.10 If an inmate with a Caution is inadvertently transferred to an institution to which s/he should not be assigned, immediate steps must be taken to isolate

36. Please provide the number of separations during the last fiscal year and type.

Separation Stats Since January 2019		
Total Number Received	487	
Inmate from Inmate	242	
	Approved: 153	Disapproved: 89
Inmate from Employee	245	
	Approved: 85	Disapproved: 160

INCLUDES SEPARATIONS PROCESSED THROUGH NOVEMBER 25, 2019

Housing - Locations

37. Please provide an Excel chart, which lists each location at which an SCDC inmate may be housed, number of inmates at the location, primary party responsible for the location, and a brief summary of reasons why/when an inmate may be housed at the location. A sample format is below.
   - Please see attached Housing Locations by Institution Category.

Housing - HVAC Systems

38. Are any SCDC facilities without heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)? If so, which facilities?
   - All SCDC facilities have heat and ventilation. Manning CI's tunnel, the 256 bed dorms at - Lee CI, Kershaw CI, Turbeville CI, and Evans CI along with the entire Wateree CI facility (except for one dorm) do not have air-conditioning. SCDC has several buildings with issues with their HVAC systems including Supermax at Kirkland CI, the administration building at Lee CI, three Q dorms at Perry CI and the Palmer building at MacDougall that need to be addressed as funding becomes available.

39. In SCDC facilities without HVAC, if any, what does SCDC consider a reasonable temperature range and how does SCDC ensure the temperature remains within that range? Is the temperature within those facilities maintained within the same range as facilities with HVAC systems, which SCDC referenced in its August 22, 2019, letter, question number 32?
   - Please see attached ADM-13.04-Energency Consumption, and Conservation.
   - Every Dorm at SCDC has heat so the temperature range for heating is the same for every building at SCDC. For the Dorms that do not have air-conditioning, those buildings were designed without air conditioning and use large ventilation fans, high ceilings and several other design features to keep the building cooler than the outside temperature. For institutions that do not have air conditioning, there is not a range as it varies based on the outside temperature.

40. Does the Quality Improvement and Risk Management division (QIRM) review temperature readings of all SCDC facilities? If so, please provide the temperature readings for Manning Pre-Release Center for the past six months. If not, is this something QIRM could do in the future without additional resources? If additional resources would be needed, please list those resources.

- The Division of Quality and Improvement and Risk Management (QIRM) does not review temperature readings. Rather, QIRM reviews and reports whether the institutions are conducting temperature checks with the frequency required. It should be noted that temperature checks are conducted by the institutions only for Restrictive Housing Units, the Diversionary Housing Unit, Crisis Stabilization Units, and crisis cells. QIRM and Operations Headquarters Leadership receives the weekly Temperature and Sanitation Resource Information Management (RIM) Report. The RIM report includes the compliance rates for the percent of required cells checked daily, temperature readings for cells found to be out of temperature range, and actions taken to address out of range temperatures. QIRM uses the report to review compliance rates for number of temperature checks for the institutions visited by the Implementation Panel and any other institutions audited by QIRM. QIRM also assesses if actions were taken to address cells out of temperature range. QIRM's findings are included in compliance reports completed by QIRM staff.
- In order for QIRM to provide more up-to-date analysis statewide for all institutions, more staff will be needed. Please note there are currently 5 analyst positions allotted to the division. A request has been made for 5 more analysts as at least 10 analysts are needed to complete comprehensive audits and to assist in quality improvement efforts for all institutions. Operations will likely need additional staff and resources if the temperature of all dorms in each institution is required to be checked.
- QIRM conducted an analysis regarding whether Manning conducted the appropriate number of temperature checks. The results are attached. If the actual temperature readings are needed, RIM can provide that report.

41. Which non-SCDC facilities that SCDC inspects as part of its statutory responsibilities, if any, do not have HVAC systems?
   - There are no non-SCDC facilities subject to inspection which are lacking HVAC systems. As with any/all other buildings, these systems at local detention facilities do require repair and/or replacement over time.
42. Are institutional wardens and their staff required to document policy compliance in all areas, or just in Restricted Housing Units, as required in SCDC Policy OP 22.48, Section 3.2?[1] If not, why not? If so, is the information documented electronically or in hard copy forms?
   - Wardens and staff are required to ensure policy compliance in all areas. Rounds are documented on hard copy forms maintained in each living area.
   - Institutional visits are also documented in red in the dorm logbook.
43. How much will it cost to replace each of the 25 institutional HVAC units SCDC described in its August 22, 2019 letter as "in critical need of replacement"?

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[1] OP-22.48, INSTITUTIONAL WEEKLY ROUNDS, 3.2 Rounds in living areas shall include all the above, but shall also include visual inspection of cells/dorms, property levels and their relative degree of organization (i.e., clutter or the absence thereof), the availability of Request to Staff Member Form (SCDC Form 19-11), Inmate Grievance Form (SCDC Form 10-5), and Sick Call/Dental Sign-up Roster (SCDC Supply M-137). RHU rounds shall include all of the above, but also include policy compliance and documentation on SCDC Form 19-7A, "Cell Check Log." RHU rounds shall include a visual inspection of every inmate in every cell. The same standard shall apply when making rounds in Behavioral Management Units (HLBMU/LLBMU).

- Tyger River - 10 rooftop units on upper and lower yards, $210,000 each = $2.1 Million. We are in the process of changing these out now. This project was funded by FY18 carryforward monies.
- Perry – 4 rooftop units on Q dorms, $200,000 each = $800,000. In the process of changing one of these out on Q-1 now. This project was funded by FY18 carryforward monies.
- Evans – 28 rooftop units on F-Dorm rooftops, $6,000 each = $168,000.
- McCormick – 28 rooftop units on F-Dorm rooftops, $6,000 each = $168,000.
- Broad River – 28 rooftop units on F-Dorm rooftops, $6,000 each = $168,000.
- These are best practice estimates except for Tyger River one unit at Perry as they have already been through Engineering Services. We will not know total cost until A - forms are submitted and approved for engineering to move forward. Engineering will provide total cost.

Member Tours

44. Please provide information on all facilities toured by ad hoc subcommittee members during the study process and areas visited/processes seen by members during each tour.
   - Please see attached HLOC Committee Member Visits as of December 12, 2019.

Inmate Composition, Work, and Credits

45. Please provide the number of offenders who are serving less than a one-year sentence at SCDC.
   - As of December 5, 2019, SCDC has 94 offenders serving a sentence of less than 1 year and 210 offenders serving a sentence of exactly 1 year. In FY 2018, 893 offenders were admitted to SCDC with a sentence of less than 1 year and an additional 716 offenders were admitted with a sentence of exactly 1 year. In FY 2019, 730 offenders were admitted to SCDC with a sentence of less than 1 year and an additional 774 offenders were admitted with a sentence of exactly 1 year.
46. Please provide the following for each fiscal year 2015 through 2019:
   a. Sentence length distribution for all inmates as of June 30;
   - Please see attached ASOF-Sentence Length Distribution
   b. Number of inmates currently working and number of correctional officers supervising them;
   - Please see attached Inmate with Earned Work Credit Job spreadsheet.
   - SCDC requests additional time to respond to the number of correctional officers supervising the inmates as there are many different working situations and we will need to draft a document responsive to this request.
47. Please explain the maximum amount of time an inmate can reduce his/her sentence through the credits below. Please note if there are any limitations on sentence reduction (e.g., 85% time, etc.)
   a. Good conduct credit,
   b. Work credit,

    c. Education credit, and

    d. Combination of one or more the credits above.

- Please see below excerpt from SCDC Policy OP 21.09, Inmate Records Plan.

12.20 Earned Work Credits/Earned Educational Credits:

- Inmates can earn up to a maximum of 15 days credit per month and 180 days credit per year.
- Maximum EWC/EEC credit accrual of six (6) days per month for "no parole" offenses.
- Maximum yearly credit accrual of 72 days per year for "no parole" offenses. (Credits cannot apply towards the reduction of the 85% service requirement pursuant to S.C. Statute 24-13-230.)

NOTE: EWC/EEC Coefficient:

12.30.1 Amount of credit earned per day.

12.30.2 Depending on the length of time to serve until max out, the inmate's release date may or may not change if s/he is promoted to a higher EWC level. The inmate may have excess good time because s/he only needs a portion of the 20 days earned for the month but the 30 days must be served first in order to earn the 20 days good time.

LEVEL	DAYS WORKED	DAILY CREDIT	CREDIT PER MONTH		CREDIT PER YEAR	
			30 DAYS	30.42 DAYS	360 DAYS	365 DAYS
2	7	.50	15.0000	15.0000	180.0000	180.0000
2	6	.4285714	12.8571	13.037142	154.2852	156.4459
2	5	.3571482	10.7142	10.864285	128.5704	130.37142
3	7	.333	10.0000	10.14	120.0000	121.68
3	5	.2380952	7.1428	7.2428571	85.7142	86.914285
5	7	.2000	6.0000	6.084	73.0000	73.008
5	5	.1428571	4.2857	4.3457142	51.4285	52.148568
7	7	.1428571	4.2857	4.3457141	51.4285	52.148568
7	5	.102040	3.0612	3.1040815	36.7346	37.248918

NOTE: Work Credits are applicable toward the initial parole eligibility and max-out dates on straight time convictions.

12.31 Full-Time Earned Education Credits:

Level 2 = One (1) EEC for Each Two (2) Days Enrollment

Level 3 = One (1) EEC for Each Three (3) Days Enrollment

Level 5 = One (1) EEC for Each Five (5) Days Enrollment

Level 7 = One (1) EEC for Each Seven (7) Days Enrollment.

12.32 Bonus Education Credits:

TRAINING HOURS:

PER WEEK	BONUS CREDITS	PER DAY	BONUS CREDITS/MONTH		CREDITS PER YEAR	
			30 DAYS	30.42 DAYS	360 DAYS	365 DAYS
B4	4-7	.0571	1.713	1.7369	20.556	20.8428
B5	8-11	.0857	2.571	2.6069	30.852	31.2828
B6	12-14	.1142	3.426	3.4739	41.112	41.6868
B7	15+	.1428	4.284	4.343	51.408	52.116

12.33 EWC/EEC Coefficient for 85% Non-parolable Sentence:

12.33.1 For offenses committed on or after January 1, 1996, classified by the statute as non-parolable, the following earning rates are stipulated by statute to the following levels of credit to be capped at six (6) credits a month and no more than 72 credits a year.

LEVEL-	DAYS WORKED-	CREDIT PER DAY	CREDIT PER MONTH	CREDIT PER YEAR
2	7	.1972386	6.000	72.000
2	6	.1972386	6.000	72.000
2	5	.1972386	6.000	72.000
3	7	.1972386	6.000	72.000
3	5	.1972386	6.000	72.000
5	7	.1972386	6.000	72.000
5	5	.1428571	4.3457142	52.148568
7	7	.1428571	4.3457141	52.148568
7	5	.1020408	3.1040815	

48. Please provide the current SCDC correctional officer to inmate ratios for road and right of way work crews.
   - This question duplicates 46b and the response will be provided when compiled.

Please do not hesitate to contact me should you require additional information or if you have further questions. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bryan P. Stirling

Attachments

BPS/ndh

cc: The Honorable Wm. Weston J. Newton
        The Honorable Micajah P. "Micah" Caskey, IV
        The Honorable Gary E. Clary
        The Honorable Chandra E. Dillard
        The Honorable Joseph H. Jefferson, Jr.
        The Honorable Jeffrey E. "Jeff" Johnson

Tracking Inmates and Locating Staff with Active Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID): Early Lessons Learned in One U.S. Correctional Facility – U.S. Department of Justice Report

Included in the Department of Corrections' (SCDC) December 18, 2019 letter to the House Legislative Oversight Committee (LOC). This information was provided in response to the following question in LOC's December 2, 2019, letter to the Department of Corrections: "8. As a way to more easily determine and track the actions/treatment of inmates, including, but not limited to, the amount of recreation time, opportunity for showers, and individuals involved in sexual and/or other assaults, has SCDC researched utilizing global positioning system (GPS) tracking devices on each inmate which could automatically populate a database with information on the location of each inmate within the prison at all times? If not, would SCDC be willing to research options and costs related to this type of tracking?"

In addition to providing the information in this document, SCDC provided the following response:
- Yes, but GPS is not believed to be a viable option due to the construction of the institutions limiting the accuracy of the location information. A similar technology, active Radio-Frequency Identification tracking, has been deployed in some correctional facilities in the US, but it is very expensive to implement. See attached report from the U.S. Department of Justice titled "Tracking Inmates and Locating Staff with Active Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID): Early Lessons Learned in One U.S. Correctional Facility" published in June 2010. Based on this report, the cost to equip one correctional institution with this technology was $3.3 million. An active RFID product vendor (Radianse) gave a presentation to SCDC in 2015 but the cost for active RFID bracelets and the required infrastructure was still cost prohibitive. The Pennsylvania DOC recently sent a survey regarding this topic to the Correctional Leaders Association. The responses are due by December of 2019 and SCDC will provide them to the committee when available.

The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:

Document Title:	**Tracking Inmates and Locating Staff with Active Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID): Early Lessons Learned in One U.S. Correctional Facility**
Author:	**Laura J. Hickman, Lois M. Davis, Edward Wells, Mel Eisman**
Document No.:	**230781**
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R E P O R T

Tracking Inmates and Locating Staff with Active Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID)

Early Lessons Learned in One U.S. Correctional Facility

Laura J. Hickman, Lois M. Davis,
Edward Wells, Mel Eisman

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Safety and Justice

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Preface

This report represents the second and final publication supported by Award No. 2005-IJ-CX-K062, awarded by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice (the first was Hickman, Eisman, and Davis, 2008). The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in both publications upon this award are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. This award is the result of NIJ's interest in helping inform the correctional field about the potential implications of the use of active radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology in correctional facilities. NIJ selected the RAND Corporation to explore this issue. The first phase of this effort was completed in November 2008. It involved the development of a feasible research design to assess the implementation and impacts of RFID use within a large, urban jail setting. This research design was presented in a report titled *Evaluation Design for the District of Columbia Department of Corrections' Use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology with Jail Inmates* (Hickman, Eisman, and Davis, 2008).

The present report represents the culmination of the second phase of this award. Its goals are twofold. The first is to identify and describe the universe of all correctional institutions in the United States that had already purchased or installed active RFID systems. The second goal is to provide an objective source of information about the advantages and the challenges of using RFID in correctional settings, drawn from the experiences of those institutions that have already obtained or implemented the technology. To date, most information about how well RFID technology works and its cost-effectiveness has been produced by the product vendors— a source with a vested interest in promoting the adoption of RFID. Given the significant expense of purchasing and the cost of operating the technology, the findings of the present report are expected to benefit state and local jurisdictions in that it presents some the early lessons learned from jurisdictions already using RFID.

This research was conducted under the auspices of the Safety and Justice Program within RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment (ISE). The mission of RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment is to improve the development, operation, use, and protection of society's essential physical assets and natural resources and to enhance the related social assets of safety and security of individuals in transit and in their workplaces and communities. Safety and Justice Program research addresses occupational safety, transportation safety, food safety, and public safety—including violence, policing, corrections, substance abuse, and public integrity.

Questions or comments about this report should be sent to the project leader, Laura Hickman (Laura_Hickman@rand.org). Information about the Safety and Justice Program is

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available online (http://www.rand.org/ise/safety). Inquiries about research projects should be sent to the following address:

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Introduction

Managing correctional populations is a challenging and expensive task for state and local jurisdictions. In recent years, a new technological tool has been offered to jurisdictions as a method of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of correctional management. This technology, active radio-frequency identification (RFID), consists of a device (or "tag") fitted with a programmable chip. This chip continually emits a signal to communicate, in near-real time (i.e., with a one- or two-second delay), radio waves within a network of RFID sensors, receivers, and monitors. The sensors' monitors record and display the tag's unique identity and location. This location information can then be displayed on computer monitors and can trigger near-real-time alerts if one of any number of preprogrammed conditions is triggered. The location information is also archived so it can be played back later for use in postincident investigations.

Active RFID technology has been marketed in the United States to correctional institutions to date primarily by two companies: TSI PRISM and Elmo-Tech. It has been offered as a tool to track the precise location of inmates and pinpoint staff location in duress situations, rather than just inventory. When fitting inmates with active RFID-tagged wristbands or ankle bracelets, RFID technology promises to provide near-real-time, centralized monitoring of inmate locations and movements throughout correctional institutions. Parameters for individual inmates can be set via programming for each wristband or ankle bracelet to generate an alert when its wearer moves into an unauthorized area or comes near inmates wearing specifically designated wrist or ankle bands. The latter function is offered as a way to help keep specific inmates or groups of inmates separate from each other within the institution. The real-time feature of the active RFID technology also promises to automate the time-intensive process of inmate head counts, which otherwise involve correctional officers visually confirming the presence and location of all inmates at regular intervals. The RFID bands are constructed with antitamper technology, which is designed to generate alerts if they are cut or if they lose contact with the skin.

Active RFID-tagged devices may also be worn on a belt by correctional officers and staff within the correctional institution. These devices allow near-real-time monitoring of staff location, and some contain an officer-down feature that will generate an alert if a staff member falls to a horizontal position during monitoring. These units also come enabled with a manual alarm function that staff can use to alert a central monitoring station of an immediate need for assistance. In addition to their use for increasing staff safety, tracking of real-time alerts may offer the possibility of more rapid deployment of staff to developing incidents within the facility or otherwise improve the efficiency of population management. Active RFID systems

also store inmate and staff location information over time for later playback. This function was designed primarily for use in investigation of incidents that may occur within the institution.

While active RFID technology has been offered as a correctional facility management tool, most of the accessible information about how well it works and its cost-effectiveness has been produced by the vendors, a source with a vested interest in promoting the adoption of their RFID products. Given the significant expense of purchasing and operating the technology, state and local jurisdictions could greatly benefit from an objective assessment of the early lessons learned in a jurisdiction already using RFID technology. The goal of the present report was to collect some of these early lessons learned to inform the corrections field.

Expectations for the Use of Active Radio-Frequency Identification Systems

Vendors of active RFID systems assert that adoption of the technology will produce a number of benefits within correctional environments when used for monitoring inmate and staff locations. Since there have been no independent evaluations of the outcomes of active RFID systems in correctional environments, there is no empirical foundation on which to make statements about the technology in practice.[1] Nonetheless, RFID vendors assert that the technology will increase the efficiency of managing inmate populations, thus saving staff time and increasing safety for both inmates and staff. By accomplishing these goals, active RFID systems are also purported to produce cost savings over the long term. Specifically, the vendors described benefits of active RFID systems that can be divided up into the following categories:

- improve monitoring and control of inmates and reduce staff time
- reduce violence and injuries
- reduce actual and attempted escapes
- reduce the number of investigations and improve investigative capabilities
- reduce inmate grievances, disciplinary actions, and lawsuits.

Correctional Facilities Currently Adopting or Using Active Radio-Frequency Identification

The extent to which U.S. correctional facilities have acquired active RFID technology is not readily accessible information. As part of the present study, we set out to document the current use of active RFID in U.S. correctional facilities. In this effort, we conducted an extensive Internet search seeking references to (1) prisons or jails that had acquired or were in the process of acquiring active RFID systems and (2) specific vendors selling active RFID systems within the United States. We contacted the two identified vendors of active RFID technology, TSI PRISM and Elmo-Tech, to obtain a list of U.S. prison or jail facilities to which they had sold active RFID systems. In this process, we also sought to verify and update a list of RFID facilities provided in an appendix of the 2007 NIJ Criminal Justice Technology Evaluation solicitation for proposals (NIJ, 2007). We identified 14 U.S. correctional facilities, with five systems used for tracking inmates, three systems used for locating staff, and six systems used

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[1]   One exception is the Urban Institute's recent evaluation of the implementation of RFID in a women's prison (the Northeast Pre-Release Center, or NEPRC, in Cleveland, Ohio). Although the technology was not fully implemented at the NEPRC, later in this report, we comment on some worthwhile lessons learned about the implementation process.

for monitoring the locations of both inmates and staff. The first installation took place in 1997. This was one of only four systems installed prior to 2004. Of the 14 total facilities identified, at the time of this writing, the three adopting the technology in 2008 and 2009 were in the process of installing or testing the systems prior to full operation.

Case Study of the Early Implementation of Active Radio-Frequency Identification in One Facility

We conducted a case study of one large jail facility in the process of installing an active RFID system to manage its inmate population. This case study capitalized on an opportunity to gather contemporaneous information about the issues and lessons learned of a facility in the process of designing, installing, and preparing the system for operation. At this facility, we conducted a site visit to observe the retrofitting of the existing facility to accommodate the installation of the RFID equipment, as well as semistructured interviews with key staff involved in all phases of the acquisition, installation, training, and other activities in preparation for system's operations.

Specifically, the case study site was the Central Detention Facility (CDF) operated by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DC DOC). The CDF has a full-time correctional staff of nearly 700 officers and a male-only population that averages 1,900 inmates per day. We first conducted initial semistructured telephone interviews with senior leadership and project managers to collect some general information about the overall effort. For example, we asked about the overall goals and expected benefits of implementing an active RFID system in the facility, overall strategy and timelines for implementation of the technology, and how the technology fits into the facility's existing and planned safety and security strategies. We conducted these initial interviews after the department had decided to adopt an active system but before it had moved forward to select an RFID vendor and issue a contract to purchase the system. Approximately 12 months after the department had issued a contract, we then conducted a two-day site visit to the CDF. At the time of the site visit, the "design" phase, involving the detailed development of the facility installation plan, was complete, and actual installation of software and equipment was substantially under way.

DC DOC intends to use the RFID system as an inmate management tool and as a tool for enhancing the security of correctional officers and other staff in the jail. When the RFID system is ready for launch, DC DOC intends to fit each inmate with a tamper-resistant wristband containing an RFID transmitting device during the jail booking process. Communication between the jail's information management system and the RFID system software allows the signals from a specific bracelet to be linked to a specific inmate. The bracelet is removed from each inmate at the time of facility discharge. Each correctional officer is also required to wear, on his or her belt, an RFID device during his or her shift that will help in identifying his or her location and generate safety-related alerts. The RFID monitoring function will be integrated into a correctional surveillance center, or CSC, which is being established in the facility. The sole function of the CSC personnel will be to monitor the RFID signals and alerts, as well as other surveillance technology, such as the closed-circuit television (CCTV) system and a telephone monitoring system.

Overall Findings

Implementation Timeline. At the time of our data-collection window (June 2009 site visit), the department was in the network installation process. At that time, the following were the key milestones for the system:

- June 2008: The contract was awarded to TSI PRISM (completed).
- June 2008–November 2008: Design phase (completed)
- August 25, 2008–May 1, 2009: Construction phase (completed)
- June 2009: Network installation phase (under way at the time of the site visit)
- Future plans
  - Late summer 2009: Integration, calibration, and testing of system
  - Late 2009/early 2010: Full system operation.

The original plan called for the design phase to last several months, with construction beginning in August 2008. However, for several reasons, the design phase took substantially longer than was originally anticipated, lasting until November 2008. For example, the inmate housing component ended up taking the longest to design and configure. A key reason was that the vendor's initial time estimate did not account for the unique architecture of the facility's 18 individual housing units. The patchwork nature of the facility's construction meant that the installation of the RFID equipment needed to be tailored to each of the 18 housing units' unique construction materials and floor space layouts. The department also desired a relatively high level of accuracy, with the ability to identify, in real time and in a multistory facility with two-tiered housing units, the location of an inmate within 2 to 5 feet indoors (and within 10 to 15 feet outdoors). The initial design produced an unacceptable level of accuracy, leading to the need to conduct a series of tests of modifications until the desired level of accuracy could be achieved.

Anticipated Staffing Needs. The planned use of the RFID system by DC DOC involves a number of administrative activities, including analysis of data and report generation, analysis of incident patterns to inform management decisions, analysis to inform investigations, and real-time tracking of inmate location. These activities will be largely conducted within a newly established CSC. Once the RFID is fully operational, the CSC will monitor and integrate this source of data into the range of other surveillance tools it has to monitor inmates' activities. Archived RFID records may also be subpoenaed for use in investigations. Some interviewees postulated that the new technology might result in "fishing expeditions" by prosecutors or defense attorneys. Most of the CCTV footage requests to date were based on active criminal cases. Aside from performing the monitoring and analysis tasks, the department also anticipates needing full-time staff for the work associated with maintaining the inmate- and officer-worn RFID devices. This is expected to be an ongoing and busy process, given the continual turnover of the jail inmate population and the large number of officers going through shift changes.

Anticipated Need to Develop RFID-Related Policies and Operating Procedures. The facility anticipated a need to develop written RFID policies and operating procedures, addressing such topics as when personnel are required to wear an RFID unit, procedures for using RFID to control access privileges to specific areas throughout the facility, directions for inmates wearing RFID devices, and how to report problems with the RFID units. Facility-specific response protocols will also need to be developed to provide decision rules as to whether, and what type

of, action should be taken when an RFID-generated alert is received. The written policies and procedures will represent the CDF's rules governing response decisions. Our interviewees reported that the vendor played an important role in offering some initial guidance on developing these written policies and operating procedures, drawing on its previous experience. The response protocols will need to be further developed and tailored by departmental staff for the CDF, particularly those involved in the operation of the RFID system and the technical staff providing analytic support in analyzing the volume of data generated by the system. The interviewees reported that, when the system was close to implementation, they would move forward in developing its initial set of protocols and refine them, with experience using the system.

Expected Staff Responses to the RFID System. DC DOC intends to use the RFID system as an inmate management tool and as a tool to enhance the security of correctional officers and other staff in the jail. A number of interviewees commented that some officers and union representatives were concerned that the RFID system would lead to excessive surveillance of officers in the performance of their duties. Thus, officers may resent the use of the system, resist compliance with RFID-related procedures, and even try to circumvent the system. On the other hand, some interviewees expected the RFID experience to be comparable to the staff acceptance of other technology upgrades. There was initial resistance to previous upgrades, but these additions came to be seen as positive, as they actually proved to be useful in identifying inmate and officer misconduct and in investigations. Our interviewees also anticipated that the reliability of the system after implementation will be critical to staff acceptance. If the system has a number of false alerts or stops functioning, it could undermine the staff's confidence in the system and affect their willingness to rely on it. In order to help promote staff acceptance of the RFID system, several interviewees underscored the importance of education and training, as well as gaining the support of key staff members within the department to champion the technology and its benefits.

Expected Response of Inmates to RFID. When the RFID system is fully installed and wristband devices are fitted to inmates, our interviewees expect inmates to initially "test" the system, including attempts to remove or destroy the RFID wristbands and the antennae and to try to identify "dead zones" where the RFID signals may not be transmitted. This inmate testing activity is expected to produce a large number of alerts initially, but the interviewees expect that these alerts will diminish over time. From management's perspective, the initial rollout phase will be important for training staff and monitoring of inmate movements and for gaining insights on what attempts inmates may make to circumvent the system. This initial period was seen as critical in order to establish the system's credibility to both staff and inmates. Following the initial "testing" period, interviewees hoped that inmates would soon begin to see the RFID system as adding a layer of protection for them, especially for those individuals who feel particularly at risk for violence from other inmates.

Costs of Implementing and Operating the RFID System. The RFID system was purchased on a fixed-priced contract.[2] We were unable to quantify the potential costs of operating the system because the RFID system was still in the implementation phase. Interviewees did discuss the issue of costs based on their experience to date and offered advice for other jurisdictions to consider if they are deciding whether to acquire an active RFID system. For example, a department may need to take into account the possibility of an extended design phase in

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[2]   The initial estimate for the RFID fixed-price contract was $2.3 million, which DC DOC requested through the budget process. The department also received a $440,000 grant from the U.S. Department of Justice.

order to tailor the RFID system to the unique architecture of the correctional institution or the amount of system testing needed to ensure the level of accuracy desired. For the case study of the department, adjustments were needed to the initial design to take into account differences in the materials of the various housing units versus the vendor's initial assumption of uniform construction throughout the facility. Upon full implementation, one senior interviewee advised that it would also be easy for other jurisdictions to underestimate the resources and staff needed to actually operate the system, particularly in a high-turnover jail environment. Another potential cost concern is a facility's computerized inmate data management system and the ability to merge the RFID data with that system. This potentially can be a costly prospect if the institution does not have the resources needed to implement such a data merger or software that is compatible. Among the potential costs that our interviewees pointed out that other facilities should consider are the long-term maintenance and upgrade costs for hardware and software, costs for maintaining an adequate staff to monitor and analyze RFID data, and resolving software compatibility issues that may arise with upgrades to other surveillance and information systems in use.

Summary and Conclusions

The recent experiences described in this report highlight some key lessons that may be of interest to other jurisdictions considering the use of active RFID systems in a correctional institution. Among these observations are that it is important for correctional administrators to clearly identify their objectives and the type of system that will best meet these objectives. Moreover, it seems most beneficial for a correctional facility to consider having its own in-house expertise or contracting with outside expertise (preferably with corrections experience) to give the facility the guidance (independent of the vendor) it will need to specify the requirements and details of its intended use of the technology, oversee the design process, and facilitate the implementation of the technology. This may be an area in which the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center can play a role in providing guidance and expertise that correctional facilities can tap into as part of the design and implementation process. In the installation process, RFID contractors and subcontractors need to have a good understanding of the environment of the correctional facility and know what is appropriate in it, especially when considering the materials and techniques for installation of an RFID system.

Training and education of staff will be critical to the successful implementation of the RFID system. Staff will require training on what to expect, on the actual implementation of the technology, on how to use the system, and on how to fine-tune alert response protocols and whether and how to analyze the data to inform management decisions. There is also a clear need to ensure successful integration of an active RFID system with the inmate management and other information technology systems (both software and hardware infrastructure) that a department currently uses or anticipated upgrades. Incompatibility can significantly increase the cost of the RFID project or limit its utility. Getting the buy-in of departmental leadership and of high-level government officials is crucial to getting the project funded initially and fully implemented as intended.

Lastly, and if at all possible, a pilot study in one area of a facility is important to undertake in order to understand how the RFID system can be effectively utilized and how to fine-tune the system and response protocols, train staff on monitoring RFID signals, understand

inmates' reaction to RFID wristbands, and determine what outcome measures will be valuable to track over time. Implementation of RFID systems is expensive, so a pilot-test will allow a facility to understand how RFID technology can meet their overall goals and gather the information and data necessary to inform decisions regarding full implementation within the facility.

An active RFID system appears to hold promise as a valuable correctional tool in ensuring that a prison or jail population is both safely and appropriately managed and in contributing to the improved safety of the correctional staff and inmates. The lessons identified in this report are informative as to the types of issues that a correctional facility may want to take into account when considering whether to deploy an active RFID system within the institution. Because the experience of correctional institutions with RFID is still fairly limited, this report represents an early look at the experiences of one of the few facilities that have invested in active RFID. It provides important information and insights on issues to consider in the conceptualization, design, and implementation of an RFID system in a correctional setting. Yet, more independent assessments of RFID systems' impacts are needed to fully assess the promise and limitations of this technology and to understand how it can be most cost-effectively utilized in correctional facilities.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the National Institute of Justice for its support of this research project, particularly our project officer, Jack Harne, for his assistance with our work. We would also like to thank representatives of both TSI PRISM and Elmo-Tech for helping us identify correctional facilities using or currently acquiring active RFID. We also thank the staff and leadership of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections for their generosity in sharing their time and their invaluable cooperation with our work. Their willingness to actively participate made this study possible. Lastly, we wish to thank the peer reviewers both of the RAND Corporation and NIJ for their contributions to overall quality of this report.

Abbreviations

CCTV	closed-circuit television
CDF	Central Detention Facility
CSC	correctional surveillance center
DC DOC	District of Columbia Department of Corrections
DEU	data extension unit
EMT	electrical metallic tubing
FTE	full-time equivalent
GPS	Global Positioning System
IT	information technology
NEPRC	Northeast Pre-Release Center
NIJ	National Institute of Justice
NLECTC	National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center
PASS	personal activated security sensor
PREA	Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003
PSD	personal safety device
RFID	radio-frequency identification

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Managing correctional populations is a challenging and expensive task for state and local jurisdictions. In recent years, a new technological tool has been offered to jurisdictions as a method of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of correctional management. This technology, active radio-frequency identification (RFID), consists of a device (or "tag") fitted with a programmable chip. This chip continually emits a signal to communicate, in near-real time (i.e., with a one- or two-second delay), radio waves within a network of RFID sensors, receivers, and monitors. The monitors record and display the tag's unique identity and location. This real-time location information can then be displayed on computer monitors and can trigger near-real-time alerts if one of any number of preprogrammed conditions is triggered. The location information is also archived so it can be played back later for use in postincident investigations. While active RFID technology has been offered as a correctional facility management tool, most of the accessible information about how well it works and its cost-effectiveness has been produced by the vendors, a source with a vested interest in promoting the adoption of their RFID products.

Given the significant expense of purchasing and operating the technology, state and local jurisdictions could greatly benefit from an objective assessment of the early lessons learned in a jurisdiction already using RFID technology. The goal of the present report was to collect some of these early lessons learned to inform the corrections field.

In the remainder of this chapter, we present a brief orientation to the two primary forms of RFID technology (passive and active RFID) used for tracking objects and people and contrast active RFID technology in correctional institutions with technologies used to track inmates in other settings.

Passive Versus Active Radio-Frequency Identification

The use of radio frequency for tracking originated with so-called passive RFID. Passive RFID technology involves the use a reader or antenna that generates radio waves. A tag is attached to the object to be tracked. This tag is passive in the sense that it merely reflects radio-wave signals back to a reader or antenna rather than generating signals itself. The reflected radio waves contain information encoded in the passive tag, which is received and recorded by the RFID reader. Passive tags do not contain a battery, as the power source is generated by the reader. Thus, passive tags can be very small (e.g., about the size of a grain of rice) for unobtrusive insertion into objects and devices, are relatively inexpensive to manufacture, and can operate for up to several decades.

The communication between tag and reader, however, occurs only when the passive tag is in relatively close range to the RFID reader (from one to several feet). Thus, passive RFID technology is often most useful for such applications as monitoring the movement of objects (including those worn by people) moving past or through a specific location.

Passive RFID technology has been in use for more than three decades, mostly in the context of inventory tracking. Over the past decade, its use has grown exponentially with both commercial customers—Walmart requires its top suppliers to place passive RFID tags on all pallets and cases being shipped to its warehouses—and by the Department of Defense. The latter requires containers shipped outside the United States to have RFID tags identifying content and point-of-origin information. The use of RFID technology in supply chains is generally intended to improve the visibility of the movement of inventory; increase the efficiency of shipping, receiving, and stocking; and reduce costs for labor, storage, and inventory losses. While there have been numerous law-enforcement uses proposed, such as controlling property (firearms, laptop computers, and vehicles) and documenting evidence chain of custody, the passive RFID technology does not yet appear to have been adopted by U.S. law-enforcement agencies ("Technology Primer," 2005).

In contrast to passive RFID, active RFID technology involves the use of battery-operated tracking devices that both receive signals and actively transmit information back to a reader or antenna. Compared with passive RFID tags, active RFID tags are necessarily larger (to house the battery), can transmit signals over a much greater distance (in excess of 300 feet), and can initiate signals to the reader/antenna, rather than only receive them. Active RFID systems can be used to monitor the near-real-time movements (i.e., with a one- or two-second delay) of objects or people within any space where radio waves can be sent and received without significant interruption or interference. This typically involves the installation of a network of readers/antennas throughout the space to be monitored. The movements of objects or people with the active RFID devices can be actively monitored from a central location, as well as recorded for historical playback of date, time, and location.

Correctional Institution Applications of Radio-Frequency Identification

Chapter Two provides a more in-depth discussion of the capability and expected function of active RFID in correctional institutions. Here, we present a brief overview. Active RFID technology has been marketed in the United States to correctional institutions to date primarily by two companies: TSI PRISM and Elmo-Tech. It has been offered as a tool to identify the precise location of inmates and staff, rather than just inventory. When fitting inmates with active RFID-tagged wristbands or ankle bracelets, RFID technology promises to provide near-real-time, centralized monitoring of inmate locations and movements throughout correctional institutions. Parameters for individual inmates can be set via programming for each wristband or ankle bracelet to generate an alert when its wearer moves into an unauthorized area or comes near inmates wearing specifically designated wrist or ankle bands. The latter function is offered as a way to help keep specific inmates or groups of inmates separate from each other within the institution. The real-time feature of the active RFID technology also promises to automate the time-intensive process of inmate head counts, which otherwise involve correctional officers visually confirming the presence and location of all inmates at regular intervals. The RFID

bands are constructed with antitamper, technology, which is designed to generate alerts if they are cut or if they lose contact with the skin.

Active RFID-tagged devices may also be worn on a belt by correctional officers and staff within the institution. These devices allow monitoring staff to identify the exact location of an officer, and some contain an officer-down feature that will generate an alert if a staff member falls to a horizontal position during monitoring. These units also come enabled with a manual alarm function that staff can use to alert a central monitoring station of an immediate need for assistance (Reza, 2004). In addition to its use for increasing staff safety, real-time monitoring of staff locations may offer the possibility of more rapid deployment of staff to developing incidents within the facility or otherwise improve the efficiency of population management. Active RFID systems also store inmate and staff location information over time for later playback. This function was designed primarily for use in investigation of incidents that may occur within the institution. Chapter Two provides a more detailed discussion of these issues.

Passive RFID systems may also be used within correctional facilities to manage and record the location of inmates in a more general way than active RFID systems. For example, some passive RFID systems fit inmates with a wristband that must be presented to a wall-mounted reader. These readers can be used to control the entry and exit of individual inmates through doors in specific areas of a facility (such as the dining hall or in specific restricted areas). Staff may also wear passive RFID devices to facilitate their access to designated areas within a facility.

Offender-Tracking Technologies in Other Settings

Active RFID systems within correctional facilities differ from technologies used to track offenders in other settings. For example, so-called electronic monitoring may be used with offenders who are under supervised release within a community. This typically involves the attachment of tamper-detecting device to an offender's ankle or wrist. This device communicates with a reader/receiver in a specific location, such as within the offender's home. The receiver records when an offender wearing the device is present at or absent from that location. The receiver may also contain a feature that generates alerts to a monitoring agency if the device has been tampered with or if the offender is not within receiving range during specific curfew hours. The specific technology used in these devices may include passive RFID systems.

Recent developments have also incorporated Global Positioning System (GPS) technology into monitoring community-supervised offenders once they leave home (or other location) and move throughout the community. Different forms of the GPS-enabled equipment are available. This includes technology that simply records movements for later download and review by supervising agencies, as well as a more active version that regularly relays, in near-real time, offender movements throughout the community (Hyde and DeJarnatt, 2005). While this form of tracking shares some similarities with the function of active RFID within correctional facilities, GPS tracking is not possible inside correctional facilities because the fortified nature of their construction prevents uninterrupted continuous transmission of satellite-to-ground communication of navigation and position-location signals to GPS receivers within the facilities (Brown, McCabe, and Wellford, 2007).

Organization of This Report

The remaining material presented in this report is organized into four chapters. Chapter Two presents background information about RFID and expectations for its deployment within correctional facilities and presents the results of our search for U.S. correctional institutions utilizing active RFID systems. We also summarize the lessons learned from a women's prison that recently acquired RFID systems. Chapter Three presents the results of an in-depth site visit with a correctional institution that is in the process of implementing RFID systems as part of a range of surveillance options within a large jail system. Chapter Four presents our overall summary and conclusions, including a discussion of the key observations and recommendations for consideration by other jurisdictions weighing their options for deploying this technology.

CHAPTER TWO

Expectations for the Use of Active Radio-Frequency Identification Systems

For some time, private companies have been marketing active RFID systems for correctional applications, asserting that the many potential benefits will offset the costs of acquiring, installing, maintaining, and operating the technology. In this chapter, we begin with a description of the expected function and benefits of the active RFID systems in correctional environments, as marketed to jurisdictions by the technology vendors.[1] We then present the results of our search to identify correctional facilities in the United States that have acquired active RFID systems. We also discuss preliminary information on the experience of three correctional facilities using RFID and the key lessons learned from an evaluation of the implementation of RFID in a women's prison.

Vendor-Described Operation of Active Radio-Frequency Identification Systems

While the capability of active RFID technology continues to develop, at present, there are several key features of the technology that are marketed to correctional facilities.[2] Active RFID systems offer a wrist- or ankle-worn device for inmates and a belt-worn device for staff. Facilities can elect to purchase systems for monitoring just inmates, just staff, or both groups. The systems allow for central monitoring of inmate and staff locations, which can be configured to display on screens at multiple workstations. The location information is displayed in near-real time, defined as an expected delay of up to two seconds. This display can take the form of a virtual map of the facility, showing the precise X-Y-Z coordinate positions of each tracked individual (where Z indicates a vertical floor location in a multifloor facility).

Inmate-worn devices are designed to be very durable and to contain tamper-detecting technology to prevent intentional and unintentional damage to the monitoring function. If tampering or damage does occur, an alert is relayed to the central monitoring station providing the identity and location of the inmate involved. The system promises not only to monitor movements but also to identify in near-real time whether inmate movements are authorized. For example, location signals from individual inmate-worn RFID devices would be automati-

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[1] This report is not intended to represent a buying guide that contrasts and compares the specific systems offered to correctional facilities by the two established U.S. RFID vendors. Instead, it discusses the general capabilities of the available active RFID systems overall but not vendor-specific details about their respective systems' operation, features, and capability.

[2] Depending on the specific RFID vendor and the contract negotiated between the vendor and buyer, some features may come as standard equipment of the system (such as centralized monitoring capability), and some features require additional purchases, such as the officer-down function available for staff monitoring devices.

cally and continually matched against the preprogrammed authorized locations for that particular inmate. If an inmate moves into an unauthorized housing area or other location, an alert would occur at the central monitoring station, providing the identity of the out-of-place inmate and his or her precise location. Active RFID systems are also designed to allow perpetual head counts of all inmates. The system would issue an alert if the number of inmates within the facility did not match an expected number of inmates (taking into account authorized entrances and exits).

Staff-worn devices may also be equipped with a feature that detects and alerts the central monitoring station if the wearer falls into a horizontal or near-horizontal position for more than a few moments. The device can also send out an automatic alert if no movement is detected within 15 minutes. These safety features were designed to automatically detect that a staff member is in need of assistance, perhaps as the result of an assault. Staff devices may also be equipped with a duress button, allowing an officer to manually generate an alert to the central monitoring station. This call-for-assistance alert signal displays the precise location of the staff member involved.

The near-real-time monitoring function of active RFID systems is supplemented with an archive function. This allows for date- and time-stamped playback of the events that happened over a specified period of time. This playback can be for the purpose of identifying the individual inmates or staff who were in or near a specific location at the time of a known incident (such as a disturbance, theft, or assault). It may also be used for determining where specific individuals were in the facility at any given time.

Vendor Expectations of the Benefits of Active Radio-Frequency Identification Systems in Correctional Environments

Vendors of active RFID systems assert that adoption of the technology will produce a number of benefits within correctional environments when used for monitoring inmate and staff locations.[3] Since there have been no independent evaluations of the outcomes of active RFID systems in correctional environments, there is no empirical foundation upon which to make statements about the technology in practice.[4] Nonetheless, RFID vendors assert that the technology will increase the efficiency of managing inmate populations, thus saving staff time and increasing safety for both inmates and staff. By accomplishing these goals, active RFID systems are also purported to produce cost savings over the long term. Specifically, the vendor described benefits of active RFID systems that can be divided up into the following categories (Hickman, Eisman, and Davis, 2008).

Improve Monitoring and Control of Inmates and Reduce Staff Time. The vendors expect RFID technology to reduce staff time spent manually counting and controlling inmates, maintaining separation among them, and monitoring their movements, requiring fewer staff members to achieve the same (or higher) level of inmate surveillance. Moreover, it is expected to improve the egress and ingress control and tracking of inmates leaving the facility. This is expected because RFID systems can provide automated, real-time inmate head counts, identi-

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[3]   This report focuses on the use of active RFID for tracking inmates and monitoring staff locations, though these systems can be expanded to also track inventory and supplies. The purported benefits of the latter are not discussed here.

[4]   One exception is the Urban Institute's recent evaluation of the implementation of RFID in a women's prison (the Northeast Pre-Release Center, or NEPRC, in Cleveland, Ohio). Although the technology was not fully implemented at the NEPRC, later in this report, we comment on some worthwhile lessons learned about the implementation process.

fication and location information, and alarms alerting staff to developing problems. Also, since RFID systems are expected to reduce the level of violence, they would thereby reduce staff time in physically monitoring activities and establishing order and in investigating and responding to acts of violence. Another major source of reduced staff time would be the increased efficiency and effectiveness of investigations. For example, in the cases of violence or property theft in the institution, investigators could use archived monitoring data to identify all individuals near the incident's location during the window of time in which it occurred. This is expected to substantially shorten the time and improve the quality of investigations.

Reduce Violence and Injuries. The vendors expect active monitoring of inmates using RFID tags to reduce inmate-on-inmate and inmate-on-staff assaults. First, it is expected to reduce violence by deterring this behavior because inmates would be aware that their exact locations are constantly being monitored. Second, violence may be reduced by greater officer awareness of (and thus more rapid response time to) developing incidents, such as when inmates congregate or certain inmates move into restricted zones. This, in turn, is expected to result in fewer and less serious inmate injuries from assaults. The technology could be expected to also increase safety by providing a way to identify violent inmates without relying on reports from victimized inmates or inmate witnesses, who may be at risk of retaliation for identifying assailants. Finally, RFID systems are expected to reduce violence by helping to ensure that certain individual inmates or groups (e.g., rival gang members, individuals [witnesses and perpetrators] involved in the same court case) do not come in contact with each other.

Reduce Actual and Attempted Escapes. RFID vendors assert that attempted escapes will be reduced through deterrence and through alarms indicating the identity and location of an inmate tampering with his or her RFID device. Also, alarms indicating that an inmate has moved into an unauthorized area would allow for quicker detection and more rapid response to the precise location of the attempted or actual escape.

Reduce the Number of Investigations and Improve Investigative Capabilities. Vendors expect RFID use to deter rule and law violations, thus yielding fewer incidents in need of investigation. Investigations could also be more efficient, requiring far less time to identify (or rule out) involved individuals and document the evidence supporting (or refuting) allegations of inmate or staff misconduct.

Reduce Inmate Grievances, Disciplinary Actions, and Lawsuits. Vendors of RFID systems also assert that the systems can reduce inmate lawsuits by preventing incidents that may give rise to grievances and legal action, such as inmate-on-inmate assaults. Moreover, disciplinary actions could decline through a reduction of incidents that lead to disciplinary actions.

Table 2.1 summarizes these vendor claims about the potential benefits of RFID systems and how effective these systems are at realizing these benefits and expected cost savings. The latter savings would be realized primarily through reduced requirements for, and more efficient use of, staff time; reduction in need for staff and inmate medical treatment; and fewer expenses related to inmate lawsuits.

Correctional Facilities Currently Adopting or Using Active Radio-Frequency Identification

The extent to which U.S. correctional facilities have acquired active RFID technology is not readily accessible information. As part of this study, we set out to document the present use of

Table 2.1
Vendor-Expected Long-Term Active Radio-Frequency Identification Outcomes, Mechanisms of Impact, and Categories of Cost Savings

Vendor-Expected Outcome	Vendor-Expected Mechanism of Impact	Vendor-Expected Category of Cost Savings
Improve inmate monitoring/control; reduce staff time	Surveillance and control of inmate movements from centralized location; reduction of need for in-person head counts, lockdowns, and escort	Reduced staff time
Reduce violence; improve safety	Deterrence; reduction/early warning of high-risk inmates congregating or inmates entering restricted areas; quicker staff response time; reduce escalation of inmate property disputes; reduction in need for inmate victims/witness to identify assailants (thereby reducing threat of retaliatory violence)	Inmate-on-inmate: fewer and less serious injuries requiring medical treatment; fewer investigations; less staff time recordkeeping and administering disciplinary sanctions; fewer inmate lawsuits Inmate-on-staff: fewer and less serious injuries requiring medical treatment; less time in recordkeeping; less time in investigation and administering disciplinary sanctions; fewer workers' compensation claims; less overtime to replace injured staff; less staff turnover from safety concerns
Reduce actual and attempted escapes	Deterrence; early warning of inmates entering restricted zones	Reduced staff time in search, investigation, and prosecution
Reduce number of investigations; improve investigative capabilities	Deterrence of rule/law violations; early warning of and increased response time to certain types of rule/law violations; time-coded electronic record of inmate and staff movements to identify suspects/witnesses and to support or refute accusations	Fewer rule/law violations requiring investigation; reduced time in conducting investigations; reduced time in recordkeeping
Reduce grievances, lawsuits, and disciplinary actions	Reduction in the incidents that lead to grievances, lawsuits, and disciplinary actions	Reduced staff time in investigation and response, recordkeeping, and court appearance; reduced attorney time; fewer settlements; fewer awards

active RFID in U.S. correctional facilities. In this effort, we conducted an extensive Internet search for references to (1) prisons or jails that had acquired or were in the process of acquiring active RFID systems and (2) specific vendors selling active RFID systems within the United States. We contacted the two identified vendors of active RFID technology, TSI PRISM and Elmo-Tech, to obtain a list of U.S. prison or jail facilities to which they had sold active RFID systems. In this process, we also sought to verify and update a list of RFID facilities provided in an appendix of the 2007 NIJ Criminal Justice Technology Evaluation solicitation for proposals (NIJ, 2007).

Table 2.2 represents the results of our search for active RFID correctional facilities. We identified 14 U.S. correctional facilities, with five systems used for tracking inmates, three systems used for locating staff, and six systems used for locating both inmates and staff.[5] The first installation took place in 1997. This was one of only four systems installed prior to 2004. Of the 14 total facilities shown in Table 2.2, at the time of this writing, the three adopting the

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[5]   Table 2.2 does not include one installation prior to 2004 because it was a beta-test by TSI PRISM of its active RFID system. This system, in California's Calipatria State Prison, was decommissioned after the beta-test was completed.

Table 2.2
U.S. Correctional Facilities That Have Acquired Active Radio-Frequency Identification Systems

Facility Name	Location	Vendor	Installation Began	Specific Use
Riverside Regional Jail	Hopewell, Va.	Elmo-Tech	2009[a]	500 staff
Sacramento County Probation and Parole Services, Youth Detention Center	Sacramento, Calif.	TSI PRISM	2009[a]	450 staff
DC DOC CDF	Washington, D.C.	TSI PRISM	2008	2,000 inmates and 700+ staff
Minnesota Department of Corrections, Minnesota Correctional Facility, Lino Lakes	Lino Lakes, Minn.	TSI PRISM	2007	1,300 inmates
Marion County Superior Court Juvenile Division, Marion County Juvenile Detention Center	Indianapolis, Ind.	TSI PRISM	2007	150 inmates and 200 staff
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, NEPRC	Cleveland, Ohio	Elmo-Tech	2006	580 inmates
Southern Nevada Correctional Center	Jean, Nev.	Elmo-Tech	2006[b]	500 inmates and 100 staff
Virginia Department of Corrections, Marion Treatment Center	Marion, Va.	TSI PRISM	2006	225 inmates and 180 staff
State of Minnesota Department of Human Services, St. Peter Regional Treatment Center[c]	St. Peter, Minn.	Elmo-Tech	2005	75 inmates
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, Ross Correctional Facility	Chillicothe, Ohio	TSI PRISM	2004	350 inmates
Illinois Department of Corrections, Logan Correctional Center	Lincoln, Ill.	TSI PRISM	2003	1,900 inmates and 100 staff
Michigan Department of Human Services, W. J. Maxey Training School for Boys	Whitmore Lake, Mich.	TSI PRISM	2002	240 inmates and 200 staff
Minnesota Correctional Facility, Faribault	Faribault, Minn.	Elmo-Tech	2002	95 inmates
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, California State Prison, Corcoran	Corcoran, Calif.	TSI PRISM	1997	200 staff

NOTE: DC DOC = District of Columbia Department of Corrections. CDF = Central Detention Facility.

[a] Full operation expected in 2010.

[b] Facility closed due to state budget cuts in 2008.

[c] This secure mental health facility is included because it houses sex offenders.

technology in 2008 and 2009 were in the process of installing or testing the systems prior to full operation.[6]

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[6]   U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement within the Department of Homeland Security recently announced plans to adopt active RFID in 19 federal immigration detention facilities. At the time of this study, installation had not yet begun in any facility.

Lessons Learned from a Recent Evaluation of Radio-Frequency Identification Implementation in One Women's Prison

In this section, we summarize findings from a recent Urban Institute study of RFID implementation in a women's prison. We discuss these findings at length because, as previously noted, there have not been other objective evaluations of RFID implementation and impact. Our purpose here is to highlight the key lessons learned from this study that correctional facilities in other jurisdictions might find helpful when considering this technology. In Chapter Three, we discuss in-depth our case-study findings for a large correctional facility in the process of implementing RFID in a jail environment.

The Urban Institute undertook a recent evaluation of the implementation and impact of active RFID at a women's prison (NEPRC) in Cleveland, Ohio (La Vigne, Halberstadt, and Parthasarathy, 2009). The prison had a population of 594 inmates and a security staff of 96 officers. Fifty-six percent of the inmates were minimum security, and 44 percent were medium security. Funds for the RFID technology came from the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA) (Pub. L. 108-79), so the primary purpose of the system was to reduce inmate-on-inmate sexual assaults and to aid in the investigation of alleged assaults. Thus, the purpose of the evaluation was to understand the factors that facilitated or hindered the implementation of the technology and the use of RFID technology to deter sexual and related acts of violence and to assess whether the use of RFID technology aids in the investigation of alleged incidents. In this prison, the RFID system was never fully operational, for a variety of reasons.

The RFID system was originally activated in August 2006; however, the system experienced signal interference problems, and, as a result, some of the installed data extension units' (DEUs') chips did not function properly, leaving some "blind" spots where inmates' ankle bracelets could not be detected. The vendor was called in to work on the problem because the NEPRC experienced transmission problems over a period of time. Because the prison did not have on-site technical expertise to maintain the RFID system, when units malfunctioned, the prison had to rely on the vendor to fix them. However, the out-of-state vendor was not always able to return to the prison immediately, so the faulty DEUs became inoperable for periods lasting from a week to several months.

Moreover, the RFID system itself became inoperable between November 2007 and July 2008. This outage was related to upgrades of the prison's information technology (IT) infrastructure and control station monitors, although the report does not describe precisely how or why this affected the RFID system. Nonetheless, it suggests that jurisdictions interested in RFID systems should carefully explore the issue of the system's compatibility with existing control station monitors' software and hardware infrastructure and coordination with planned upgrades. As a result of this problem, the facility decided to stop equipping newly entering inmates with RFID ankle bracelets; about 25 percent of the inmates did not wear these bracelets during this time. Consequentially, the inmate population surmised that the system was inoperable. Thus, any deterrent effect that the mere presence of the RFID equipment might have had on the other 75 percent of the inmates during the first 13 months of implementation was lost.

As originally envisioned, the RFID system would be used to detect inmates in "exclusion zones," such as prohibited housing units or close proximity to other inmates with whom they had conflicts or sexual relationships. However, due to budgetary constraints, these zones were

not programmed for use. Thus, the RFID system did not generate alerts when inmates moved into prohibited locations, thus limiting the use of this technology.

Moreover, only a small number of correctional officers were trained on how to use the system; one officer was trained on how to maintain and operate the system; and several line staff learned how to equip inmates with anklets. Because extensive training of the NEPRC staff was not undertaken initially, most staff did not have an understanding of the capabilities or purpose of the system. Further, there was some evidence early on that written protocols for using the RFID system were not available. Furthermore, the RFID system's six remote monitoring terminals were not easily accessible to most correctional officers while they supervised inmates. Consequently, officers reported that trying to locate inmates using the RFID system was too difficult because of the length of time it took to contact a senior staff member who would then seek to determine inmate locations. Further, the RFID system had a 30- to 60-second time delay in relaying location information to RFID-monitoring computers. These operational delays hampered the staff's ability to track and locate inmates in real time. Because of these obstacles, the Urban Institute researchers reported that correctional staff did not rely on the RFID system to locate inmates but instead resorted to using the facility's pre-RFID method of calling inmates to report to a specific location via the prison's intercom system.

Last, in terms of the benefits of using RFID systems to aid in investigations, the Urban Institute report noted that, according to interviewees, RFID use appeared to help improve the efficiency of investigations by reducing the number of incident investigation cases closed due to insufficient evidence.

In summary, the NEPRC's early experience with RFID suggests the following potential lessons for other jurisdictions:

- Educate and train staff early on in the use of the RFID technology to get their buy-in on the utility of the system.
- Ensure that the RFID-gathered information is easily accessible or transmitted to staff who are expected to use it.
- Understand the implications of RFID compatibility issues with existing IT infrastructure or planned control monitor hardware and software upgrades.
- Have in-house trained expertise instead of relying solely on the vendor for technical support. If the system is unreliable (or inoperable at times), its credibility among staff and potential deterrent value for inmates will be undermined.
- Finally, in acquiring and implementing the technology, be very concrete (internally and contractually with the RFID vendor) about the desired functions of the RFID system, and ensure that the budget allows for acquiring or enabling those desired functions.

CHAPTER THREE

Case Study of the Early Implementation of Active Radio-Frequency Identification in One Facility

In this chapter, we discuss some of the early lessons learned through a case study that we conducted of one large jail facility in the process of installing an active RFID system to manage its inmate population. This case study capitalized on an opportunity to gather contemporaneous information about the issues and lessons learned at a facility in the process of designing, installing, and preparing the system for operation. We conducted a site visit to observe the retrofitting of the existing facility to accommodate the installation of the RFID equipment, as well as semistructured interviews with key staff involved in all phases of the acquisition, installation, training, and other activities in preparation for the system's operations. In this chapter, we first present the case-study methodology and then present the case-study findings.

Methodology

For the case study, we examined the DC DOC–operated CDF jail facility that was in the process of installing an active RFID system to manage its inmate population. While the unique status of the District of Columbia as a federal district means that the CDF is technically a federal detention facility, in effect, the facility's function and inmate population are typical of U.S. jails in large urban settings. The CDF has a full-time correctional staff of nearly 700 officers and a male-only population that averages 1,900 inmates per day and cannot exceed 2,164. The median length of stay for inmates is 25 days. We provide more details about the facility in subsequent sections.

In executing the case study of the adoption of the RFID system within this facility, we first conducted initial semistructured telephone interviews with senior leadership and project managers to collect some general information about the overall effort. For example, we asked about the overall goals and expected benefits of implementing an active RFID system in the facility, overall strategy and timelines for implementation of the technology, and how the technology fits into the facility's existing and planned safety and security strategies. We conducted these initial interviews after the department had decided to adopt an active RFID system but before it had moved forward to select an RFID vendor and issue a contract to purchase the system.

Approximately 12 months after the department had issued a contract, we conducted a two-day site visit to the CDF. At the time of the site visit, the design phase, involving the detailed development of the facility installation plan, was complete, and actual installation of software and equipment was substantially under way.

The site visit itself consisted of semistructured interviews with 11 individuals (correctional officers, managers, and technical staff) who were involved in the design, implementation, or operation of the technology and related surveillance technologies. We also toured the CDF, including the administrative areas; the Correctional Surveillance Center (CSC), a surveillance monitoring center; the receiving area; and one housing unit. The in-person tour was conducted to help us understand how the RFID system was being implemented, as well as some of the technical and design issues.

The interviews were conducted using a standardized, semistructured protocol. The specific questions were tailored to the role and job responsibilities of the specific interviewee within the institution. The overall protocol contained the following questions about the implementation of RFID in the facility, with other follow-up questions used for clarification:

- What are the expected benefits and outcomes from deploying RFID?
- How does RFID fit into the continuum of existing surveillance technologies and policies in the facility?
- How is RFID expected to affect the way in which officers are deployed or other aspects of the facility's operations?
- What type of training will officers and staff receive on RFID?
- How do officers perceive the role of RFID in ensuring their safety and helping them to better manage the inmate population?
- What concerns, if any, do the officers and staff have regarding the implementation and use of RFID technology? How are these concerns being addressed?
- How are inmates expected to respond to RFID?
- What factors were important in selecting the vendor for this contract?
- What technology issues have arisen during the design phase and are anticipated for the implementation phase?
- What types of adjustments were made during the design phase? How, if at all, did these adjustments affect the plans for deployment of RFID within the facility's housing units?
- What factors either facilitated or hindered the design or implementation process?
- What are some suggestions for other jurisdictions considering adoption of active RFID in a correctional facility?

Along with the interviews, we collected relevant documentation, including planning documents, the RFID call for proposals issued to select a vendor, and the timelines developed for RFID adoption. Such written documentation was used to contextualize and enhance the information gathered from the semistructured interviews, as well as identify any discrepancies that required additional clarification.

Overview of Planned Deployment and Operation of the Radio-Frequency Identification System

We begin with an overview of the major plans for RFID implementation, with more details discussed in subsequent sections. When the RFID system is ready for launch, DC DOC intends to fit each inmate, during the jail booking process, with a tamper-resistant wristband containing an RFID transmitting device.[1] Communication between the jail's information manage-

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[1]   The technology vendor refers to its inmate-worn device as a personal activated security sensor (PASS) unit.

ment system and the RFID system software will allow the signals from a specific bracelet to be linked to a specific inmate. The bracelet will be removed from the inmate at the time of facility discharge.[2] It will then be cleaned and prepared for use with the next new inmate. All correctional officers will also be required to wear on their belts an RFID transmitting device that resembles a pager during their shift.[3] The correctional officer devices purchased by DC DOC have three safety features: (1) a duress button that can be manually pressed if the wearer needs to call for assistance, (2) an officer-down feature that automatically sends off an alert if the wearer falls to a horizontal position, and (3) a feature that generates an alert if the wearer has not moved in 15 minutes (suggesting that he or she might need assistance). Software programming will also associate unique signals from a specific device to each designated officer. At the end of a shift, each officer will be required to return the RFID device to a designated location within the facility.

The RFID monitoring function will be integrated into the CSC, which is being established in the facility simultaneously with the operations of the RFID system. The CSC will be staffed with personnel whose sole function will be to monitor the RFID signals and other surveillance technology. This other technology used within the CSC will include an updated version of the facility's closed-circuit television (CCTV) system[4] and a telephone monitoring system. Our interviewees described the planned CSC as state of the art and believed that their facility will be the first in the country to integrate the monitoring of active RFID signals into its facility's overall centralized CSC.

Staff in the CSC will monitor the movement of inmates and respond to alerts from inmate- and officer-worn devices based on a predetermined response protocol. Since the RFID system will continuously monitor all inmates and be able to pinpoint the exact position of officers in the event of an alert, the monitoring staff may become overwhelmed with the amount of data being produced. The potential increase in the detection of prohibited behaviors and the sheer amount of data generated could make it difficult to know what signals require specific officers' responses. Therefore, facility-specific protocols need to be developed that provide decision rules as to whether and what type of action needs to be taken. For example, signals that detect unauthorized movement into an exclusion zone might require that the monitoring center staff notify an officer in that area so that he or she can immediately investigate and possibly prevent an incident (e.g., inmate-on-inmate assault) from occurring. In general, response protocols are a set of rules that will govern the officers' responses to a set of alarms generated by the RFID system. With more experience and time operating the RFID system, these protocols will inevitability require revisions and refinements.

DC DOC also employs analytic staff who will be tasked with analyzing recorded RFID signal information to identify patterns that may help to inform inmate population management or to increase facility safety and security. For example, the CSC analytic staff could be tasked with identifying whether certain patterns of inmate (or staff) movements are associated with early indications of violent or disruptive incidents. This information would then be used to adjust inmate management practices. In addition to this more general analysis, DC

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[2]   Even though it will not function outside of the facility, to minimize logistical challenges, the bracelet will remain on inmates who leaving the facility under temporary release, unless the individual has been admitted to the hospital.

[3]   The technology vendor refers to the RFID device worn by correctional officers as a personal safety device (PSD).

[4]   Currently, the department has 210 cameras in place; full implementation of the expanded CCTV camera system calls for a total of 900 cameras.

DOC intends to use the RFID system for investigation of specific incidents within the facility, including establishing which individuals were in the proximity of a known incident or establishing the location of specific individuals at the time of an alleged incident.

Reasons for Adopting an Active Radio-Frequency Identification System

In its written documents released to solicit bids from vendors, DC DOC stated that its goals for an active RFID system were "to increase inmate management and accountability, to improve productivity and efficiency, to reduce jail operational costs, and to significantly enhance the safety of correctional officers and staff" (DC DOC, 2007). These outcomes were anticipated through the technology's capability to identify, locate, and track inmates in real time and to offer advanced safety and security features for officers and staff.[5]

During our interviews, we asked the respondents to discuss their views of the reasons for adopting an active RFID system and its potential utility. In response, they described multiple issues. One reason that the respondents identified was to help increase safety and security within the facility by more closely tracking inmate movements. In the CDF, jail staff are required to allow inmates to have eight hours outside of their cells, so there are large numbers of inmates moving around within the facility at any one time. On average, there are two correctional officers supervising 80 inmates. Inmates may move from their designated housing unit to areas throughout the facility unescorted with only a hall pass (e.g., for religious gatherings, programming and work details, or medical reasons). Given the correctional staff–to-inmate ratio, it was not possible for correctional officers to directly observe all inmates, at all times, in all parts of the facility. Thus, tracking and identifying inmates in real time with an active RFID system was seen as a means of improving security (e.g., ensuring that inmates do not escape the facility) and safety (e.g., protection of inmates and personnel inside the facility).

For example, the RFID system also will add a layer of protection for those inmates who have so-called enemies within the jail. Currently, the only way for the facility to do so is to manually register the cellblocks of the respective parties and restrict access to these areas. This manual system requires close and continuous monitoring by correctional officers. The RFID system would essentially automate the process of restricting access, so that alerts would sound if known enemies come into the proximity of a restricted cellblock or of an individual inmate.

An active RFID system was also seen as a way to quickly respond to developing or violent incidents by rapidly identifying and alerting the correctional officers who are in the immediate vicinity.

The interviewees with whom we spoke expressed other expected outcomes as well:

- Enable more efficient deployment of personnel and resources, especially as the RFID system is integrated with the other surveillance technologies (namely, CCTV cameras).
- Enable more accurate inmate head counts and reduce staff overtime costs involved in doing manual head counts to reconcile discrepancies.
- Improve documentation of services and programming that inmates receive while incarcerated and reduce the amount of time required to produce individual and summary reports on programs and service use.

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[5]   If an alert is sounded, RFID will allow the CSC to pinpoint the exact location of a correctional officer. The system will allow the department to also review staff movement as part of the investigative process for an incident or suspected incident.

- Increase the pace, efficiency, and quality of investigations by rapidly providing accurate and objective information.
  - Allow for identification of inmates involved in incidents.
  - Increase the percentage of prosecutions and convictions obtained following inmate-on-staff assault incidents.
  - Reduce the number of fraudulent charges leveled against officers because inmates will be aware that the exact location of individual officers can be pinpointed at any given time in the facility and officer locations can be identified in real time.
- Result in an overall reduction in both inmate-on-inmate and inmate-on-staff assaults.
  - Curb future violence; inmates will now know they will be able to be positively identified.
  - Increase surveillance of the interiors of cells, including which and how many inmates are present inside particular cells.
  - Increase officer safety by identifying officers in need of assistance and by increasing response time to incidents.
- Allow analysis of data to identify patterns and to more accurately identify the locations of potential incidents more quickly than officer surveillance and monitoring processes currently in place. For example, the CDF experienced an escape three years ago. One interviewee postulated that, if the facility had had records of where everyone was at the time or the correct deployment of officers, it would have been able to prevent the escape.

Overall Findings

In this section, we summarize the key findings from the case study. Although we focus primarily on RFID, where appropriate, we also capture the lessons learned from this department's implementation of the other surveillance technologies and the new CSC, since DC DOC intends its RFID system to complement and work in conjunction with these other technologies.

Upper Management Support. Getting the buy-in of departmental leadership and of high-level government officials is crucial to getting a project funded, started, and completed. For this department, there was high-level support among upper management for implementing the RFID system along with other new surveillance technologies. In addition, and crucial to getting the funding, the project had the support of local officials. Senior correctional officers also were supportive of this project, which was important in gaining buy-in from line staff.

Upper management support is also crucial for guiding the development of policy regarding the chain of command in notification, the response protocols when an alert is triggered, and setting expectations for both staff and inmates and policy for addressing noncompliance.

Design and Construction Issues. In considering the adoption of and, later, plans for utilizing RFID, the department sought to draw on the experience of other institutions that were using active RFID. They concluded that the application of active RFID in the United States was in its infancy, relative to its use in international correctional facilities. Thus, department staff made phone calls and looked for written materials about the RFID experiences of institutions in various countries, including Singapore, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. In considering the best strategies for designing the RFID system for the CDF, the department also drew on the experience of one member of its technical staff who had previously worked with RFID systems in an industry setting. While it was a different setting and application, the prior experience of internal staff was thought to be helpful in the department's preparation for acquiring RFID systems.

The department's key criteria in selecting an RFID vendor were that it wanted to implement an active (versus passive) RFID system and to work with a vendor that had correctional experience. The department also wanted to be able to track inmates' exact locations in real time. It was not interested in a zone-based system, which has the ability to track inmates within specific areas of the facility but would not allow tracking of individuals from one zone to another throughout the facility. The ability to track inmates' exact locations throughout the facility and having an RFID vendor with the most correctional experience were important factors in the final decision. As noted by one interviewee involved in the technical aspects of the system, the vendor indicated that it had solved some of the issues with RFID systems raised by past clients in the past few years. Assurances from TSI PRISM about recent technological advancements helped to ease the uncertainty in the minds of the decisionmakers within the department about whether the RFID system would operate as expected in the CDF.

Implementation Timeline. The overall timeline for the adoption and implementation of RFID began in June 2008, when the contract was awarded to the chosen vendor. Full operation of the RFID system is expected to be under way in 2010. First, we present an overall timeline of milestones, and then we discuss issues that delayed the timeline as it was initially planned. At the time of our data-collection window (June 2009 site visit), the department was in the network installation process. At that time, the following were the key milestones for the system:

- June 2008: The contract was awarded to TSI PRISM (completed).
- June 2008–November 2008: Design phase (completed)
- August 25, 2008–May 1, 2009: Construction phase (completed)
- June 2009: Network installation phase (under way at the time of the site visit)
- Future plans
  - Late summer 2009: Integration, calibration, and testing of system
  - Late 2009/early 2010: Full system operation.

On June 6, 2008, the RFID contract was awarded, and, within one week, the vendor conducted a review of the facility and informed DC DOC management of its initial system design. As discussed earlier, the original plans were for the design phase to last from June 2008 to August 2008. However, a number of design issues arose, as discussed in this section, that lengthened this phase by three months, through November 2008. Although the construction phase began in August 2008, the installation of RFID equipment in the housing units did not take place until January 2009 and was completed in May 2009.

Our site visit took place in June 2009, at which time the department was beginning the network installation phase. This involved installing the server and computers and then calibrating and testing the system.

The department hoped to begin fitting inmates with RFID devices in the spring of 2010, while simultaneously developing the procedures for routinely fitting new inmates and for removing devices from inmates being discharged. After an initial period of focusing on the procedures for fitting inmates with the RFID devices, the department also planned for the CSC to begin tracking the movements of inmates, at least within several housing units, and use this experience to begin fine-tuning the monitoring center's procedures and response protocols.

In early 2010, after the initial experience with fitting the inmates with RFID devices, the department planned to begin issuing RFID devices to correctional officers on duty.

Last, in the late fall of 2009 and early 2010, full operation of the RFID system was anticipated, including all staff trained, RFID devices fitted to inmates and staff, and monitoring operating as planned. An exact timeline for this was not available at the time of our site visit.

Next, we summarize some of the key challenges the department has experienced during the initial phases of the project, some of which contributed to schedule delays.

The original plan called for the design phase to last several months, with construction beginning in August 2008. However, for several reasons, the design phase took substantially longer than was originally anticipated, lasting until November 2008. The inmate housing component ended up taking the longest to design and configure. A key reason was that the architecture of the individual housing units was unique, with the different units constructed at different times using different materials and floor space layout configurations, including two-story housing units. Because RFID operates via radio waves, physical barriers (e.g., the thickness of the walls, the amount of steel, and other factors) can attenuate the signal's strength. Thus, the post-award detailed design for the placement of the RFID components (e.g., exciters, transmitters, and conduit) took longer than anticipated because the vendor's team had to redesign the plan when it discovered that its initial assumption (that wall materials and thickness were standard throughout the CDF) was incorrect. The redesign had to take this variation in construction into account. In effect, the vendor needed to tailor the installation of the RFID equipment to each of the 18 housing units' unique construction materials and floor space layouts. Delays resulted because the vendor did not fully appreciate the complex nature of the CDF's construction and physical layout until the project was under way.

The department also desired a relatively high level of accuracy, with the ability to identify, in real time and in a multistory facility, the location of an inmate within 2 to 5 feet indoors (and within 10 to 15 feet outdoors). The initial design revealed an unacceptable level of accuracy, leading to the need to test different customized solutions and modification of the overall RFID system design. For example, the original plan did not call for the installation of RFID antennae in the individual cells. However, it was discovered that, when the cell doors were shut in the housing units, the accuracy of the system was compromised because the amount of steel in the doors interfered with the radio-wave signal. This problem took weeks to solve. Ultimately, the solution was to place antennae in every fourth cell, which would allow the department to still get the level of accuracy it desired in placing each inmate in three-dimensional space. Because the antennae are large, boomerang-shaped objects, one challenge was how to mount them on the cell walls so that inmates could not remove or tamper with them. Testing materials to house the antennae (and other infrastructure) to minimize tampering by inmates also contributed to project delays. The vendor arrived at an installation solution using epoxy material that was acceptable to the department. After this step was completed, the department required the vendor to do additional testing to verify that the location accuracy of the system met the specifications set out in the original contract.

Another complication was that the subcontractor had installed lower-grade conduit (i.e., electrical metallic tubing, or EMT) instead of rigid conduit. The solution was to strap the conduit at shorter intervals to give it more rigidity. This issue was discovered well into the installation process. This issue illustrates the ongoing requirement to inspect all materials and equipment prior to installation to ensure that the contractor has met all the specifications set out in the statement of work.

Another problem was the accuracy of the location information in the multistory facility with two-tiered housing units. On occasion and if, for example, an inmate were sitting on the floor of the second story, an RFID receiver on the first floor could detect the signal generated by that inmate's RFID device. The result would be an inaccurate location reading, placing that inmate on the first story instead of the second story. It was determined that the problem was due to the installation location of RFID signal repeaters (so-called exciters). These exciters amplify and help relay the signal of the inmate- and officer-worn RFID devices to the RFID receivers.[6] Since the exciters on the second story were installed very near the floor, the RFID signals were being relayed through the floor to the receivers below. To resolve this issue, the vendor elevated the exciters on the second story approximately 3 feet off the floor. This solution meant that the signals relayed by the second-story exciters were in better range of the second-story receivers than of those below.

Another source of delay was related to the design of the inmate RFID bracelet's fastener—originally designed for prison, in which inmates have longer stays in a correctional facility than in jails (with a high turnover rate in the inmate population), the department found that the bracelets were so secure that they were difficult to remove. Thus, before training of staff could occur on fitting and removing bracelets from inmates, the bracelets' fasteners had to be redesigned.

Another issue was that project management personnel and subcontractors changed during the project implementation phase. This meant that new project personnel coming onboard midstream had a steep learning curve, which also contributed to delays.

Anticipated Staffing Needs. DC DOC's planned use of the RFID system involves a number of administrative activities, including analysis of data and report generation, analysis of incident patterns to inform management decisions, analysis to inform investigations, and real-time tracking of inmate location. These activities will be largely conducted within a newly established CSC. This surveillance center consists of various divisions for its staff, including camera watchers, analysts, internal affairs, a telephone analyst, and staff to deal with outside requests for surveillance information (such as from prosecutors or defense attorneys). One manager commented that it would be easy to underestimate the amount of staff needed for this type of surveillance center, given the large amount of data generated by all the surveillance technologies (eventually), including RFID.

To help ensure that the staffing of the CSC remains adequate on any given day, nonuniformed staff will fill the monitoring positions. The department reasoned that, if correctional officers performed the monitoring functions, there was the possibility of these officers being reassigned inside the facility when others called in sick or when an emergency arose. Thus, the department felt that the CSC needed dedicated nonuniformed staff members who were not dual-positioned. As one interviewee commented, it would be unacceptable for the department

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[6]   RFID systems include one or more RFID receiver systems that are associated with a number of distributed transmitters, referred to as RFID tag exciters. According to one patent application (Sadr et al., n.d.),

> The exciters can act as signal repeaters from the RFID receiver system that enable transmission of a tag signal to a distant exciter, which in turn filters, amplifies and re-transmits the signal to the intended collection of RFD tags within the line-of-sight view of the exciter.

to make a substantial investment in an RFID system and surveillance monitoring center and then have this function understaffed or closed at times.[7]

The CCTV camera, telephone monitoring, and RFID systems will also generate a large amount of data that can be useful for investigation purposes and for creating summary reports. In the case of the surveillance cameras, once the U.S. attorney and other attorneys realized that these data existed, a large volume of requests came in to see videotape from the cameras to determine what inmates were doing at specific time periods. This also resulted in a number of requests for information regarding the phone records of specific inmates, to aid in investigations. Once the RFID is fully operational, the CSC will monitor and integrate this source of data into the range of other surveillance tools it has to monitor the activities of inmates. If the U.S. Attorney's Office, for example, has reason to believe that some criminal activity is happening within the jail, it may obtain a subpoena for RFID records in order to aid in an investigation. According to one interviewee who believes that the CSC is now fully staffed, it now has enough trained analysts to handle these requests. One interviewee in a management position was not concerned that this new technology might result in fishing expeditions because most of the requests to date had been based on ongoing investigations.

Aside from performing the monitoring and analysis tasks, the department also anticipates needing full-time staff for the work associated with maintaining the inmate- and officer-worn RFID devices. For example, someone needs to ensure that the RFID devices are properly accounted for and that routine maintenance is done. The batteries of the RFID devices need to be charged and the devices cleaned, reissued, and removed from both inmates and officers as they enter and exit the jail. This is expected to be an ongoing and busy process, given the continual turnover of the jail inmate population and the large number of officers going through shift changes.

Anticipated Need to Develop RFID-Related Policies and Operating Procedures. The facility anticipated a need to develop written RFID policies and operating procedures. These entailed establishing guidelines that employees, contract personnel, nonuniformed CSC staff, and others need to follow in using the RFID system to help ensure increased safety, security, and accountability within the CDF. DC DOC's written documents address such topics as when personnel are required to wear a RFID unit, procedures for using RFID to control access privileges to specific areas throughout the facility, directions for inmates wearing RFID devices, and how to report problems with the RFID units.

As noted earlier, facility-specific response protocols have been developed to provide decision rules as to whether, and what type of, action should be taken when an RFID-generated alert is received. For example, an alert could be generated by close proximity of two inmates who are designated enemies. Written policies and procedures would then dictate the response of the operators in the CSC as they observe the alert generated by the RFID system. For example, written policies would direct them to locate the area of the facility and, at the same time, look at the CCTV monitor to determine whether the contact appears to be brief and

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[7] This decision also has other potential implications with respect to command and control. The expectation was that having nonuniformed personnel doing the monitoring would add a level of independence for the unit, with the CSC reporting up through investigative services versus operations. However, in operation, this has meant that, when the CSC calls down to the housing units with surveillance information, the correctional officers want to take orders from a commander rather than from nonuniformed personnel. Therefore, this has required an added level of reporting, at which the nonuniformed staff in the CSC first send the information to the command center and then command center staff direct the unit officers on how to respond.

inadvertent or whether a situation is developing that warrants alerting correctional officers to intervene. Not all alerts require that an action be undertaken. In short, written policies and procedures specify the CDF's rules governing response decisions.

Our interviewees reported that the vendor played an important role in offering some initial guidance on developing these written policies and operating procedures, drawing on its previous experience. This has meant that the department did not have to begin from scratch in developing these internal policies. However, the interviewees reported that the response protocols will need to be further refined and tailored by departmental staff for the CDF, particularly those involved in the operation of the RFID system and the technical staff providing analytic support in analyzing the volume of data generated by the system. The interviewees reported that, when the system was close to implementation, they would move forward in more fully developing its initial set of protocols and that they expected to refine them as the department gains experience using the system.

Expected Staff and Inmate Responses to Radio-Frequency Identification

DC DOC intends to use the RFID system as an inmate management tool and as a tool for enhancing the safety of correctional officers and other staff within the jail. A key issue with the implementation of the active RFID system is the response of both staff and inmates to the new technology. Each issue is discussed in this section in turn.

Expected Staff Responses to the RFID System. Some staff may be accepting of the technology because it offers them PSDs and a greater level of safety while conducting their routine work in housing units. In fact, this is the primary motive for implementing the technology. Combined with positive identification of inmates who engage in spitting, throwing projectiles, or other acts against officers, and the improved rate of conviction of inmates for staff assaults, DOC expects the rate of inmate-on-staff assaults to decrease significantly over time.

In discussing issues surrounding the implementation and use of the RFID system, our interviewees most frequently raised staff acceptance of this new surveillance technology. A number of interviewees commented that some officers and union representatives were concerned that the RFID system would lead to excessive surveillance of officers in the performance of their duties. Thus, officers might resent the use of the system, resist compliance with RFID-related procedures, and even try to circumvent the system.

On the other hand, some interviewees expected the RFID experience to be comparable to the staff acceptance of the recent installation of a more sophisticated CCTV camera system in the new CSC. There was initial resistance to these upgrades, but these additions came to be seen as positive, as they actually proved to be helpful in identifying inmates involved in assaults and in aiding in investigations. These interviewees felt that some officers saw these episodes as a positive outcome of adding the new technology. The interviewees expected that addition of the RFID system would similarly gain acceptance if it is able to demonstrate its practical utility.

Another issue potentially affecting officers' acceptance of RFID is that the department introduced a number of technological innovations within a short period of time. These began with a new timekeeping system, a more sophisticated CCTV camera surveillance system and a new surveillance center, an enhanced telephone system for monitoring inmate calls, and finally the addition of active RFID. The collective set of technology innovations represents a significant cultural change for facility personnel, so general resistance to the changes, including RFID, might be expected. Indeed, technology enhancements made to the timekeeping system alone reportedly met with some officer opposition. At the same time, the department

had experienced a high turnover in staff due to the retirement of a large number of its older staff. The influx of new staff might work to counter some of the resistance to the technological changes in that several interviewees commented that the newer staff seemed to be more comfortable with technology in general and, therefore, more accepting of the range of newly introduced surveillance technologies.

A final issue discussed by our interviewees on the topic of staff acceptance was the importance of the reliability of the system. Several interviewees stated that, once the system is installed, if the system has a number of false alerts or stops functioning, it can undermine staff confidence in the system and affect their willingness to rely on it. For this reason, one interviewee felt that it was important to have the contractor readily available after the system is installed to do repairs.

In order to help promote staff acceptance of the new technology, several interviewees underscored the importance of education and training, as well as getting peer leaders' support. Several interviewees felt that it was necessary to have both initial training when the system first becomes operational and ongoing training. The training needs to occur in several steps, including initial general information and specifics on helping personnel understand the technology, using it appropriately, and its expected benefits. Several interviewees also commented that, in terms of staff acceptance, it was important to gain allies for implementing this technology, especially senior officers who are widely respected within the jail. They emphasized that the training sessions ought to focus on the safety and security benefits of the RFID system and not on its potential for identifying officer noncompliance with policies and procedures.

Expected Inmate Responses to the RFID System. When the RFID system is fully installed and wristband devices are fitted to inmates, our interviewees expect inmates to initially test the system, including attempts to remove or destroy the RFID wristbands and the antennae and to try to identify dead zones where the RFID signals might not be transmitted. According to one senior manager, the wristbands are probably the weakest link in the RFID system. That is, they are the most accessible part of the system to inmates and, therefore, the most likely target of tampering. This inmate testing activity is expected to produce a large number of alerts initially, but the interviewees expect that these alerts will diminish over time. The interviewees expect this outcome because, in turn, they expect the RFID system to function according to plan and that the staff response to alerts will be consistent and appropriate.

From management's perspective, the initial rollout phase will be important for training staff on the placement of the RFID wristbands, monitoring of inmate movements, and strategies inmates might use in attempts to circumvent the system. This initial period was seen as critical in order to establish the system's credibility with both staff and inmates. Following the initial testing period, interviewees hoped that inmates would soon begin to see the RFID system as adding a layer of protection for them, especially for those individuals who feel particularly at risk of violence from another inmate.

Costs of Implementing and Operating the Radio-Frequency Identification System

The cost of the RFID fixed-price contract was $3.3 million. DC DOC was granted the necessary funds through the budget process and a U.S. Department of Justice grant. Additional costs included $42,000 for staff to provide initial RFID training and $60,329 in overtime expenditures. The latter covered 1,440 hours of staff time, primarily for security escorts. Anticipated future costs are $194,000 annually for ongoing maintenance and support for the RFID system, including replacement parts and equipment. The ongoing staffing costs for RFID-

related operation and maintenance include seven full-time equivalents (FTEs) and one contractor FTE to support operations on site.

The CSC was a separate project and could have been implemented without the RFID. Since DC DOC believes that the CSC will play a key role in RFID surveillance, however, we provide the reported CSC costs here as guidance for other jurisdictions considering this approach. Initial construction and staffing of the CSC required an additional $3.05 million. The anticipated ongoing cost to support the CSC (including staff and equipment) is $1.05 million annually after the first year.

During the case-study data collection, we were unable to quantify the potential costs of operating the system because the RFID system was still in the early stages of implementation. We asked the interviewees to discuss the issue of costs based on their experience to date. In particular, we asked that they offer advice for other jurisdictions to consider if they are deciding whether to acquire an active RFID system.

In response, one interviewee pointed out that it is very easy to underestimate the true cost of an active RFID system. For example, a department may need to take into account the possibility of an extended design phase in order to tailor the RFID system to the unique architecture of the correctional institution and the amount of system testing needed to ensure that the level of accuracy desired is attained. Even though a fixed-price contract may be in place, the longer installation and testing period can produce greater costs to the jurisdiction. One example in the DC DOC facility was the staff time involved in moving inmates during installation of RFID within the housing units. During the initial phases of installation, inmates were moved out of the housing units—three units at a time in order to speed up the installation process. Extra staff were needed to manage the elaborate inmate movement process and to provide security for the contractor's work crews, which resulted in some overtime expenses being incurred. At the same time, DOC's contractual housing allotment was retroactively reduced (in a budgetary adjustment unrelated to RFID). Thus, the installation process contributed in part to the department exceeding its contractual housing budget by $1.2 million during the fiscal year of RFID implementation.

Upon full implementation, one senior interviewee advised, it would also be easy for other jurisdictions to underestimate the resources and staff needed to actually operate the system. For example, full-time administrative staff will be needed to maintain the RFID wristbands and PSDs and to issue the PSDs to officers. Inmates will be issued RFID bracelets during the receiving and discharge processes. Given the transient nature of a jail with a high turnover in the inmate population, staff levels are expected to be higher than in a prison. DC DOC estimated that at least two mid-management staff members (i.e., sergeants) would need to be dedicated to maintaining the RFID wristbands for staff and other activities.

As one interviewee noted, any institution that is considering implementing RFID needs to have an offender management system and the ability to link the RFID data with that system. This potentially can be a costly prospect if the institution does not have the resources needed to develop the interface to synchronize the two systems[8] or have software that is compatible.

In addition to these costs mentioned, our interviewees advised that other jurisdictions contemplating the adoption of active RFID should consider the following potential costs:

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[8]   That is, individuals need to be simultaneously (or near simultaneously) registered in both systems and removed from both systems or, in the event of a temporary absence from the facility, deactivated from the systems.

- In the design and construction phases, officers will be needed to protect the contractors while they are installing the system, which may entail overtime costs.
- Long-term maintenance costs of the system also need to be considered.
- If the jurisdiction intends to fully use all the system's capability and the data that it produces for inmate and officer facility management, the cost of hiring full-time monitoring and analytic staff (e.g., for a CSC) will need to be included.
- The added cost of procuring potentially expensive hardware and resolving software compatibility issues may need to be addressed in integrating the system with existing surveillance and information systems.
- Once attorneys and outside stakeholders realize the value of the data, the cost of additional staff time could be consumed by a potentially large number of requests for RFID-generated information for investigations and reports on services received (such as medical care or access to programming).

The department is still early on in the process of implementing RFID, so this summary captures the department's experience primarily in the design and construction phases of the project. The interviewees also described the challenges they might encounter and expected benefits when the system is fully operational.

It is important to note, however, that this department is implementing the RFID system at the same time that it is implementing a range of other surveillance technologies, as well as a new surveillance monitoring CSC, which may make it difficult to separate out the effects of RFID itself. One unexpected benefit of the delays in implementing RFID is that the department has been able to collect some data on the impact of the new camera surveillance system on inmate and staff behavior and so might be able to look at the incremental effect of adding in RFID to the range of surveillance options the department is deploying.

When it is fully deployed, it will be challenging for the department to isolate and assess the effects of RFID alone versus an increase in surveillance technology in general. For example, some outcome measures are unique to RFID (e.g., improving the accuracy of head counts), whereas, for other outcomes, it might be harder to assess whether a decrease in violence, for example, is related to RFID or some combination of the different surveillance technologies. Further, because the department has a number of new staff coming onboard, it may be challenging to assess whether an increase in potential violence is related to the inmates testing new staff or inmates testing the new RFID system (and other surveillance technology).

One would also expect initially that incident frequency would rise as the department improves its ability to detect the occurrence of incidents. Indeed, this has been DC DOC's experience in implementing the CSC and having dedicated staff to monitor the CCTV system.

CHAPTER FOUR

Summary and Conclusions

In implementing any new technology, there are general lessons that are applicable to RFID systems as well (Upchurch, 2009; Davis and Jackson, 2005):

- Ensure upper management buy-in and support.
- Plan for adequate and continuous training.
- Conduct thorough vendor research and develop a detailed vendor contract.
- Identify and secure adequate personnel to implement and maintain the system.
- Develop a maintenance approach.
- Heavily involve the end users; identify all the key internal and external stakeholders and understand their different needs, concerns, and expectations.
- Talk to others and learn from their experiences.
- Assess the project risks, such as whether adequate funding will be available for maintaining the technology over the long run and staff acceptance of the new technology.

The recent experience of DC DOC and of the NEPRC site highlight some key lessons that will be of interest to other correctional facilities considering the use of RFID systems in their institution. In this chapter, we summarize the key lessons learned.

Lessons Learned

In making the decision whether to deploy a passive or active RFID system, it will be important for correctional administrators to clearly identify their objectives and what type of system will best meet these objectives. Passive RFID systems can store information and may be more appropriate in a correctional setting where it is less important to be able to actively monitor inmate movement in real time; instead, the goal may be primarily zone control to prevent unauthorized movement into a restricted area within the facility. A passive RFID system in general may be easier to implement in a prison setting because there is less movement and turnover in the inmate population than there is in a jail setting. In DC DOC's view, the maximum benefit of active RFID systems may be in the jail setting precisely because there is a lot of inmate movement and turnover in the jail population and not enough officers to keep track of all inmates in real time or to escort inmates as they move from location to location.

The correctional facility used for the case study appears to be unique in that it has a multi-disciplinary technical staff comprised of a senior industrial engineer with prior RFID experience who designed the RFID system for DC DOC; an industrial engineering subcontractor

who served as the project manager for RFID installation; a Ph.D. statistician responsible for data analysis, reporting, and advanced problem-solving; an IT specialist who serves as chief of network operations; and a director of the correctional surveillance center. This in-house team of experts worked closely with the vendor on the design, implementation, and closely overseeing RFID implementation. DC DOC also plans to integrate the RFID system into a centralized CSC that it views as state of the art, with dedicated, trained staff. This department felt that having in-house staff with this kind of expertise was important to understand the strengths and limitations of the technology and to develop an effective strategy for its deployment in a correctional setting. Because most RFID vendors have limited experience with corrections, the department felt that such in-house staff and expertise were crucial to informing decisions about how to effectively use this technology in a correctional setting, rather than relying only on an outside vendor's assessment. For many correctional facilities, however, it would be unusual to have this type of in-house technical expertise, so they would have to rely on vendors for guidance and recommendations. After installation, the correctional facility will need staff to operate the software and hardware components of the RFID system and to incorporate its use into the facility's own policies and procedures. As one manager noted, having an RFID contractor that will be readily available after the system is installed to do repairs could be an important issue for the agency to deal with because, once the system is in place, the facility is dependent on the contractor, especially when the system goes down.

In the installation process, RFID contractors and subcontractors need to have a good understanding of the correctional facility's environment and know what is appropriate in it, especially when considering the materials and techniques for installation of an RFID system. One interviewee recommended that a correctional facility put a clause in the contract concerning (1) the approval of recommended locations of RFID equipment and (2) the level of the technology's location accuracy. These two issues were described as central to overall performance of the system.

In short, it seems most beneficial for a correctional facility to consider having its own in-house expertise or contracting with outside expertise (preferably with corrections experience) to give the facility the guidance (independent of the vendor) it will need to specify the requirements and details of its intended use of the technology, oversee the design process, and effectively implement the technology in the facility. In DC DOC's view, having engineering project managers (preferably with an industrial engineering background) with adequate project management experience in implementing capital technology projects is likely to greatly improve the likelihood of successful implementation. If a correctional agency does not have an in-house industrial engineering group, it may be worth considering hiring one or two FTEs (preferably with an industrial engineering background) as engineering project managers. Alternatively, this may be an area in which the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC) can play a role in providing guidance and expertise that correctional facilities can tap into as part of the design and implementation processes. Regardless, it is important to recognize that, once the vendor has put the system in place, the facility will need ongoing in-house staff expertise to operate the RFID system. It is also important to have a good understanding of the process flow of one's facility before undertaking an RFID project—specifically, understanding how inmates and staff move throughout a facility and which areas will be most critical to monitor.

Training and education of staff will be critical to gaining staff acceptance and readiness for the successful implementation of an RFID system. Implementing an RFID system will

likely represent a significant cultural shift for an institution, so it will be important to get buy-in from all the relevant stakeholders. The different stakeholders will require training on what to expect, on the actual implementation of the technology, on how to use the system, on how to fine-tune alert response protocols, and on whether and how to analyze the data to inform management decisions. As one interviewee noted, it is not possible to just flip a switch right away and expect the deployment of RFID to go smoothly. Like the launch of any complex technology, there is an involved process of trial and error, experiential learning and revision.

Both DC DOC's and the NEPRC experiences underscored the importance of recognizing the need to be able to integrate the RFID system with the offender management and other IT systems that a department may have. This can potentially be a costly prospect if the institution does not have the resources needed to implement such a data merger or have software that is compatible. In the case of DC DOC, it is currently in the process of integrating its RFID system with the other data systems. Because the RFID data will be passing through its surveillance monitoring center, as well as the data from the enhanced telephone system and CCTV camera system, the infrastructure needed is complex, with different databases and networks being involved. In the case of the NEPRC, system upgrades to the prison's IT infrastructure rendered the RFID system inoperable for an extended period of time. This experience in particular highlights the need to consider system compatibility with existing software and hardware infrastructure, as well as with planned upgrades.

As was the case in DC DOC, getting the buy-in of departmental leadership and of high-level government officials is crucial to getting the project funded initially and fully implemented. Also, early in the process, the department should meet with all staff to educate them about RFID technology and to gain the support of key staff members within the department to champion the technology and its benefits. This training is particularly important before the RFID system is implemented, as its potential value cannot be observed until it is fully operational. For this particular department, the implementation of multiple technologies within a short period of time may make it particularly challenging to gain acceptance of this new system.

Last, and if at all possible, a pilot study is important to undertake in order to understand how the RFID system can be effectively utilized and how to fine-tune the system and response protocols, train staff on monitoring RFID signals, understand inmates' reaction to RFID wristbands, and determine what outcome measures will be valuable to track over time. Implementation of RFID systems is expensive, so a pilot study will allow a facility to understand how RFID technology can meet the facility's overall goals and gather the information and data necessary to inform decisions regarding full implementation within the facility. Further, a pilot study that examines the effects of RFID implementation in several housing units may allow a facility to understand how differences in housing units' design and construction, wave transmission characteristics, lines of sight, and other important characteristics may affect inmate monitoring via RFID. In the case of DC DOC, funding for the full RFID system was available within a given period of time, so the department felt that it had to move forward with full implementation. However, interviewees recognized that, ideally, one would undertake a pilot study to first test and fine-tune the system, outcome measures, and procedures to optimize the benefits of the RFID system in a correctional setting.

Conclusions

An RFID system appears to hold promise as a valuable correctional tool for ensuring that a prison or jail population is both safely and appropriately managed and in contributing to the improved safety of the correctional staff and inmates. However, as with any new technology, there are factors that need to be considered in making the decision whether to invest in an RFID system and how it will fit into the overall processes and procedures of an institution.

The lessons identified in this report are informative as to the types of issues that a correctional facility may want to consider in contemplating the use of an RFID system within its institution. Because the experience of correctional institutions with RFID is still fairly limited, the detailed case study represents one large correctional facility's experience to date. While its scope is narrow, it contributes new information and insights on issues to consider in the conceptualization, design, and implementation of an RFID system in a correctional setting. Clearly, more independent assessments of RFID systems' impacts are needed to fully assess the promise and limitations of this technology in correctional settings. Unfortunately, as we have discussed in detail elsewhere (Hickman, Eisman, and Davis, 2008), outcome evaluations of this technology will be very challenging to conduct and require data collection over lengthy periods of RFID operation. Thus, it seems likely that individual jurisdictions will need to proceed in making decisions about acquiring active RFID without the benefit of objective analysis for some years into the future.

In the meantime, the National Institute of Justice's NLECTC (or some other national corrections organization) could potentially assist the field by facilitating discussions among representatives of facilities that have already acquired the technology and those interested in exploring it. These discussions could take the form of webinars, discussion forums, or conference presentations. It seems that interested jurisdictions are doing this to some degree individually as they seek to explore the possibilities of acquiring this technology. A broader effort, such as a webinar, would be more efficient for jurisdictions with RFID to share their knowledge and experience with the field of corrections and could be archived to ensure accessibility to other jurisdictions that may become interested in the future.

Moreover, other resources could be made available, such as worksheets helping jurisdictions clarify their expectations for the technology's capability, checklists that direct them to the issues that need to be resolved before entering into an RFID system contract, a tool kit that might help them identify the level and type of staffing needed for each type of RFID deployment, and perhaps basic contracting boilerplate language (to ensure that critical issues are spelled out in the contract). The development of these sorts of tools would probably be a challenge, given that there is so little experience with the technology to date and it continues to evolve over time. By the same token, there appears to be enough experience accumulating in the field to allow at least the distillation of some orienting information and tips that could be of value to jurisdictions exploring the potential use of RFID in the field of corrections.

Without question, the technology is expensive to purchase, install, and operate. Thus, a critical question for many jurisdictions is whether it will ultimately prove to be cost-effective over the long run. Again, a reliable answer to this question depends on the availability of rigorous outcome evaluation data for generating reasonable cost-effectiveness estimates. At this early stage of use of RFID in the field, there is still too little experience with the actual function and impact of active RFID in correctional settings to even roughly approximate whether it can

ultimately produce cost savings over the long run for institutions in general or for institutions of specific types.

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Prolonged Incarceration Spreadsheet

Included in the Department of Corrections' (SCDC) December 18, 2019 letter to the House Legislative Oversight Committee (LOC). This information was provided in response to the following question in LOC's December 2, 2019, letter to the Department of Corrections: "11. SCDC has notified the subcommittee of various prolonged incarcerations and early releases. Please provide the number of inmates whose release dates were impacted by SCDC audits or information SCDC obtained from other sources ("information"). Please include inmates held past their release date and inmates who, because the information allowed SCDC to catch an error before it was too late, were released on time. With each inmate, please provide the following information in an Excel spreadsheet:

    a. Applicable audit or information obtained;
    b. Max out date in the computer prior to obtaining information;
    c. Max out date in the computer after obtaining information;
    d. Actual release date;
    e. Number of days incarcerated past release date, if any;
    f. Number of days of incarceration saved by obtaining the information (e.g., max out date prior to obtaining information minus actual release date); and
    g. Cost per day to house an inmate."

In addition to providing the information in this document, SCDC provided the following response:
- Please see attached Prolonged Incarceration spreadsheet

Name	SCDC #	Reason	Discovery	Max-out Date Prior to Correction	Max-out Date	Actual Release Date	Length of Prolonged Incarceration by # of Days (G)-(F)	Prolonged Incarceration Avoided by # of Days (E)-(G)	Variable Cost per Inmate per Day (All Funds)	Total Cost of Prolonged Incarceration (Variable Cost)	Total Cost per Inmate per Day (All Funds)	Total Cost of Prolonged Incarceration (Total Cost)
		Incorrect offense SCDC code	Informed by PPP	6/22/2014	1/22/2012	5/19/2014	848	34	FY 2012 = 160 * $5.58 FY 2013 = 365 * $5.93 FY 2014 = 323 * $6.24	$5,072.77	FY 2012 = 160 * $47.38 FY 2013 = 365 * $50.13 FY 2014 = 323 * $52.43	$42,813.14
		Additional jail time given	Release audit	10/12/2015	8/3/2015	9/22/2015	50	20	FY 2016 = 50 * $6.80	$340.00	FY 2016 = 50 * $54.47	$2,723.50
		Incorrect CDR code	SFREV Screening	8/20/2016	5/3/2015	4/22/2016	355	120	FY 2015 = 58 * $6.40 FY 2016 = 297 * $6.80	$2,390.80	FY 2015 = 58 * $54.05 FY 2016 = 297 * $54.47	$19,312.49
		Consecutive structure entered incorrectly	Release audit	10/6/2016	7/10/2016	9/13/2016	65	23	FY 2017 = 65 * $6.97	$453.05	FY 2017 = 65 * $57.33	$3,726.45
		Incorrect offense SCDC code	Release audit	1/28/2017	9/18/2016	11/9/2016	52	80	FY 2017 = 52 * $6.97	$362.44	FY 2017 = 52 * $57.33	$2,981.16
		Incorrect SCDC offense code	Notified by institution	4/24/2020	12/21/2016	7/24/2018	580	640	FY 2017 = 191 * $6.97 FY 2018 = 365 * $8.44 FY 2019 = 24 * $8.49	$4,615.63	FY 2017 = 191 * $57.33 FY 2018 = 365 * $64.96 FY 2019 = 24 * $70.78	$36,359.15
		Saturday release. MAXREL not checked by institution	Institution did not review MAXREL for weekend release	12/1/2018	12/1/2018	12/3/2018	2	0	FY 2019 = 2 * $8.49	$16.98	FY 2019 = 2 * $70.78	$141.56
		Additional jail time given	Release audit	3/2/2019	10/26/2018	2/26/2019	123	4	FY 2019 = 123 * $8.49	$1,044.27	FY 2019 = 123 * $70.78	$8,705.94
		Additional jail time given	Received FORM 9 from PPP	5/14/2020	1/7/2019	4/29/2019	112	381	FY 2019 = 112 * $8.49	$950.88	FY 2019 = 112 * $70.78	$7,927.36
		Incorrect SCDC offense code	Community supervision review	8/23/2019	5/28/2017	4/30/2019	702	115	FY 2017 = 33 * $6.97 FY 2018 = 365 * $8.44 FY 2019 = 304 * $8.49	$5,891.57	FY 2017 = 33 * $57.33 FY 2018 = 365 * $64.96 FY 2019 = 304 * $70.78	$47,119.41
		SCDC offense code changed to non 85%	Community supervision review	8/31/2019	10/3/2016	5/17/2019	956	106	FY 2017 = 270 * $6.97 FY 2018 = 365 * $8.44 FY 2019 = 321 * $8.49	$7,687.79	FY 2017 = 270 * $57.33 FY 2018 = 365 * $64.96 FY 2019 = 321 * $70.78	$61,909.88
		Incorrect SCDC offense code	Informed by PPP	6/23/2019	3/11/2019	5/7/2019	57	47	FY 2019 = 57 * $8.49	$483.93	FY 2019 = 57 * $70.78	$4,034.46
		Incorrect SCDC offense code	During 2nd release audit	10/2/2019	9/3/2017	7/16/2019	681	78	FY 2018 = 300 * $8.44 FY 2019 = 365 * $8.49 FY 2020 = 16 * $8.49	$5,766.69	FY 2018 = 300 * $64.96 FY 2019 = 365 * $70.78 FY 2020 = 16 * $70.78	$46,455.18
		Incorrect SCDC offense code entered	Institutional conviction audit	7/14/2019	7/14/2019	8/9/2019	26	0	FY 2019 = 26 * $8.49	$220.74	FY 2019 = 26 * $70.78	$1,840.28
		Incorrect SCDC offense code entered	Institutional conviction audit	9/9/2019	9/5/2018	8/21/2019	350	19	FY 2019 = 298 * $8.49 FY 2020 = 52 * $8.49	$2,971.50	FY 2019 = 298 * $70.78 FY 2020 = 52 * $70.78	$24,773.00
		Order 9/1/2015 misunderstood	Informed by PPP	9/27/2019	3/6/2018	8/23/2019	535	35	FY 2018 = 116 * $8.44 FY 2019 = 365 * $8.49 FY 2020 = 54 * $8.49	$4,536.35	FY 2018 = 116 * $64.96 FY 2019 = 365 * $70.78 FY 2020 = 54 * $70.78	$37,192.18
		Needed GPS-PPP was informed of weekend release.	PPP did not install GPS on weekend	8/24/2019	8/24/2019	8/25/2019	1	0	FY 2020 = 1 * $8.49	$8.49	FY 2020 = 1 * $70.78	$70.78
		Additional Hayes Time given	Release audit	10/12/2019	6/12/2019	8/27/2019	76	46	FY 2019 = 18 * $8.49 FY 2020 = 58 * $8.49	$645.24	FY 2019 = 18 * $70.78 FY 2020 = 58 * $70.78	$5,379.28
		Additional Hayes time given. Form 9 not filled out properly.	FORM 9 filled out incorrectly	8/23/2019	7/18/2019	8/1/2019	14	22	FY 2020 = 14 * $8.49	$118.86	FY 2020 = 14 * $70.78	$990.92
		Additional jail time given on #10 & 11. Credit for time served on probation citation should have been entered.	Release audit	2/19/2020	7/9/2019	9/25/2019	78	147	FY 2020 = 78 * $8.49	$662.22	FY 2020 = 78 * $70.78	$5,520.84
		Entries were not entered on transfer history for parole violation	Probation Revocation audit	11/23/2019	10/2/2019	10/16/2019	14	38	FY 2020 = 14 * $8.49	$118.86	FY 2020 = 14 * $70.78	$990.92
		Probation Revocation in 2016. 559 jail time days not given until special PPP audit. Probation revocation audit.	Probation Revocation audit	1/4/2020	8/9/2018	10/21/2019	438	75	FY 2019 = 325 * $8.49 FY 2020 = 113 * $8.49	$3,718.62	FY 2019 = 325 * $70.78 FY 2020 = 113 * $70.78	$31,001.64
		Additional Hayes time given	Release audit	11/23/2019	9/28/2019	10/22/2019	24	32	FY 2020 = 24 * $8.49	$203.76	FY 2020 = 24 * $70.78	$1,698.72
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	11/1/2019	10/22/2019	10/25/2019	3	7	FY 2020 = 3 * $8.49	$25.47	FY 2020 = 3 * $70.78	$212.34
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	2/1/2020	9/24/2019	10/29/2019	35	95	FY 2020 = 35 * $8.49	$297.15	FY 2020 = 35 * $70.78	$2,477.30
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	11/20/2019	10/7/2019	10/30/2019	23	21	FY 2020 = 23 * $8.49	$195.27	FY 2020 = 23 * $70.78	$1,627.94
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	2/1/2020	7/5/2019	10/30/2019	117	94	FY 2020 = 117 * $8.49	$993.33	FY 2020 = 117 * $70.78	$8,281.26

Name	SCDC #	Reason	Discovery	Max-out Date Prior to Correction	Max-out Date	Actual Release Date	Length of Prolonged Incarceration by # of Days (G)- (F)	Prolonged Incarcration Avoided by # of Days (E) - (G)	Variable Cost per Inmate per Day (All Funds)	Total Cost of Prolonged Incarceration (Variable Cost)	Total Cost per Inmate per Day (All Funds)	Total Cost of Prolonged Incarceration (Total Cost)
		Additional jail time awarded	Release Audit	12/9/2019	11/1/2019	11/7/2019	6	32	FY 2020 = 6 * $8.49	$50.94	FY 2020 = 6 * $70.78	$424.68
		KCI did not check tentative release list	Release section verified weekend releases	12/27/2019	11/17/2019	11/18/2019	1	39	FY 2020 = 1 * $8.49	$8.49	FY 2020 = 1 * $70.78	$70.78
		Additional Hayes time given.	Probation Revocation Audit	10/11/2020	11/10/2017	11/21/2019	741	325	FY 2018 = 232 * $8.44 FY 2019 = 365 * $8.49 FY 2020 = 144 * $8.49	$6,279.49	FY 2018 = 232 * $64.96 FY 2019 = 365 * $70.78 FY 2020 = 144 * $70.78	$51,097.74
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	1/9/2020	10/27/2019	11/22/2019	26	48	FY 2020 = 26 * $8.49	$220.74	FY 2020 = 26 * $70.78	$1,840.28
		Additional jail time awarded	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/17/2020	10/12/2019	11/27/2019	46	51	FY 2020 = 46 * $8.49	$390.54	FY 2020 = 46 * $70.78	$3,255.88
		Additional jail time awarded and consecutive statue changed	Probation Revocation audit	8/20/2020	10/13/2019	12/2/2019	50	262	FY 2020 = 50 * $8.49	$424.50	FY 2020 = 50 * $70.78	$3,539.00
		Sentencing sheets modified by county	Probation Revocation audit	2/4/2020	11/6/2019	12/3/2019	27	63	FY 2020 = 27 * $8.49	$229.23	FY 2020 = 27 * $70.78	$1,911.06
		Awarded Hayes time per continuation. Received on 12/6/2019	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/4/2020	12/5/2019	12/6/2019	1	29	FY 2020 = 1 * $8.49	$8.49	FY 2020 = 1 * $70.78	$70.78
		Original sentencing sheet entered correctly, received corrected sentencing sheet which made inmate not 85%.	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/21/2020	6/17/2019	12/9/2019	175	43	FY 2019 = 13 * $8.49 FY 2020 = 162 * $8.49	$1,485.75	FY 2019 = 13 * $70.78 FY 2020 = 162 * $70.78	$12,386.50
		Authorize absence was omitted from tran count and warrant issued was changed from 5/6/2019 to 4/8/2019.	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/13/2020	10/12/2019	12/10/2019	59	34	FY 2020 = 59 * $8.49	$500.91	FY 2020 = 59 * $70.78	$4,176.02
		Additional jail time awarded	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/29/2020	9/6/2019	12/10/2019	95	50	FY 2020 = 95 * $8.49	$806.55	FY 2020 = 95 * $70.78	$6,724.10
		HAYES time awarded	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/7/2020	12/5/2019	12/10/2019	5	28	FY 2020 = 5 * $8.49	$42.45	FY 2020 = 5 * $70.78	$353.90
							7549	3283	Total	$60,240.74		$492,117.80

Name	SCDC #	Reason	Discovery	Max-out Date Prior to Correction	Max-out Date	Actual Release Date	Days in FY 12	Days in FY 13	Days in FY 14	Days in FY 15	Days in FY 16	Days in FY 17	Days in FY 18	Days in FY 19	Days in FY 20	Costs for FY 12	Costs for FY 13	Costs for FY 14	Costs for FY 15	Costs for FY 16	Costs for FY 17	Costs for FY 18	Costs for FY 19	Costs for FY 20	TOTAL	Length of Prolonged Incarceration by # of Days (G)-(F)	Prolonged Incarceration Avoided by # of Days (E)-(G)	Cost Per Day (All Funds)	Total Cost of Prolonged Incarceration
		Incorrect offense SCDC code	Informed by PPP	6/22/2014	1/22/2012	5/19/2014	160	365	323							$7,580.80	$18,297.45	$16,934.89							$42,813.14	848	34	FY 2012 = 160 * $47.38 / FY 2013 = 365 * $50.13 / FY 2014 = 323 * $52.43	$42,813.14
		Additional jail time given	Release audit	10/12/2015	8/3/2015	9/22/2015					50									$2,723.50					$2,723.50	50	20	FY 2016 = 50 * $54.47	$2,723.50
		Incorrect CDR code	SFREV Screening	8/20/2016	5/3/2015	4/22/2016				58	297								$3,134.90	$16,177.59					$19,312.49	355	120	FY 2015 = 58 * $54.05 / FY 2016 = 297 * $54.47	$19,312.49
		Consecutive structure entered incorrectly	Release audit	10/6/2016	7/10/2016	9/13/2016						65									$3,726.45				$3,726.45	65	23	FY 2017 = 65 * $57.33	$3,726.45
		Incorrect offense SCDC code	Release audit	1/28/2017	9/18/2016	11/9/2016						52									$2,981.16				$2,981.16	52	80	FY 2017 = 52 * $57.33	$2,981.16
		Incorrect SCDC offense code	Notified by institution	4/24/2020	12/21/2016	7/24/2018						191	365	24							$10,950.03	$23,710.40	$1,698.72		$36,359.15	580	640	FY 2017 = 191 * $57.33 / FY 2018 = 365 * $64.96 / FY 2019 = 24 * $70.78	$36,359.15
		Saturday release. MAXREL not checked by institution	Institution did not review MAXREL for weekend release	12/1/2018	12/1/2018	12/3/2018								2									$141.56		$141.56	2	0	FY 2019 = 2 * $70.78	$141.56
		Additional jail time given	Release audit	3/2/2019	10/26/2018	2/26/2019								123									$8,705.94		$8,705.94	123	4	FY 2019 = 123 * $70.78	$8,705.94
		Additional jail time given	Received FORM 9 from PPP	5/14/2020	1/7/2019	4/29/2019								112									$7,927.36		$7,927.36	112	381	FY 2019 = 112 * $70.78	$7,927.36
		Incorrect SCDC offense code	Community supervision review	8/23/2019	5/28/2017	4/30/2019						33	365	304							$1,891.89	$23,710.40	$21,517.12		$47,119.41	702	115	FY 2017 = 33 * $57.33 / FY 2018 = 365 * $64.96 / FY 2019 = 304 * $70.78	$47,119.41
		SCDC offense code changed to non 85%	Community supervision review	8/31/2019	10/3/2016	5/17/2019						270	365	321							$15,479.10	$23,710.40	$22,720.38		$61,909.88	956	106	FY 2017 = 270 * $57.33 / FY 2018 = 365 * $64.96 / FY 2019 = 321 * $70.78	$61,909.88
		Incorrect SCDC offense code	Informed by PPP	6/23/2019	3/11/2019	5/7/2019								57									$4,034.46		$4,034.46	57	47	FY 2019 = 57 * $70.78	$4,034.46
		Incorrect SCDC offense code	During 2nd release audit	10/2/2019	9/3/2017	7/16/2019							300	365	16							$19,488.00	$25,834.70	$1,132.48	$46,455.18	681	78	FY 2018 = 300 * $64.96 / FY 2019 = 365 * $70.78 / FY 2020 = 16 * $70.78	$46,455.18
		Incorrect SCDC offense code entered	Institutional conviction audit	7/14/2019	7/14/2019	8/9/2019									26									$1,840.28	$1,840.28	26	0	FY 2020 = 26 * $70.78	$1,840.28
		Incorrect SCDC offense code entered	Institutional conviction audit	9/9/2019	9/5/2018	8/21/2019								298	52								$21,092.44	$3,680.56	$24,773.00	350	19	FY 2019 = 298 * $70.78 / FY 2020 = 52 * $70.78	$24,773.00
		Order 9/1/2015 misunderstood	Informed by PPP	9/27/2019	3/6/2018	8/23/2019							116	365	54							$7,535.36	$25,834.70	$3,822.12	$37,192.18	535	35	FY 2018 = 116 * $64.96 / FY 2019 = 365 * $70.78 / FY 2020 = 54 * $70.78	$37,192.18
		Needed GPS-PPP was informed of weekend release.	PPP did not install GPS on weekend	8/24/2019	8/24/2019	8/25/2019									1									$70.78	$70.78	1	0	FY 2020 = 1 * $70.78	$70.78
		Additional Hayes Time given	Release audit	10/12/2019	6/12/2019	8/27/2019								18	58								$1,274.04	$4,105.24	$5,379.28	76	46	FY 2019 = 18 * $70.78 / FY 2020 = 58 * $70.78	$5,379.28
		Additional Hayes time given. Form 9 not filled out properly.	FORM 9 filled out incorrectly	8/23/2019	7/18/2019	8/1/2019									14									$990.92	$990.92	14	22	FY 2020 = 14 * $70.78	$990.92
		Additional jail time given on #10 & 11. Credit for time served on probation citation should have been entered.	Release audit	2/19/2020	7/9/2019	9/25/2019									78									$5,520.84	$5,520.84	78	147	FY 2020 = 78 * $70.78	$5,520.84
		Entries were not entered on transfer history for parole violation	Probation Revocation audit	11/23/2019	10/2/2019	10/16/2019									14									$990.92	$990.92	14	38	FY 2020 = 14 * $70.78	$990.92
		Probation Revocation in 2016. 559 jail time days not given until special PPP audit. Probation revocation audit.	Probation Revocation audit	1/4/2020	8/9/2018	10/21/2019								325	113								$23,003.50	$7,998.14	$31,001.64	438	75	FY 2019 = 325 * $70.78 / FY 2020 = 113 * $70.78	$31,001.64
		Additional Hayes time given	Release audit	11/23/2019	9/28/2019	10/22/2019									24									$1,698.72	$1,698.72	24	32	FY 2020 = 24 * $70.78	$1,698.72
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	11/1/2019	10/22/2019	10/25/2019									3									$212.34	$212.34	3	7	FY 2020 = 3 * $70.78	$212.34
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	2/1/2020	9/24/2019	10/29/2019									35									$2,477.30	$2,477.30	35	95	FY 2020 = 35 * $70.78	$2,477.30
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	11/20/2019	10/7/2019	10/30/2019									23									$1,627.94	$1,627.94	23	21	FY 2020 = 23 * $70.78	$1,627.94
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	2/1/2020	7/5/2019	10/30/2019									117									$8,281.26	$8,281.26	117	94	FY 2020 = 117 * $70.78	$8,281.26
		Additional jail time awarded	Release Audit	12/9/2019	11/1/2019	11/7/2019									6									$424.68	$424.68	6	32	FY 2020 = 6 * $70.78	$424.68
		KCI did not check tentative release list	Release section verified weekend releases	12/27/2019	11/17/2019	11/18/2019									1									$70.78	$70.78	1	39	FY 2020 = 1 * $70.78	$70.78
		Additional Hayes time given.	Probation Revocation Audit	10/11/2020	11/10/2017	11/21/2019							232	365	144								$15,070.72	$25,834.70	$10,192.32	$51,097.74	741	325	FY 2018 = 232 * $64.96 / FY 2019 = 365 * $70.78 / FY 2020 = 144 * $70.78	$51,097.74
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	1/9/2020	10/27/2019	11/22/2019									26									$1,840.28	$1,840.28	26	48	FY 2020 = 26 * $70.78	$1,840.28
		Additional jail time awarded	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/17/2020	10/12/2019	11/27/2019									46									$3,255.88	$3,255.88	46	51	FY 2020 = 46 * $70.78	$3,255.88
		Additional jail time awarded and consecutive statue changed	Probation Revocation audit	8/20/2020	10/13/2019	12/2/2019									50									$3,539.00	$3,539.00	50	262	FY 2020 = 50 * $70.78	$3,539.00
		Sentencing sheets modified by county	Probation Revocation audit	2/4/2020	11/6/2019	12/3/2019									27									$1,911.06	$1,911.06	27	63	FY 2020 = 27 * $70.78	$1,911.06
		Awarded Hayes time per continuation. Received on 12/6/2019	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/4/2020	12/5/2019	12/6/2019									1									$70.78	$70.78	1	29	FY 2020 = 1 * $70.78	$70.78
		Original sentencing sheet entered correctly, received corrected sentencing sheet which made inmate not 85%.	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/21/2020	6/17/2019	12/9/2019								13	162								$920.14	$11,466.36	$12,386.50	175	43	FY 2019 = 13 * $70.78 / FY 2020 = 162 * $70.78	$12,386.50
		Authorize absence was omitted from tran count and warrant issued was changed from 5/6/2019 to 4/8/2019.	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/13/2020	10/12/2019	12/10/2019									59									$4,176.02	$4,176.02	59	34	FY 2020 = 59 * $70.78	$4,176.02
		Additional jail time awarded	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/29/2020	9/6/2019	12/10/2019									95									$6,724.10	$6,724.10	95	50	FY 2020 = 95 * $70.78	$6,724.10
		HAYES time awarded	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/7/2020	12/5/2019	12/10/2019									5									$353.90	$353.90	5	28	FY 2020 = 5 * $70.78	$353.90
																												Total	$492,117.80

Column rate headers: 6/30/2012 — 47.38 | 6/30/2013 — 50.13 | 6/30/2014 — 52.43 | 6/30/2015 — 54.05 | 6/30/2016 — 54.47 | 6/30/2017 — 57.33 | 6/30/2018 — 64.96 | 6/30/2019 — 70.78 | 6/30/2020 — 70.78

Name	SCDC #	Reason	Discovery	Max-out Date Prior to Correction	Max-out Date	Actual Release Date	Days in FY 12	Days in FY 13	Days in FY 14	Days in FY 15	Days in FY 16	Days in FY 17	Days in FY 18	Days in FY 19	Days in FY 20	Costs for FY 12	Costs for FY 13	Costs for FY 14	Costs for FY 15	Costs for FY 16	Costs for FY 17	Costs for FY 18	Costs for FY 19	Costs for FY 20	TOTAL	Length of Prolonged Incarceration by # of Days (G)-(F)	Prolonged Incarceration Avoided by # of Days (E)-(G)	Variable Cost Per Day (All Funds)	Total Cost of Prolonged Incarceration
		Incorrect offense SCDC code	Informed by PPP	6/22/2014	1/22/2012	5/19/2014	160	365	323							$892.80	$2,164.45	$2,015.52							$5,072.77	848	34	FY 2012 = 160 * $5.58 / FY 2013 = 365 * $5.93 / FY 2014 = 323 * $6.24	$5,072.77
		Additional jail time given	Release audit	10/12/2015	8/3/2015	9/22/2015					50									$340.00					$340.00	50	20	FY 2016 = 50 * $6.80	$340.00
		Incorrect CDR code	SFREV Screening	8/20/2016	5/3/2015	4/22/2016				58	297								$371.20	$2,019.60					$2,390.80	355	120	FY 2015 = 58 * $6.40 / FY 2016 = 297 * $6.80	$2,390.80
		Consecutive structure entered incorrectly	Release audit	10/6/2016	7/10/2016	9/13/2016						65									$453.05				$453.05	65	23	FY 2017 = 65 * $6.97	$453.05
		Incorrect offense SCDC code	Release audit	1/28/2017	9/18/2016	11/9/2016						52									$362.44				$362.44	52	80	FY 2017 = 52 * $6.97	$362.44
		Incorrect SCDC offense code	Notified by institution	4/24/2020	12/21/2016	7/24/2018						191	365	24							$1,331.27	$3,080.60	$203.76		$4,615.63	580	640	FY 2017 = 191 * $6.97 / FY 2018 = 365 * $8.44 / FY 2019 = 24 * $8.49	$4,615.63
		Saturday release. MAXREL not checked by institution	Institution did not review MAXREL for weekend release	12/1/2018	12/1/2018	12/3/2018								2									$16.98		$16.98	2	0	FY 2019 = 2 * $8.49	$16.98
		Additional jail time given	Release audit	3/2/2019	10/26/2018	2/26/2019								123									$1,044.27		$1,044.27	123	4	FY 2019 = 123 * $8.49	$1,044.27
		Additional jail time given	Received FORM 9 from PPP	5/14/2020	1/7/2019	4/29/2019								112									$950.88		$950.88	112	381	FY 2019 = 112 * $8.49	$950.88
		Incorrect SCDC offense code	Community supervision review	8/23/2019	5/28/2017	4/30/2019						33	365	304							$230.01	$3,080.60	$2,580.96		$5,891.57	702	115	FY 2017 = 33 * $6.97 / FY 2018 = 365 * $8.44 / FY 2019 = 304 * $8.49	$5,891.57
		SCDC offense code changed to non 85%	Community supervision review	8/31/2019	10/3/2016	5/17/2019						270	365	321							$1,881.90	$3,080.60	$2,725.29		$7,687.79	956	106	FY 2017 = 270 * $6.97 / FY 2018 = 365 * $8.44 / FY 2019 = 321 * $8.49	$7,687.79
		Incorrect SCDC offense code	Informed by PPP	6/23/2019	3/11/2019	5/7/2019								57									$483.93		$483.93	57	47	FY 2019 = 57 * $8.49	$483.93
		Incorrect SCDC offense code	During 2nd release audit	10/2/2019	9/3/2017	7/16/2019							300	365	16							$2,532.00	$3,098.85	$135.84	$5,766.69	681	78	FY 2018 = 300 * $8.44 / FY 2019 = 365 * $8.49 / FY 2020 = 16 * $8.49	$5,766.69
		Incorrect SCDC offense code entered	Institutional conviction audit	7/14/2019	7/14/2019	8/9/2019									26									$220.74	$220.74	26	0	FY 2020 = 26 * $8.49	$220.74
		Incorrect SCDC offense code entered	Institutional conviction audit	9/9/2019	9/5/2018	8/21/2019								298	52								$2,530.02	$441.48	$2,971.50	350	19	FY 2019 = 298 * $8.49 / FY 2020 = 52 * $8.49	$2,971.50
		Order 9/1/2015 misunderstood	Informed by PPP	9/27/2019	3/6/2018	8/23/2019							116	365	54							$979.04	$3,098.85	$458.46	$4,536.35	535	35	FY 2018 = 116 * $8.44 / FY 2019 = 365 * $8.49 / FY 2020 = 54 * $8.49	$4,536.35
		Needed GPS-PPP was informed of weekend release.	PPP did not install GPS on weekend	8/24/2019	8/24/2019	8/25/2019									1									$8.49	$8.49	1	0	FY 2020 = 1 * $8.49	$8.49
		Additional Hayes Time given	Release audit	10/12/2019	6/12/2019	8/27/2019								18	58								$152.82	$492.42	$645.24	76	46	FY 2019 = 18 * $8.49 / FY 2020 = 58 * $8.49	$645.24
		Additional Hayes time given. Form 9 not filled out properly.	FORM 9 filled out incorrectly	8/23/2019	7/18/2019	8/1/2019									14									$118.86	$118.86	14	22	FY 2020 = 14 * $8.49	$118.86
		Additional jail time given on #10 & 11. Credit for time served on probation citation should have been entered.	Release audit	2/19/2020	7/9/2019	9/25/2019									78									$662.22	$662.22	78	147	FY 2020 = 78 * $8.49	$662.22
		Entries were not entered on transfer history for parole violation.	Probation Revocation audit	11/23/2019	10/2/2019	10/16/2019									14									$118.86	$118.86	14	38	FY 2020 = 14 * $8.49	$118.86
		Probation Revocation in 2016. 559 jail time days not given until special PPP audit. Probation revocation audit.	Probation Revocation audit	1/4/2020	8/9/2018	10/21/2019								325	113								$2,759.25	$959.37	$3,718.62	438	75	FY 2019 = 325 * $8.49 / FY 2020 = 113 * $8.49	$3,718.62
		Additional Hayes time given	Release audit	11/23/2019	9/28/2019	10/22/2019									24									$203.76	$203.76	24	32	FY 2020 = 24 * $8.49	$203.76
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	11/1/2019	10/22/2019	10/25/2019									3									$25.47	$25.47	3	7	FY 2020 = 3 * $8.49	$25.47
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	2/1/2020	9/24/2019	10/29/2019									35									$297.15	$297.15	35	95	FY 2020 = 35 * $8.49	$297.15
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	11/20/2019	10/7/2019	10/30/2019									23									$195.27	$195.27	23	21	FY 2020 = 23 * $8.49	$195.27
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	2/1/2020	7/5/2019	10/30/2019									117									$993.33	$993.33	117	94	FY 2020 = 117 * $8.49	$993.33
		Additional jail time awarded	Release Audit	12/9/2019	11/1/2019	11/7/2019									6									$50.94	$50.94	6	32	FY 2020 = 6 * $8.49	$50.94
		KCI did not check tentative release list	Release section verified weekend releases	12/27/2019	11/17/2019	11/18/2019									1									$8.49	$8.49	1	39	FY 2020 = 1 * $8.49	$8.49
		Additional Hayes time given.	Probation Revocation Audit	10/11/2020	11/10/2017	11/21/2019							232	365	144								$1,958.08	$3,098.85	$1,222.56	$6,279.49	741	325	FY 2018 = 232 * $8.44 / FY 2019 = 365 * $8.49 / FY 2020 = 144 * $8.49	$6,279.49
		Additional jail time awarded	Probation Revocation Audit	1/9/2020	10/27/2019	11/22/2019									26									$220.74	$220.74	26	48	FY 2020 = 26 * $8.49	$220.74
		Additional jail time awarded	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/17/2020	10/12/2019	11/27/2019									46									$390.54	$390.54	46	51	FY 2020 = 46 * $8.49	$390.54
		Additional jail time awarded and consecutive statute changed	Probation Revocation audit	8/20/2020	10/13/2019	12/2/2019									50									$424.50	$424.50	50	262	FY 2020 = 50 * $8.49	$424.50
		Sentencing sheets modified by county	Probation Revocation audit	2/4/2020	11/6/2019	12/3/2019									27									$229.23	$229.23	27	63	FY 2020 = 27 * $8.49	$229.23
		Awarded Hayes time per continuation. Received on 12/6/2019	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/4/2020	12/5/2019	12/6/2019									1									$8.49	$8.49	1	29	FY 2020 = 1 * $8.49	$8.49
		Original sentencing sheet entered correctly, received corrected sentencing sheet which made inmate no 85%.	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/21/2020	6/17/2019	12/9/2019								13	162								$110.37	$1,375.38	$1,485.75	175	43	FY 2019 = 13 * $8.49 / FY 2020 = 162 * $8.49	$1,485.75
		Authorize absence was omitted from tran count and warrant issued was changed from 5/6/2019 to 4/8/2019.	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/13/2020	10/12/2019	12/10/2019									59									$500.91	$500.91	59	34	FY 2020 = 59 * $8.49	$500.91
		Additional jail time awarded	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/29/2020	9/6/2019	12/10/2019									95									$806.55	$806.55	95	50	FY 2020 = 95 * $8.49	$806.55
		HAYES time awarded	Discovered on 1st release audit	1/7/2020	12/5/2019	12/10/2019									5									$42.45	$42.45	5	28	FY 2020 = 5 * $8.49	$42.45
																												Total	$60,240.74

Inmate Release Data Entry Process Before and After LOC Study

Included in the Department of Corrections' (SCDC) December 18, 2019 letter to the House Legislative Oversight Committee (LOC). This information was provided in response to the following question in LOC's December 2, 2019, letter to the Department of Corrections: "12. Please provide two flow charts, one which shows each of the items below: (a) SCDC's process for entering data related to inmate release dates prior to the LOC study process; and (b) SCDC's process for entering and auditing data related to inmate release dates as of November 2019."

In addition to providing the information in this document, SCDC provided the following response:
- Please see attached Timeline Inmate Record Audit.

Included in SCDC's December 18, 2019 letter to LOC

Entering Data related to Inmate Release Dates prior to LOC study

1. Inmate admitted to Reception and Evaluation Center

2. Commitment Orders entered by Records Analyst

3. Record then sent to Inmate Records Office to have Commitment Order entries audited by assigned staff

4. Commitment Orders reviewed by institutional classification staff upon arrival at assigned institution(s)

5. Commitment Orders audited by Inmate Records staff 60 days before release from SCDC

Staff Training and Development Curricula - 2019

Included in the Department of Corrections' (SCDC) December 18, 2019 letter to the House Legislative Oversight Committee (LOC). This information was provided in response to the following question in LOC's December 2, 2019, letter to the Department of Corrections: "16. Please list the training provided to each type of SCDC employee and when the training is provided (e.g., when hired, before interaction with inmates, annually, etc.)."

In addition to providing the information in this document, SCDC provided the following response:

- Please see attached 2019 Training and Staff Development Curricula.

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

DIVISION OF TRAINING and STAFF DEVELOPMENT

M E M O R A N D U M

THROUGH: Dennis Patterson, Assistant Deputy Director
                 Operations

FROM: Tessie A. Smith, Division Director
                 Division of Training and Staff Development

SUBJECT: **EMPLOYEE TRAINING**

DATE: **December 9, 2019**

Attached is the Correctional Staff Learning and Performance Curricula for CY 2019 that addresses New Employee On-Boarding, Agency Orientation, Correctional Officer Basic Training and Institutional In-Service. This is submitted in response to the Legislative Oversight Committee request, item #16, Employee Training.

                    S/   *Tessie A. Smith*
                           Division Director
                           Division of Training and Staff Development

cc: Dayne Haile

NOTE: New Hires – DAY ONE (Before interaction with inmates and assignment to worksite.)

2019 NEW EMPLOYEE ON-BOARDING (NEO) – 8.0 Hrs

Course Title	*Mandated By
Employee/Inmate Relations and PREA	ACA,PP
Grooming and Attire	ACA, PP
Human Resources (Benefits)	NA
Physical Agility Test (PAT)	PP,NA
Reporting for Duty	PP,NA
SC Code of Conduct	PP, Governor's Directive
SCEIS	PP,NA
Social Media	PP
Training Academy Overview	NA
TOTAL HOURS	**8**

E-Learning Course Title	*Mandated By
Key Control	ACA, PP
Tool Control	ACA, PP
Effective Communication: Deafness Sensitivity for New Employees	ADA, CC, DOJ
NIC Incident Command System for Corrections: Basic	HSPD-5, GD
TOTAL HOURS	**4**

Legend: *Mandated by

ACA – American Correctional Association
ADA – American with Disabilities Act
CC – Court Case
DACUM – Developing a Curriculum
DOJ – Department of Justice
F – Federal Law
GD - Governor's Directive
HSPD – Homeland Security Presidential Directive/
NA – Needs Assessment
OSHA – Occupational Safety & Health Administration
PP – Policy & Procedure

2019 AGENCY ORIENTATION – 40 hrs
Table 1 (ILT)

Instructor Led Training (ILT) Course Title	*Mandated By
Agency Executive Staff Welcome	ACA
Bloodborne/Airborne Pathogens and Respiratory Fit Test	OSHA, ACA, PP
Contraband Control	PP
Cultural Diversity	ACA
Defensive Driving	PP
Domestic Violence	PP
Hostage Situation	PP
Employee/Inmate Relations	PP
Grooming and Attire	PP
Inmate Panel	PP
Introduction to Incident Command System for Corrections	HSPD-5, GD
Introduction to K2, Drug ID, Searches and Contraband	PP
Mental Health	CC
Office of General Counsel	NA
OSHA HAZCOM/Lockout Tagout	OSHA
Police Services/K9	NA
Prison Rape Eliminate Act (PREA)/Sexual Misconduct	ACA, OSHA, F, PP
Professional Organizations	NA
Professionalism and Ethics	PP, NA
Report Writing	F, ACA, PP
Reporting for Duty	NA
SCEIS	GD
Security Threat Groups	PP
Sexual Harassment	ACA, NA
Social Media	PP, EBP
Suicide	CC
Training Academy Orientation	ACA, PP
Workplace Violence	PP
SUBTOTAL TABLE 1 HOURS	**40 hrs. Classroom**

Table 2 (E-Learning)

E-Learning Course Title	*Mandated By
First Aid	ACA, PP
CPR and AED	ACA, PP
Radio	ACA
SUBTOTAL TABLE 2 HOURS	**4.5 hrs. E-Learning**
SUBTOTAL TABLE 1 HOURS	**40 hrs. Classroom**
TOTAL HOURS	**44.5 HOURS**

LEGEND: * Mandated by:

ACA – American Correctional Academy

NA – Needs Assessment

F – Federal Law

HSPD – Homeland Security Presidential Directive

PP – Policy & Procedures

OSHA – Occupational Safety & Health Administration

DACUM – Developing a Curriculum

EBP– Evidence Based Practices

CC – Court Case

2019 CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BASIC TRAINING
4-WEEK CURRICULUM
(As of 2/4/19)

Course Title	Hours	*Mandated By
Basic Correctional Officer Orientation	1.5	NA
Correctional Officer Basic Drill and Ceremony	4	PP, NA
Defensive Tactics	30	ACA, PP
Employee/Inmate Relations	3	ACA, PP
Examinations	4.5	PP
First Aid/CPR	6.5	ACA, PP
Frisk Search, Cell Search, & Property Control	6	ACA, DACUM
Incident Command System for Corrections: Simulations (*As of 2/4/19)	*7.5	HSPD-5, GD
Interpersonal Communications	10	ACA
Legal	2	ACA, PP
Less Lethal Munitions – Chemical Agents	4	ACA,PP
Mechanical Restraints	8	ACA,PP
Mental Health – Recognition and Reporting	2	Case Law
Pre-Crisis Communications Skills	3	ACA
Security Procedures	4	ACA, PP
Suicide Intervention/Prevention	2	ACA,PP
Supervision of Offenders	4	ACA
Transportation of Inmates and Vehicle Searches	8	PP
Use of Force	6	PP
Weapons Familiarization and Performance: Revolver, Shotgun, Night Fire, Perimeter Shotgun, Shooting Scenarios	44	ACA, PP
TOTAL HOURS - OFFICERS: *All of the above*	160.0	
TOTAL HOURS - CADETS: *All of the above with the exception of resolver training*	124.0	
TOTAL HOURS – NON-SECURITY: *All of the above with the exception of all weapons training*	116.0	

LEGEND: *Mandated by:

ACA – American Correctional Academy
NA – Needs Assessment
F – Federal Law
GD - Governor's Directive
HSPD – Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Governor's Directive
PP – Policy & Procedures
OSHA – Occupational Safety & Health Administration
DACUM – Developing a Curriculum
EBP – Evidence Based Practices

2019 ANNUAL MANDATORY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Included in SCDC's December 18, 2019 letter to LOC

NOTE: All personnel will be required participate in Agency Mandates based on their classification (Certified or Non-Certified), title or position. Check with your immediate supervisor for additional information.

2019 Agency Training Mandates (Videos located on SCEIS MySC Learning)	Code	Hours	*Mandated By
Domestic Violence (Video)	1032.14V	0.5	SCDC, PP
Effective Communications: Deafness Sensitivity (Video) *(1)	27.02V	1.0	DOJ, NA
ERI/Fire Extinguisher/Fire Escape Hood (Video)	1004.17V	1.0	ACA, OSHA
IT Security Awareness (Video)	1053.27V	0.5	PP
PREA: (Video)	1073.30V	0.5	ACA
SC Gov't Code of Conduct (Video) *Change 1 (June 2019)	2067.01V	1.0	STATE
TB/Bloodborne Pathogens (Video) *Change 1 (June 2019)	1072.10V	.50	OSHA
Videos on Internet (https//nic.learn.com)			
Incident Command System for Corrections (ICSC) Intermediate *(2)	461.03	2.0	HSPD-5
Incident Command System for Corrections ((ICSC) Basic *(2)	461.02	1.0	HSPD-5
Incident Command System for Corrections (ICSC) Advanced *(2)	461.04	3.0	HSPD-5
Live Courses (Block Training not available on Video)			
DT for Non-Uniform/Non-Certified Employees *(3)	1003.14	3.5-4.5	NA
Employee/Inmate Relations: Professionalism & Ethics	1013.17	1.5	ACA, PP
Recognizing Mental Illness/ Appropriately Responding *(4) *Change 1 (June 2019)	1096.11	2.0-2.5	SCDC, PP
Workplace Violence	1075.64	1.0	PP, OSHA
ALL SCDC EMPLOYEES MUST PARTICIPATE IN THE TRAINING LISTED ABOVE.			
*(3) Certified Employees CANNOT take Defensive Tactics (DT) for Non-Uniform/Non-Certified Employees			
IN ORDER TO RETAIN YOUR SCDC CERTIFICATION, YOU MUST PARTICIPATE IN ALL CLASSES LISTED ABOVE AND BELOW.			
Communication Skills & Counseling Techniques	1058.15	1.00	ACA
Continuous Law Enforcement Education (CLEE) (video) *Change 1 (June 2019)	1088.00	.5-1.00	STATE, PP
CPR *(5)	1001.43	1.0-2.5	ACA, PP
Defensive Tactics (DT)	1003.11	3.0-6.0	ACA, PP
Legal Update 2019 (Video)	1009.36V	1.5	ACA, PP
Less Lethal Munition	1027.01	1.5-2.0	ACA, PP
Mechanical Restraints	1029.00	2.0-3.0	ACA, PP
Report Writing 101	1051.13	1.0	PP, NA
Respiratory Fit Test *(6)	1090.09	0.5-2.0	OSHA
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA): Level 3 Institutions Only	1024.00	1.0-2.0	OSHA, PP
Suicide Prevention (Instructor Led) *(5)	1015.16	2.0	ACA, PP
Suicide Part I (Video) *(5)	1015.17V	1.0	ACA, PP
Suicide Part II (Video) *(5)	1015.18V	1.0	ACA, PP
Transportation of Inmates *Change 1 (June 2019)	1016.00	1.0	PP, NA
Use of Force: What Would You Do? (2018/2019) *(7) *Change 2 (Aug. 2019)	1012.02	2.0-2.5	PP
Weapons Re-Qualification/Shotgun Training	12.00	1.0-7.0	ACA, PP
Weapons Retention & Disarmament	1003.01	1.5-2.5	ACA, PP
TOTAL		**32-50**	

2019 ANNUAL MANDATORY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

NOTES:

*(1) EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS: DEAFNESS SENSITIVITY (Video): 2019 new hires are required to take this E-Learning Course (Adobe Connect video) after New Employee Onboarding (NEO) and before attending Agency Orientation (AO); therefore, they are not required to take it again as annual mandatory training.

*(2) INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM FOR CORRECTIONS (ICSC): All Correctional Officers will take the ICSC Basic Course. Corporals and Sergeants will take the Intermediate Course. Lieutenants up to Executive Level Staff will take the Advanced Course. Non-uniform staff who are non-supervisors will take the Basic Course. First-line supervisors will take the Intermediate Course. Mid-Management Level Staff up to Executive Staff will take the Advance Course.

*(3) DEFENSIVE TACTICS FOR NON-UNIFORM/NON-CERTIFIED: DT for Non-Uniform/Non-Certified Staff will be optional. However, employees working at an institution or in positions that require them to regularly go to an institution are strongly encouraged to attend.

*(4) RECOGNIZING MENTAL ILLNESS AND APPROPRIATELY RESPONDING: This training is for certified, uniform staff hired prior to January 1, 2018 at Evans, Kershaw, Lee, Lieber, MacDougall, McCormick, Perry, Ridgeland, Turbeville, Tyger River, Trenton, Manning, and Goodman. Certified uniform staff hired prior to January 1, 2018, at Palmer, Livesay, and Wateree will travel to the closest institution to complete this training.

*(5) CPR, SUICIDE (INSTRUCTOR LED), SUICIDE PARTS I & II VIDEOS: All certified employees, medical and mental health employees, are REQUIRED to complete this in addition to Agency Training Mandates for ALL SCDC employees as listed in the first section.

*(6) RESPIRATORY FIT TEST: This annual training is required for all certified employees and/or any employee who serves on a special emergency team, medical position or medical area of assignment where respiratory protection may be required.

*(7) USE OF FORCE: WHAT WOULD YOU DO: This course is required to be taken by all certified staff. Wardens were required to take in 2018 and therefore do not need to take again in 2019.

Legend: *Mandated By	
ACA – American Correctional Association	**HSPD-5 –** Homeland Security/Presidential Directive
DACUM – Developing a Curriculum	**NA –** Needs Assessment
DOJ – Department of Justice	**OSHA –** Occupational Safety & Health Administration
DOL – Department of Labor	**PP –** Policy & Procedure
F – Federal Law	**STATE –** State Government

Inmate Classification Instruments and Instructions

Included in the Department of Corrections' (SCDC) December 18, 2019 letter to the House Legislative Oversight Committee (LOC). This information was provided in response to the following question in LOC's December 2, 2019, letter to the Department of Corrections: "17. Based on testimony from Dr. Austin (SCDC classification consultant) during the October 23, 2019, Subcommittee meeting, please provide an updated breakdown of how the new classification will operate, including the two components, anticipated number of inmates moving from higher to lower levels, discretionary options and how much discretion is expected, and partnership with the parole board."

In addition to providing the information in this document, SCDC provided the following response:
- Attached are the classification instrument instructions and the classification instruments (initial classification and reclassification). These documents describe how the new classification system will be operationalized. Please note that Level 1 is minimum security, Level 2 is medium security and Level 3 is maximum security. Below are the current and anticipated numbers of inmates in each custody level.
    - Current – 3,884 Level 1; 8,343 Level 2; and 4,887 Level 3 as of November 25, 2019
    - Anticipated – 4,272 Level 1; 10,738 Level 2 and 2,104 Level 3 as of November 25, 2019
    *These numbers do not include those inmates housed in RHU's or unclassified inmates in R&E's.
- Discretionary overrides are included in the classification instructions/instruments. The general standard is that 5-15 percent of a prison population's custody levels are based on discretionary overrides rather than the original initial classification or reclassification scores.
- The partnership with the parole board is a future initiative for the agency.

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING
INITIAL AND RECLASSIFICATION CUSTODY ASSESSMENTS

This document contains instructions for completing the initial classification and reclassification instruments for all inmates held in the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) and its various facilities. All sections must be entered completely using a combination of information provided by the inmate during the assessment, prior criminal history, inmate record and the automated system.

Using the above information, classification staff will complete all scoring items in the Classification Application on the secured login. This will produce a final score that will indicate a custody designation at the initial and reclassification assessment:

- Minimum (MI): Males 4 points or less / Females 6 points or less
- Medium (ME): Males 5 – 9 points / Females 7 – 11 points
- Close (CL): Males 10 points or more / Females 12 points or more

DISCRETIONARY OVERRIDES

The below information will be considered if assigning a custody other than the recommended level. A **full 2 -3 member ICC** will be required if a custody level override is utilized. A detailed justification for the override must be entered in the comments section of the review.

Discretionary Overrides – Higher Custody	**Discretionary Overrides – Lower Custody**
___ Recent Assaultive Behavior (w/in past 12 months)	___ Positive Adjustment
___ Gang Affiliation/Recent Activities	___ Crime Less Severe Than Scored
___ Crime More Severe Than Scored	___ Pre-Release/ Re-Entry Programming Needs
___ Prior Record More Severe Than Scored	___ Prior Record Less Severe Than Scored
___ Recent Disruptive Behavior	___ Behavior Warrants Less Restrictive
___ Notoriety of Offense	___ Prior Minimum Custody Placement
___ Security Concerns	___ Physically Disabled Inmate
___ Arrest History (manual record check for plead down/nolle prossed sex offenses)	

Non-Discretionary Overrides – Minimum Custody Restrictions – The automated system will not allow an override to MI custody if an inmate meets the following criteria:

___ Must have 8 years or less to maxout	___ Must be a U.S. citizen
___ No convicted sex offenses	___ No Class I Escapes
___ No category 4 – 5 open arrest detainers	___ No Class II Escapes within 7 years
___ No Hold or Wanted category 4 – 5 detainers	___ No designated gang members
___ No out of state/federal detainers (Wanted/Hold/Notify)	___ No current violent offense with prior violent commitment
___ No ICE detainers	

The following custody designations will pend to Central Classification for final approval:

- Initial placement in MI custody.
- Custody levels scoring as MI custody overridden to CL custody.

INITIAL ASSESSMENT - CLASSIFICATION APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS:

When an inmate is initially processed through the Reception & Evaluation Center and each time there is a transfer to another institution, an initial classification assessment will be conducted.

1. Select "Classification Application" from the Intranet Secured Login.

2. Enter SCDC # or Inmate Name and enter.

3. Select "+" to begin assessment.

4. Select SCDC Initial Classification Version and "add". The SCDC Reclassification Version will be used at the annual review or if a significant change occurs to the inmate's status.

5. Click on folder to begin assessment.

<u>INITIAL ASSESSMENT - SCORING INSTRUMENT:</u>

<u>ITEM #1</u> – The system will auto populate the current commitment with the highest category offense.

ITEM #1 Current Offense with Highest Category	Pts
Category 1 or 2	1
Category 3	3
Category 4	5
Category 5	7

<u>ITEM #2</u> – The system will auto populate the prior commitment within the past seven (7) years with the highest category (priors and completed convictions).

ITEM #2 Prior Commitments – Highest Category in Past 7 Years	
None	0
Category 1 or 2	1
Category 3	3
Category 4	5
Category 5	7

<u>ITEM #3</u> – The system will auto populate any Class I or Class II escape within the past seven (7) years. If the inmate has both a Class I and a Class II escape, the system will select the higher score (7).

ITEM #3 Escape History – in Past 7 Years	
None	0
Class II or more	3

Class I or more	7

ITEM #4 – The system will auto populate any assault with or without a weapon within the past seven (7) years. If the inmate has both an assault with a weapon and one without, the system will use the higher score (7).

ITEM #4 Institutional Assaultive History – in Past 7 Years	
None	0
Any Assault - no weapon	3
Any Assault - weapon used	7

ITEM #5 – The system will auto populate the inmate's current age.

ITEM #5 Current Age	
25 years and younger	2
26 - 32 years	1
33 - 50 years	0
51 years and older	-1

ITEM #6 – The system will auto populate the inmate's Security Threat Group status.

ITEM #6 Validated/Suspected Gang Membership	
Designated Gang Member	2
No	0

ITEM #7 – The system will auto populate the inmate's verified education status, whether the inmate is a 1st time offender, or if the inmate was in MI custody if previously released from SCDC.

ITEM # 7 Mitigating Factors	
Verified Education (HS/GED or higher)	-1
1st Time Offender or Prior SCDC Minimum Custody at Release	-1

Once all items have been scored and saved, the classification application will score a recommended custody. Click on "+ Custody Assignment".

Select the custody drop down box and click on the final custody designation. If the custody is any custody other than the recommended custody, a detailed justification must be indicated in the text box. Click "add" when complete.

Once the initial classification has been completed, the ICC will ensure the inmate understands his assigned custody and the factors affecting his score. If an inmate is receiving an initial assessment and is a previous SCDC inmate within the past seven (7) years, classification staff will need to factor items listed in the reclassification assessment into the final decision. Inmates are not permitted to waive an initial classification assessment and must appear before the ICC.

RECLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT – CLASSIFICATION APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS:

Every 12 months or whenever an inmate has a significant status change (i.e., major disciplinary conviction, added or dismissed detainer/commitment, change in gang affiliation, etc.), a reclassification assessment will be conducted. In addition to several of the same factors considered in the initial assessment, the reclassification assessment will also consider major disciplinary convictions and participation in work and program assignments.

1. Select Classification Application from the Secured Login on the intranet.

2. Enter the SCDC # or Inmate Name and enter.

3. Select "+" to begin assessment.

4. Select SCDC Reclassification Version and "add".

5. Click on bottom right folder to begin assessment.

RECLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT - SCORING INSTRUMENT:

ITEM #1 – The system will auto populate the current commitment with the highest category offense.

ITEM #1 Current Offense with Highest Category	Pts
Category 1 or 2	1
Category 3	3
Category 4	5
Category 5	7

ITEM #2 – The system will auto populate the prior commitment within the past seven (7) years with the highest category (priors and completed convictions).

ITEM #2 Prior Commitments – Highest Category in Past 7 Years	
None	0
Category 1 or 2	1
Category 3	3
Category 4	5

Category 5	7

ITEM #3 – The system will auto populate any Class I or Class II escape within the past seven (7) years. If the inmate has both a Class I and a Class II escape, the system will select the higher score (7).

ITEM #3 Escape History – in Past 7 Years	
None	0
Class II or more	3
Class I or more	7

ITEM #4 – The system will auto populate any assault with or without a weapon within the past seven (7) years. If the inmate has both an assault with a weapon and one without, the system will use the higher score (7).

ITEM #4 Institutional Assaultive History – in Past 7 Years	
None	0
Any Assault - no weapon	3
Any Assault - weapon used	7

ITEM #5 – The system will auto populate the inmate's current age.

ITEM #5 Current Age	
25 years and younger	2
26 - 32 years	1
33 - 50 years	0
51 years and older	-1

ITEM #6 – The system will auto populate the inmate's Security Threat Group status.

ITEM #6 Validated/Suspected Gang Membership	
Designated Gang Member	2
No	0

ITEM #7 – The system will auto populate the number of major disciplinary convictions within the past 24 months.

ITEM #7 Number of Major Disciplinary Convictions	
None past 24 mos.	-2
None past 12 mos.	-1
1 - 3 past 12 mos.	1
4 - 5 past 12 mos.	3
6+ past 12 mos.	5

ITEM #8 – The ICC will determine how many points will be scored based on the inmate's participation in work and/or program assignments within the past 12 months. Program staff will ensure information regarding the inmate's participation in programs is submitted to classification prior to the scheduled assessment and may serve as a committee member.

Item #8 Work/Program Participation – in Past 12 Mos.	
Refusing to Work or Program	2
Received Earned Work **OR** Program Credits within past 12 months	-1
Received Earned Work **AND** Program Credits within past 12 months – Or Not Required	-3

Once all items have been scored and saved, the classification application will score a recommended custody. Click on "+ Custody Assignment". Note below an example of a non-discretionary override that will not allow placement in minimum custody.

Select the custody drop down box and click on the final custody designation. If the custody is any custody other than the recommended custody, a detailed justification must be indicated in the text box. Click "add" when complete.

Once the reclassification assessment has been completed, the ICC will ensure the inmate understands his assigned custody and the factors affecting the score. If an inmate chooses to waive appearance at the assessment, the classification caseworker will ensure the inmate is notified of the results.

South Carolina Department of Corrections
Initial Classification - Males

Inmate's Name: _____ **SCDC #:** _____

Institution: _____ **Review Date**: _____

ITEM #1 Current Offense with Highest Category	Pts	Score
Category 1 or 2	1	
Category 3	3	
Category 4	5	
Category 5	7	
ITEM #2 Prior Commitments – Highest Category in Past 7 Years		
None	0	
Category 1 or 2	1	
Category 3	3	
Category 4	5	
Category 5	7	
ITEM #3 Escape History – in Past 7 Years		
None	0	
Class 2 or more	3	
Class 1 or more	7	
ITEM #4 Institutional Assaultive History – in Past 7 Years		
None	0	
Any Assault - no weapon	3	
Any Assault - weapon used	7	
ITEM #5 Current Age		
25 years and younger	2	
26 - 32 years	1	
33 - 50 years	0	
51 years and older	-1	
ITEM #6 Validated/Suspected Gang Membership		
Designated Gang Member	2	
No	0	
ITEM # 7 Mitigating Factors		
Verified Education (HS/GED or higher)	-1	
1st Time Offender or Prior SCDC Minimum Custody at Release	-1	
Total Score		

South Carolina Department of Corrections
Re-Classification – Males

Inmate's Name: _____ **SCDC #**:_____

Institution: _____ **Date of Review**: _____ **Review Reason:** _____

ITEM #1 Current Offense with Highest Category	Pts	Score
Category 1 or 2	1	
Category 3	2	
Category 4	4	
Category 5	6	
ITEM #2 Prior Commitments with Highest Category – in Past 7 Years		
None	0	
Category 1 or 2	1	
Category 3	2	
Category 4	4	
Category 5	6	
ITEM #3 Escape History - in Past 7 Years		
None	0	
Class 2 or more	3	
Class 1 or more	7	
ITEM #4 Past Assaultive Disciplinary History – in Past 7 Years		
None	0	
Any Assault – no weapon	3	
Any Assault – weapon used	7	
ITEM #5 Current Age		
25 years and younger	2	
26 – 32 years	1	
33 -50 years	0	
51 years and older	-1	
ITEM #6 Validated/Suspected Gang Membership		
Designated Gang Member	2	
No	0	
ITEM #7 Number of Major Disciplinary Convictions		
None past 24 mos.	-2	
None past 12 mos.	-1	
1 - 3 past 12 mos.	1	
4 - 5 past 12 mos.	3	
6+ past 12 mos.	5	
Item #8 Work/Program Participation – in Past 12 Mos.		
Refusing to Work or Program	2	
Received Earned Work **OR** Program Credits within past 12 months	-1	
Received Earned Work **AND** Program Credits within past 12 months – Or Not Required	-3	
Total Score		

Revised 12/5/19

MALES - TOTAL CUSTODY SCORE (items 1 –8) - Circle One

10 or more points = Close
5 to 9 points = Medium
4 points or less = Minimum

Check (✓) All Factors that Apply to this Inmate for Purpose of Over-Riding Scored Custody Level

Non-Discretionary – Minimum Custody Restrictions	Discretionary Override – Higher Custody	Discretionary Override – Lower Custody
___ Must have 8 years or less to maxout	___ Recent Assaultive Behavior (w/in past 12 months)	___ Positive Adjustment
___ No convicted sex offenses	___ Gang affiliation/recent activities	___ Crime Less Severe Than Scored
___ No category 4 – 5 open arrest detainers	___ Crime More Severe Than Scored	___ Pre-Release/ Re-Entry Programming Needs
___ No Hold or Wanted detainers (category 4 - 5)	___ Prior Record More Severe Than Scored	___ Prior Record Less Severe Than Scored
___ No out of state/federal detainer (Wanted/Hold/Notify)	___ Recent Disruptive Behavior	___ Behavior Warrants less restrictive
___ No ICE detainers	___ Notoriety of Offense	___ Prior minimum custody placement
___ Must be a U.S. Citizen	___ Security Concerns	___ Physically disabled Inmate
___ No Class I escapes	___ Arrest History	
___ No Class II escape within 7 yrs		
___ No designated gang members		
___ No current violent with prior violent commitment		

Is Override of Scored Custody Level Recommended? _____Yes _____ No
(Overrides must be made by a 2 – 3 member ICC committee.)

If yes, give rationale (required):

_____

_____

Recommend Population Assignment and Custody Level

Population Assignment _____   **Custody Level: _____**

General Population	GP	Minimum	MIN
Protective Custody	PC	Medium	MED
Medical	MD	Close	CLO
Mental Health	MH		
Restrictive Housing Unit	RHU		

Classification Caseworker: _____ Date of Review _____/_____/_____
Next Review Date _____/_____/_____

Revised 12/5/19

South Carolina Department of Corrections
Initial Classification - Females

Inmate's Name: _____ **SCDC #:**_____

Institution: _____**Review Date**: _____

ITEM #1 Current Offense with Highest Category	Pts	Score
Category 1 or 2	1	
Category 3	3	
Category 4	5	
Category 5	7	
ITEM #2 Prior Commitments – Highest Category in Past 7 years		
None	0	
Category 1 or 2	1	
Category 3	3	
Category 4	5	
Category 5	7	
ITEM #3 Escape History - in Past 7 Years		
None	0	
Class 2 or more	3	
Class 1 or more	7	
ITEM #4 Assaultive Disciplinary Convictions- in Past 7 Years		
None	0	
Any Assault - no weapon	3	
Any Assault - weapon used	7	
ITEM #5 Current Age		
25 years and younger	2	
26 – 32 years	1	
33 -50 years	0	
51 years and older	-1	
ITEM #6 Validated/Suspected Gang Membership		
Designated Gang Member	2	
No	0	
ITEM # 7 Mitigating Factors		
Verified Education (HS/GED or higher)	-1	
1st Time Offender or Prior SCDC Minimum Custody at Release	-1	
Total Score		

Revised 12/5/19

South Carolina Department of Corrections
Re-Classification – Females

Inmate's Name: _____ **SCDC #:**_____

Institution: _____ **Date of Review**: _____ **Review Reason:** _____

ITEM #1 Current Offense with Highest Category	Pts	Score
Category 1 or 2	1	
Category 3	2	
Category 4	4	
Category 5	6	
ITEM #2 Prior Commitments – Highest Category in Past 7 Years		
None	0	
Category 1 or 2	1	
Category 3	2	
Category 4	4	
Category 5	6	
ITEM #3 Escape History - in Past 7 Years		
None Listed	0	
Class 2 or more	3	
Class 1 or more	7	
ITEM #4 Past Assaultive Disciplinary History – in Past 7 Years		
None	0	
Any Assault – no weapon	3	
Any Assault – weapon used	7	
ITEM #5 Current Age		
25 years and younger	2	
26 – 32 years	1	
33 -50 years	0	
51 years and older	-1	
ITEM #6 Validated/Suspected Gang Membership		
Designated Gang Member	2	
No	0	
ITEM #7 Number of Major Disciplinary Convictions		
None past 24 mos.	-2	
None past 12 mos.	-1	
1 – 3 past 12 mos.	1	
4-5 past 12 mos.	3	
6+ past 12 mos.	5	
Item #8 Work/Program Participation – in Past 12 Mos.		
Refusing to Work or Program	2	
Received Earned Work **OR** Program Credits past 12 months	-1	
Received Earned Work **AND** Program Credits within past 12 months – Or Not Required	-3	
Total Score		

Revised 12/5/19

FEMALES - TOTAL CUSTODY SCORE (items 1 –8) - Circle One

12 or more points = Close
7 to 11 points = Medium
6 points or less = Minimum

Check (✓) All Factors that Apply to this Inmate for Purpose of Over-Riding Scored Custody Level

Non-Discretionary – Minimum Custody Restrictions	Discretionary Over-Ride – Higher Custody	Discretionary Over-Ride – Lower Custody
___ Must have 8 years or less to maxout	___ Recent Assaultive Behavior (w/in past 12 months)	___ Positive Adjustment
___ No convicted sex offenses	___ Gang Affiliation/Recent Activities	___ Crime Less Severe Than Scored
___ No category 4 – 5 open arrest detainers	___ Crime More Severe Than Scored	___ Pre-Release/ Re-Entry Programming Needs
___ No Hold or Wanted detainers (category 4 - 5)	___ Prior Record More Severe Than Scored	___ Prior Record Less Severe Than Scored
___ No out of state/federal detainer (Wanted/Hold/Notify)	___ Recent Disruptive Behavior	___ Behavior Warrants Less Restrictive
___ No ICE detainers	___ Notoriety of Offense	___ Prior Minimum Custody Placement
___ Must be a U.S. Citizen	___ Security Concerns	___ Physically Disabled Inmate
___ No Class I escapes	___ Arrest History	
___ No Class II escape within 7 yrs		
___ No designated gang members		
___ No current violent with prior violent commitment		

Is Over-Ride of Scored Custody Level Recommended? _____Yes _____ No
(Over-rides must be approved by a 2 – 3 member ICC committee.)

If yes, give rationale (required):

_____
_____

Recommend Population Assignment and Custody Level

Population Assignment _____ **Custody Level: _____**

General Population	GP		Minimum	MIN
Protective Custody	PC		Medium	MED
Medical	MD		Close	CLO
Mental Health	MH			
Restrictive Housing Unit	RHU			

Classification Caseworker: _____ **Date of Review** _____/_____/_____
Next Review Date _____/_____/_____

_____

Revised 12/5/19

Incident Reporting Flow Chart

Included in the Department of Corrections' (SCDC) December 18, 2019 letter to the House Legislative Oversight Committee (LOC). This information was provided in response to the following question in LOC's December 2, 2019, letter to the Department of Corrections: "23. Please provide a flow chart that shows where incident reports go, from submission to resolution, within each division and facility. Please note how each submission may be made (e.g., electronic or hard copy form)."

In addition to providing the information in this document, SCDC provided the following response:

- Please see attached flow chart. Incident reports at the institutions are submitted by staff and provided to their supervisor. Reports are then provided to the Major of security for disposition. The Major reviews the incident reports and determines actions to be taken. For incident reports dealing with inmates, the Major may conduct an administrative hearing or refer to a formal hearing dependent upon the circumstances of the incident. For incident reports dealing with inappropriate behavior by staff under their purview the Major may address the issue informally or may refer to the Warden for formal corrective action. For incident reports dealing with inappropriate behavior by staff not under their purview (e.g., non-uniformed staff), the Major shall refer the incident report to the Warden for appropriate action. For incident reports received concerning security related issues or other matters submitted by staff, the Major will either address the concerns themselves or refer the incident report to the appropriate authority.
- If an incident occurs in a division, it is completed by the employee and forwarded to their supervisor for review and recommendation and then provided to the Division Director for appropriate action.

Incident Reporting

Included in SCDC's December 18, 2019 letter to LOC

Institution

1
Reports submitted by staff and provided to their supervisor.

2
Reports are then provided to the Major of security for disposition.

3
The Major reviews the incident reports and determines actions to be taken.

4

For incident reports dealing with inappropriate behavior by staff under their purview, the Major may address the issue informally or may refer to the Warden for formal corrective action.

For incident reports dealing with inappropriate behavior by staff not under their purview, the Major shall refer the incident report to the Warden for appropriate action.

For incident reports received concerning security related issues or other matters submitted by staff, the Major will either address the concern themselves or refer the incident report to the appropriate authority.

For incident reports dealing with inmates, the Major may conduct an administrative hearing or refer to a formal hearing dependent upon the circumstances of the incident.

Division- If an incident occurs in a division, it is completed by the employee and forwarded to their supervisor for review and recommendation and then provided to the Division Director for appropriate action.

Investigation Decision Tree and Separation Caution Memorandum

Included in the Department of Corrections' (SCDC) December 18, 2019 letter to the House Legislative Oversight Committee (LOC). This information was provided in response to the following question in LOC's December 2, 2019, letter to the Department of Corrections: "35. Please describe the situations in which an inmate's housing may be changed to separate the inmate from another inmate or from an employee, and the process to implement the separation (e.g., is a request required, if so, who has to complete a form and who decides if the separation occurs, etc.)."

In addition to providing the information in this document, SCDC provided the following response:

- Prison Rape Elimination Act- Allegation of Sexual Abuse or Sexual Harassment; Substantiated Case of Sexual Abuse or Sexual Harassment.
    - o When an inmate submits, or the institution is notified of an allegation of sexual abuse, the security officer who is notified ensures that the alleged victim is separated from the alleged perpetrator for the duration of the investigation (Staff or Inmate). If the case is substantiated through an investigation, the Prison Rape Elimination Act Compliance Manager will submit an SCDC Form 19-141 "Separation/Caution Memorandum" to classification to review.
- Please see below excerpt from SCDC Policy 21.04 Inmate Classification Plan responsive to this question:

18. SEPARATIONS/CAUTIONS: To establish guidelines to flag the records of inmates for whom special caution must be taken for certain actions involving these inmates.
18.1 *The Central Classification Separation Committee is* responsible for issuing the official caution to be placed in the inmate's records when conditions or circumstances exist that would potentially jeopardize the safety and security of the inmate, employee(s), or other persons. SCDC Form 19-141, "Separation/Caution Memorandum," will be submitted to *Central* Classification *(CC).*
18.2 The reasons an inmate may be identified with a Separation/Caution include:

- The inmate has testified against another inmate, and this is verified through court documentation, solicitor's office, or law enforcement.
- *Co-defendants are assessed on a case-by-case basis. Known hostility must exist or inmate must have a separation order from an appropriate law enforcement agency.*
- The victim, victim's family members, or known associates are incarcerated or employed at the inmate's assigned institution, and this is verified through court documentation, solicitor's office, law enforcement, victim/witness office, or employee.
- There are known strong hostilities between inmates, and this is verified by MINs and/or SCDC Form 19-29, "Incident Report."
- The inmate has physically assaulted and/or caused serious injuries to an SCDC employee who works at an institution, and this is verified by MINs and/or SCDC Form 19-29.
- The inmate makes written or verbal threats against an employee(s) or other inmate(s) that are found to be credible by institutional or Agency personnel.
- *Relatives* of an inmate employed at the institution or with the SCDC *will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine if potential concerns exist between the inmate and the employee.*
- *Parent, child or current spouse of the inmate. Siblings will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.*

18.3 When an employee determines that circumstances warrant the placement of a separation in an inmate's record, s/he will complete SCDC Form 19-141, "Separation/Caution Memorandum," verify the

information, attach any documentation, and forward it to the Warden/Duty Warden for approval. The Warden/Duty Warden will sign the SCDC Form 19-141 and forward it to *Central Classification* if approved. Documentation of the Warden Duty Warden's disapprovals will be noted on the staff memorandum and filed in the institutional record, central record, and maintained in the Warden's office. NOTE: For Kirkland R&E Center only: The R&E Manager can sign the 19-141 as would a Duty Warden. The R&E Manager will also determine if the 19-141 is invalid due to insufficient evidence and disapprove the Separation Request at that time instead of forwarding it to *Central* Classification. Documentation of disapproved request will be noted on the staff memorandum and filed in the institutional record, central record, and maintained at the Kirkland R&E Center.

18.4 Upon receipt of SCDC Form 19-141, "Separation/Caution Memorandum," *the Central Classification Separation Committee* will review for approval or disapproval. When a separation is approved, the information is entered into the automated system and SCDC Form 19-141 and documentation will be filed in *Central Classification automated* separation files. Temporary placement of SCDC Form 19-141 in Section 2 may be permitted only until the automated form is returned. An automated form (golden rod copy) will be printed and filed in the inmate's Central Record and Institutional Record. This copy will be placed in Section 2 of both records with nothing being filed on top of the Caution (golden rod). When *the Central Classification Separation Committee* disapproves a Separation/Caution, a return memo will be forwarded to the institution with an explanation as to the reason for disapproval. *Classification staff will file it in Section 3 of the Inmate Record.*

18.5 All active cautions will be reviewed for accuracy and applicability once every two (2) years. The Division Director of Classification and Inmate Records will be responsible for establishing a review schedule and procedures. If modifications to the Caution are necessary, a written request must be forwarded to the Division Director.

18.6 Cautions will not be removed from any record unless the original conditions causing the placement of the Caution are no longer a factor. When it is determined that a Caution is no longer necessary, the appropriate employee will request removal of the Caution by completing SCDC Form 19-141, "Separation/Caution Memorandum," with the Warden's approval and signature. When forwarded to *CC* for removal, an explanation must accompany the request. The Division Director of Classification and Inmate Records or designee will make the final decision to approve or disapprove removal of the Caution. If approved for removal, *CC* will be responsible for dropping the Caution from the automated system and for notifying Inmate Records via CRT message to remove it from the Central Record. The appropriate staff at the institution will be notified to remove it from the Institutional Record. (Note: A hard copy will be maintained by *CC* for historical information.)

18.7 When an inmate is released or paroled from the SCDC, any Caution information will remain in his/her records and will not be purged. In the event the inmate is reincarcerated, the Classification Coordinator at the Reception and Evaluation Center will review the inmate's record for Caution information when s/he is readmitted. If the inmate has previously had a designated Caution, the Classification Coordinator will ensure that both the manual and the automated records are properly flagged. If necessary, SCDC Form 19-141 will be completed and forwarded to *CC*.

18.8 When an initial or scheduled review is conducted by the ICC, the Classification Caseworker/Community Programs Supervisor will be responsible for checking the inmate's record for Cautions to verify that the manual and automated systems coincide. If they do not match, *Central* Classification will be notified to initiate any necessary corrective actions. If it is discovered that two (2) or more inmates housed in the same institution have Cautions against each other, an immediate transfer request should be made to *Central* Classification.

18.9 It is the responsibility of the Institutional Operations Section at both the sending and receiving institutions to carefully check the inmate's Institutional Record and automated system for placement of a Separation/Caution.

18.10 If an inmate with a Caution is inadvertently transferred to an institution to which s/he should not be assigned, immediate steps must be taken to isolate

PCM Receives Incident Report (SCDC Form 19-29A)

South Carolina Department of Corrections

SEXUAL ABUSE (Inmate or staff abuser)

SEXUAL HARASSMENT (Who is the alleged abuser?)

STAFF

INMATE

PCM emails PC about incident

PCM emails PC about incident

PC determines it's PREA and forwards to Police Services

PC determines it's not PREA returns to PCM

PC determines it's PREA and forwards to Police Services

Repeated Sexual Harassment?*

YES

NO

Police Services notifies PC & Warden

Police Services notifies PC & Warden

Facility conducts administrative investigation

PCM documents that harassment is not repeated

Warden notifies PCM

Warden notifies PCM

PCM notifies victim of investigative outcome & saves all case documents on shared drive

PC – Agency PREA Coordinator (barkley.john@doc.sc.gov)

PCM – Facility PREA Compliance Manager

*Review all current and prior incident reports in this alleged victim's file to verify if this is a repeat offense from this perpetrator.

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
SEPARATION/CAUTION MEMORANDUM

TO: Division Director, Classification and Inmate Records
FROM:
SUBJECT: SEPARATION/CAUTION
DATE:

Please ensure that a "SEPARATION/CAUTION" is issued for placement in the offender Central Record, Institutional Record, and Automated Record of the below listed inmate(s):

1. TYPE OF ACTION REQUESTED: ☐ SEPARATION REQUIREMENT   ☐ DELETION OF SEPARATION

     SCDC #: _____   INMATE NAME: _____

     To be separated/deleted from:

     SCDC #: _____   INMATE NAME: _____

     SCDC #: _____   INMATE NAME: _____

     SCDC #: _____   INMATE NAME: _____

     SCDC #: _____   INMATE NAME: _____

     SCDC #: _____   INMATE NAME: _____

     ☐ EMPLOYEE:

     Employee I.D. #: _____   EMPLOYEE NAME: _____

     Employee I.D. #: _____   EMPLOYEE NAME: _____

2. Explanation/Reason for Caution:

3. Source of Information:

4. Comments:

Attach supplemental sheets as needed: S/_____

Position: _____   Location: _____

Classification Case Manager/Designee: _____

Location: _____

Telephone: _____

Original Central Classification   **Copy:** Warden's Jacket

SCDC Form 19-141 (Revised May 2018)

Housing Locations by Institution Category

Included in the Department of Corrections' (SCDC) December 18, 2019 letter to the House Legislative Oversight Committee (LOC). This information was provided in response to the following question in LOC's December 2, 2019, letter to the Department of Corrections: "37. Please provide an Excel chart, which lists each location at which an SCDC inmate may be housed, number of inmates at the location, primary party responsible for the location, and a brief summary of reasons why/when an inmate may be housed at the location. A sample format is below."

Housing (as of November 1, 2019)			
Location	Number of inmates housed	Primary party responsible for location	Why/When an inmate may be housed at this location (e.g., pre-trial, receive medical care, separation due to discipline, etc.)
Jail/Designated Facilities			
Add rows beneath with each jail where SCDC houses inmates			
SCDC Prisons			
Add rows beneath with each SCDC facility			
Health Care Facilities			
Add rows beneath with each SCDC health facility and private health facility SCDC utilizes			
Out of State Facilities			
Add rows beneath with each facility out of state where SCDC houses inmates			

In addition to providing the information in this document, SCDC provided the following response:
- Please see attached Housing Locations by Institution Category

Housing Locations by Institution Category

Institution Category	Inst. Category Description	Location Code	Primary party responsible for location	Why/When an inmate may be housed at this location (e.g., pre-trial, receive medical care, separation due to discipline, etc.)
0101-0599 - SCDC Institution		**18,646**		
161	TYGER RIVER	1,027	Warden Jake Gadsden	General Population
171	LEATH	615	Warden Patricia Yelldell	General Population
173	LIVESAY	474	Warden George Dodkin	Work Release/Labor Crew
181	MCCORMICK	935	Warden Charles Williams	General Population
191	PERRY	840	ADDOS Scott Lewis (Acting)	General Population
211	BROAD RIVER	1,301	Warden Michael Stephan	General Population
222	TRENTON	461	Warden Evonne Dreher	General Population
232	GOODMAN	529	Warden Steve Duncan	Labor Crew
241	KIRKLAND	1,495	Warden Terri Wallace	R&E/Medical/General Population
251	MANNING	646	Warden Lisa Engram	Pre-Release/Work Release/Labor Crew
331	GRAHAM	734	Warden Marian Boulware	R&E/GP/Work Release/Pre-Release/Labor Crew/Medical
411	ALLENDALE	913	Warden McKendley Newton	General Population
421	LIEBER	1,110	Warden Brian Kendall	General Population
422	MACDOUGALL	652	Warden Edsel Taylor	General Population
442	RIDGELAND	940	Warden Levern Cohen	General Population
531	EVANS	1,262	Warden Donnie Stonebreaker	General Population
541	KERSHAW	1,340	Warden Tonya James	General Population
551	LEE	1,248	Warden Kenneth Nelsen	General Population
563	PALMER	225	Warden Joseph McFadden	Pre-Release/Work Release/Labor Crew
571	TURBEVILLE	1,036	Warden Kenneth Sharp (Eff. 12/17)	General Population
582	WATEREE RIVER	863	Warden Donald Beckwith	General Population
0700-0799 - Designated Facilities		**326**		
704	Abbeville County Prison Camp	15	Jail Administrator	Local public works assignments as approved
707	Allendale County Jail	3	Jail Administrator	Local public works assignments as approved
708	Anderson City Jail	3	Chief of Police	Local public works assignments as approved
710	Anderson County Detention Center	46	Detention Director	Local public works assignments as approved
718	Barnwell County Detention Center	9	Jail Administrator	Local public works assignments as approved
720	Beaufort County Detention Center	3	Jail Administrator	Local public works assignments as approved
730	Chester County Detention Center	18	Detention Administrator	Local public works assignments as approved
736	Clarendon County Detention Cente	2	Detention Director	Local public works assignments as approved
739	Clinton City Jail	3	Chief of Police	Local public works assignments as approved
742	Darlington County Detention Cente	1	Detention Director	Local public works assignments as approved
744	Darlington County Prison Camp	18	Prison Camp Director	Local public works assignments as approved
748	Dillon County Detention Center	20	Jail Administrator	Local public works assignments as approved
750	Dorchester County Detention Cente	3	Detention Director	Local public works assignments as approved
751	Easley City Jail	1	Chief of Police	Local public works assignments as approved
752	Fairfield County Detention Center	45	Detention Director	Local public works assignments as approved
754	Georgetown County Detention Cen	23	Detention Director	Local public works assignments as approved
758	Greenwood County Detention Cent	5	Jail Administrator	Local public works assignments as approved
759	Fort Mill City Jail	1	Chief of Police	Local public works assignments as approved
773	Laurens County (R. Eugene Johns	16	Jail Administrator	Local public works assignments as approved
780	Marion County Prison Camp	20	Prison Camp Director	Local public works assignments as approved
781	Marlboro County Detention Center	6	Jail Administrator	Local public works assignments as approved
782	Newberry County Detention Center	9	Detention Director	Local public works assignments as approved
785	Oconee County Detention Center	9	Detention Director	Local public works assignments as approved
789	Pickens County Jail	5	Jail Administrator	Local public works assignments as approved
790	Pickens County Prison Camp	13	Prison Camp Director	Local public works assignments as approved
794	Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Ce	3	Detention Director	Local public works assignments as approved
796	Union County Prison Camp	16	Detention Director	Local public works assignments as approved
798	York County Detention Center	6	Jail Administrator	Local public works assignments as approved
799	York County Prison Camp	4	Prison Camp Director	Local public works assignments as approved
0800-0899 - County Locations		**70**		
802	AIKEN CO	2	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
804	ANDERSON CO	3	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
808	BERKELEY CO	1	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
809	CALHOUN CO	1	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
810	CHARLESTON CO	10	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
811	CHEROKEE CO	10	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
813	CHESTFIELD CO	1	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
814	CLARENDON CO	1	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
817	DILLON CO	1	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
821	FLORENCE CO	2	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
823	GREENVILLE CO	12	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
826	HORRY CO	1	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
828	KERSHAW CO	1	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
829	LANCASTER CO	1	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
832	LEXINGTON CO	3	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date

Housing Locations by Institution Category

Institution Category	Inst. Category Description	Location Code	Primary party responsible for location	Why/When an inmate may be housed at this location (e.g., pre-trial, receive medical care, separation due to discipline, etc.)
838	ORANGEBURG CO	2	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
839	PICKENS CO	2	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
840	RICHLAND CO	11	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
842	SPARTANBURG CO	2	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
843	SUMTER CO	2	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
846	YORK CO	1	County Facility Administrator	Pending Hearing or Court Date
1000-1099 - Hospitals		**25**		
1002	MUSC--CHARLESTN	1	Hospital Administrator	Medical Care
1008	GRNVLL MEMRL HSPTL	1	Hospital Administrator	Medical Care
1016	TRIDENT REGIONAL	1	Hospital Administrator	Medical Care
1017	TUOMEY REGIONAL	1	Hospital Administrator	Medical Care
1018	JUST CARE INC(COLA CARE C	13	Hospital Administrator	Medical Care
1019	PALMETTO RCHLAND	6	Hospital Administrator	Medical Care
1020	PALMETTO BAPTIST	1	Hospital Administrator	Medical Care
1028	AIKEN REG MEDICAL CENTER	1	Hospital Administrator	Medical Care
2200-2254 - Other States, Territories		**57**		
2201	ALABAMA	1	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2203	ARIZONA	1	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2205	CALIFORNIA	3	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2206	COLORADO	2	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2208	DELAWARE	1	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2209	FLORIDA	4	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2210	GEORGIA	4	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2213	ILLINOIS	2	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2220	MARYLAND	3	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2229	NEW HAMPSHIRE	1	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2230	NEW JERSEY	7	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2231	NEW MEXICO	3	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2233	NORTH CAROLINA	7	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2236	OKLAHOMA	2	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2238	PENNSYLVANIA	2	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2239	RHODE ISLAND	1	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2242	TENNESSEE	2	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2246	VIRGINIA	11	State DOC Director	ICC or OJ
2257 - CoreCivic (Private Facility in		**48**		
2257	CORECIVIC	48	Warden Vergara	Security Concerns

SCDC Policy ADM-13.04-Energy Consumption and Conservation

Included in the Department of Corrections' (SCDC) December 18, 2019 letter to the House Legislative Oversight Committee (LOC). This information was provided in response to the following question in LOC's December 2, 2019, letter to the Department of Corrections: "39. In SCDC facilities without HVAC, if any, what does SCDC consider a reasonable temperature range and how does SCDC ensure the temperature remains within that range? Is the temperature within those facilities maintained within the same range as facilities with HVAC systems, which SCDC referenced in its August 22, 2019, letter, question number 32?"

In addition to providing the information in this document, SCDC provided the following response:
- Please see attached ADM-13.04-Energy Consumption, and Conservation.
- Every Dorm at SCDC has heat so the temperature range for heating is the same for every building at SCDC. For the Dorms that do not have air-conditioning, those buildings were designed without air conditioning and use large ventilation fans, high ceilings and several other design features to keep the building cooler than the outside temperature. For institutions that do not have air conditioning, there is not a range as it varies based on the outside temperature.

SCDC POLICY/PROCEDURE

Change 1 to ADM-13.04: 5.1

NUMBER: ADM-13.04

TITLE: ENERGY CONSUMPTION, MANAGEMENT, AND CONSERVATION

ISSUE DATE: June 5, 2015

RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY: DIVISION OF *FACILITIES MANAGEMENT*

OPERATIONS MANUAL: ADMINISTRATION

SUPERSEDES: ADM-13.04 (April 1, 2003); (October 1, 2001)

RELEVANT SCDC FORMS/SUPPLIES: NONE

ACA/CAC STANDARDS: 4-ACRS-1A-07, 4-ACRS-1A-12, 4-ACRS-4B-03, *4-4138, 4-4139, 4-4139-1, 4-4145, 4-4146, 4-4153*

STATE/FEDERAL STATUTES: South Carolina Code of Laws, 1976, as amended, §48-52-10 through §48-52-680.

Discussion: Responsible energy consumption and energy conservation must be a cooperative effort between all SCDC employees and inmates. Maintenance personnel will be responsible for the installation of energy efficient equipment and for making needed repairs; however, energy conservation is every employee and inmate's responsibility. Energy Awareness Coordinators and Energy Management Teams will serve as leaders for this effort. Maintenance personnel cannot be expected to discover all energy conservation/consumption problems within SCDC institutions and buildings. All employees and inmates should make every effort to assist maintenance personnel by looking for potential problems and providing possible solutions. The Agency can only conserve energy through a cooperative effort by everyone.

PURPOSE: To establish guidelines that encourage more efficient use of energy resources and to develop plans to manage the energy budget and eliminate energy waste within the South Carolina Department of Corrections.

POLICY STATEMENT: The Agency is committed to conserving energy and promoting responsible energy consumption practices. To this end, the SCDC will designate an Energy Manager and Energy Awareness Coordinators who will be responsible for creating Energy Management Teams to generate energy consumption awareness. The Agency recognizes that a cooperative effort is required to reduce the amount of wasted energy within the SCDC and will encourage all employees and inmates to assist in this endeavor. The SCDC will ensure that the energy management program is in keeping with all applicable Agency policies/procedures, American Correctional Association Standards, and state and federal statutes.

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SPECIFIC PROCEDURES:

1. RESPONSIBILITIES:

1.1 Energy Manager: The *Assistant Director, Division of Facilities Management* (within the Division of *Facilities Management*) will be designated as the Agency's Energy Manager. The Energy Manager will be responsible for reviewing energy conservation suggestions submitted by employees through the Employee Innovation System. Inmates may submit energy conservation suggestions through the

Wastewatchers Program. (**NOTE:** Staff and inmates making significant contributions to the energy management program will be recognized for their input.) The Energy Manager will be responsible for ensuring that the Agency complies with state statutes governing energy conservation and management for state agencies. The Energy Manager and the Division Director of Finance will submit reports to the State Energy Office as required by state statute and as requested by the State Energy Office.

1.2 Energy Awareness Coordinators: The Agency Director, each Warden, and the highest ranking official in each SCDC building (e.g., Headquarters building, Support Services building, Training Academy, etc.) will appoint an Energy Awareness Coordinator to establish and monitor energy conservation measures and goals within his/her institution or building. The Energy Awareness Coordinator will form an Energy Management Team. The Energy Awareness Coordinator will also be responsible for assisting the Inmate Representative Committee with energy conservation ideas.

1.3 Energy Management Teams: Each Energy Awareness Coordinator will form an Energy Management Team (EMT) that will include representatives from each of the main components of the institution or building. (In an institution, the members would come from education, food service, maintenance, budgeting, and security. For the Headquarters building, the members would come from each office and division.) An existing committee (e.g., safety committee, staff meeting members, etc.) may serve as the EMT. Each EMT will establish and monitor energy conservation measures and goals within the institution or building. EMTs will be responsible for the enforcement of SCDC Policy/Procedure ADM-13.04 in their respective areas. Each EMT will meet at least quarterly, and each Energy Awareness Coordinator will be responsible for disseminating minutes to the EMT. Copies of the minutes should also be forwarded to the *Assistant Director,* Division of *Facilities Management*.

1.4 Inmate Representative Committees: In addition to the EMT, the Inmate Representative Committees may suggest energy conservation ideas and ways to decrease waste to EMTs.

2. TRANSPORTATION CONSERVATION: Employees utilizing Agency vehicles must observe all state and local speed laws and, when feasible, travel via the most efficient route possible. Whenever possible, vehicle trips will be planned and coordinated in advance to prevent more than one (1) vehicle from going to the same destination at the same time. Vehicle maintenance will be performed in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations pursuant to SCDC Policy/Procedure OP-20.02, "Transportation Management."

3. LIGHTING CONSERVATION:

3.1 The last employee to leave an area that will not be occupied for several hours will be responsible for turning off all lights, unless to do so would jeopardize the security and/or safety of the area.

3.2 Maintenance personnel will ensure that lighting is maintained at the following recommended standard illumination levels unless such would jeopardize the security and/or safety of the area:

AREA	RECOMMENDED FOOT CANDLES
Cells (at desk level)	20
Cafeterias	30-40
Personal Grooming Areas	20
Washrooms	20
Break/Briefing Rooms	20-30
Conference Rooms	30-40
Corridors/Stairways	10-10
Mail Rooms	70-80
Office/Clerical Areas	50-70
Artist/Drafting Rooms	90-100
Storage Areas	5-10
Machine Operating Rooms	90-100

(**NOTE**: Light readings will be taken at desk level for offices and at eye level for grooming areas and public spaces. For institutions or areas without light meters, assistance can be requested from the Division of *Occupational* Safety *and Workers' Compensation* or from the Division of *Facilities Management*.) (**4-ACRS-1A-07**, *4-4145, 4-4146*)

3.3 Maintenance personnel will be responsible for removing any unnecessary fixtures, lamps, and ballasts. Unit supervisors/office managers will be responsible for ensuring that all lamps, fixtures, lenses, globes, and reflecting surfaces of lamps are kept clean and free of dust, grease, and other dirt accumulations. High pressure sodium lights will be used for outside lighting where possible.

3.4 If lighting is controlled automatically, maintenance personnel will be responsible for periodically checking the timer for proper operation and accuracy. If outside lighting is activated by photocells, maintenance personnel will periodically verify proper operation of the same.

3.5 If incandescent lamps are being used for periods over four (4) hours per day, maintenance personnel will replace the lamps with compact fluorescent lamps where feasible and economical.

3.6 Because the lumen output of fluorescent lamps decrease*s* as they age, yet consume the same amount of energy, timely replacement (such as group relamping) will be implemented by maintenance personnel.

3.7 The most efficient fixtures (e.g., electronic ballasts and T8 lamps) will be used where possible.

3.8 In recessed down lights, reflector lamps of lower wattage will be used where feasible.

3.9 Inside warehouses or industry buildings (or where precise color rendition is not important), high pressure sodium lights will be used.

4. ENCLOSED AREAS CONSERVATION:

4.1 In working areas, except where security considerations dictate otherwise, employees will be responsible for ensuring that curtains and shades are left open on cold days to benefit from solar heat gain, closed on hot days to reduce solar heat gain, and closed at night during the winter to reduce heat loss through the window.

4.2 Weather-stripping and/or caulking will be installed around all windows and doors, where needed, to reduce the flow of outside air. Window air conditioning units will be covered by maintenance personnel in cold weather. Broken and/or cracked glass and missing window panes will be replaced. Doors that will not close properly will be fixed. Storm windows and doors will be installed where appropriate and economically feasible.

5. HEATING, VENTILATION, AND AIR CONDITIONING (HVAC) CONSERVATION:

5.1 The use of *state issued* portable electric heaters or heat lamps ~~is prohibited~~ *are permitted* in SCDC owned or leased buildings. *NOTE: Use of portable electric heaters must be approved on SCDC Form 8-19, " Request for Use of Portable Electric Heater." In extenuating circumstances, a portable electric heater can be approved via a telephone call to Division Director Occupational Safety & Worker's Compensation or Division Director of Facilities Management, with a follow-up official request on SCDC Form 8-19.* (Changes in BLUE, amended by Change 1, dated August 7, 2017.)

5.2 Employees working in areas with thermostats for simple HVAC systems (cannot heat and cool at the same time) will set the thermostat so that the room air temperature is 78°F when cooling and 68°F when heating. In areas with more complex systems (heat and cool at the same time), exact thermostat settings will be determined and set forth by the *Assistant Director, Division of Facilities Management* or designee, Division of *Facilities Management*, due to the unique features of these systems and to minimize energy use while maintaining comfort. **(4-ACRS-4B-03***, 4-4153***)**

5.3 Heating and cooling will be reduced or shut off in unoccupied lobbies, corridors, vestibules, and storage areas by maintenance personnel. Heat-producing equipment should be consolidated into one (1) area to better control heating and cooling (copiers, fax machines, vending machines, etc.).

5.4 Employees may use ventilating fans or ventilating systems (including free-standing fans) in their working areas. During the cooling season, if cool at night and humidity levels permit, doors, windows, and ventilating equipment should be used to cool the building contingent upon safety and security requirements. If practical, maintenance personnel will wire restroom exhaust fans with the light circuit so that they do not run unnecessarily.

5.5 HVAC systems should be turned OFF when a building is to be unoccupied for eight (8) hours or more, unless damage would occur to the building or its contents or when the outside temperature is expected to be lower than 50°F. When possible, automatic set-back thermostats will be installed by maintenance personnel to automatically set back temperatures for these extended periods (usually these thermostats will be set to shut off 30 minutes before the building is expected to be unoccupied and be set to turn on 30 minutes before the building is to be occupied). (**NOTE:** The only exception to this will be made where heat pumps [without a step-up thermostat] are used and where potential savings can be lost when the thermostat is turned up/down in the winter.)

6. ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CONSERVATION:

6.1 Where energy management systems are installed, they will be used to the fullest extent possible by institutional maintenance personnel to monitor and control lighting and HVAC equipment for optimum energy efficiency and comfort.

6.2 Institutional maintenance personnel will continuously monitor the energy management system and will ensure that the settings and program instructions are adjusted appropriately for operational changes. **(4-ACRS-4B-03,** *4-4153***)**

7. WATER HEATING/PLUMBING CONSERVATION:

7.1 Institutional maintenance personnel will set temperature control devices for domestic hot water (water used for personal hygiene or general cleaning) at 105°F or the lowest setting on the control device, whichever is higher. Higher settings may be used in those facilities that have insufficient hot water. If practical and economically feasible, a mixing valve set at 105°F will be installed between the hot water tank and the nearest tap by institutional maintenance personnel. (**4-ACRS-1A-12,** *4-4138, 4-4139, 4-4139-1*)

7.2 Hot water required for food preparation or other health reasons will be set as required by pertinent laws and codes (such as DHEC regulations requiring dishwasher water to be set at 180°F).

7.3 Time clocks, installed by institutional maintenance personnel, will be used on water heaters to reduce the operating time, when feasible.

7.4 Maintenance personnel will install flow restrictors on all lavatories, showers, and hose bibs, etc., to reduce water flow to the minimum amount necessary. Spring operated faucet valves and water-conserving showerheads will be installed where feasible if funding allows.

7.5 Maintenance personnel will ensure that all water leaks and drips are eliminated and that insulation is installed and properly maintained on hot water storage tanks and exposed piping.

7.6 Water should not be left running unattended (mop sinks, kitchen loading docks, bathrooms, etc.).

8. KITCHEN EQUIPMENT CONSERVATION:

8.1 Kitchen personnel should utilize exhaust and hood fans only during food preparation*,* and should reduce the temperature or turn off cooking equipment during slower periods.

8.2 Kitchen personnel will turn on steam tables 30 minutes prior to use, keep them covered during use, and turn them off as soon as possible after use.

8.3 When possible, maintenance personnel will place condenser coils outside and will ensure that there is adequate ventilation around all condensers and compressors.

8.4 Maintenance personnel will set the controls on all refrigeration equipment as low as necessary, and kitchen personnel will ensure that the capacity of each unit is not exceeded. Kitchen personnel, under general supervision of maintenance personnel,

will clean the condensers and coils on self-contained refrigeration units. Maintenance personnel will clean the condensers and coils, and check the refrigerant regularly, on all other refrigerant equipment. Kitchen personnel should consolidate trips to the refrigerator/freezer to avoid the unnecessary opening of doors.

9. PERSONAL APPLIANCE CONSERVATION:

9.1 Personal electrical appliances of employees and inmates must be Underwriter Laboratory (UL) approved and meet the National Electrical Code. (**NOTE:** The SCDC will not be responsible for any personal property that is damaged by an electrical surge [e.g., lightning, high or low voltage, etc.].)

9.2 Automatic coffee makers should be limited. Coffee pools should be created to take advantage of one (1) coffee maker per group.

9.3 Personal electrical appliances (e.g., radio, TV, fan, etc.) may be used by inmates in keeping with the requirements of SCDC Policy/Procedure OP-22.03, "Authorized Inmate Property and Disposition of Unauthorized Property." However, no more than two (2) authorized appliances will be in use at any one time per inmate.

10. OFFICE EQUIPMENT CONSERVATION: Employees utilizing office and/or audio-visual equipment will ensure that they are turned off when not in use (including computers, CRTs, typewriters, dictating equipment, calculators, televisions, projectors, etc.). Slide projectors should not be rapid-cooled (switch in "fan" position) unless they are to be moved immediately. Power management functions should be utilized on all computer systems when possible.

11. PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE: Preventive maintenance of all equipment such as boilers, furnaces, air conditioners, etc., will be conducted by maintenance personnel in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations (including filter changes, adjustments, cleaning, testing, and other related maintenance). The *Assistant Director,* Division of *Facilities Management*, will be available should any technical assistance or additional information be needed. (See SCDC Policy/Procedure ADM-13.07, "Maintenance and Repairs," for more information.)

12. INSPECTIONS: Energy consumption and conservation measures will be reviewed during inspections conducted by Inspectors assigned to the Division of *Facilities Management* and during visits by the Department's Energy Manager. Written reports detailing the findings of these inspections at institutions will be forwarded to the respective Warden, a copy maintained by the Division Director of *Facilities Management* or designee, and a copy sent to the appropriate

Regional **Director. Written reports detailing the findings of these inspections at sites other than institutions will be forwarded to the responsible *Deputy* Director, a copy maintained by the Division Director of *Facilities Management* or designee, and a copy sent to the responsible member of the Agency Director's Staff.**

13. REPORTS: Quarterly and annual energy consumption graphs will be furnished to the Agency Director and the Agency Director's staff for review and distribution to appropriate authorities (e.g., Energy Awareness Coordinators, Energy Awareness Teams, etc.).

14. DEFINITION(S):

Energy Management System refers to an automated system which has been implemented in some institutions to control all the boilers, heating, air conditioning, lighting, etc., within the institution.

SIGNATURE ON FILE

S/_____

s/Bryan P. Stirling, Director

ORIGINAL SIGNED COPY MAINTAINED IN THE OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT.

Analysis of Whether Manning Correctional Institution Conducted Appropriate Number of Temperature Checks

Included in the Department of Corrections' (SCDC) December 18, 2019 letter to the House Legislative Oversight Committee (LOC). This information was provided in response to the following question in LOC's December 2, 2019, letter to the Department of Corrections: "40. Does the Quality Improvement and Risk Management division (QIRM) review temperature readings of all SCDC facilities? If so, please provide the temperature readings for Manning Pre-Release Center for the past six months. If not, is this something QIRM could do in the future without additional resources? If additional resources would be needed, please list those resources."

In addition to providing the information in this document, SCDC provided the following response:

- The Division of Quality and Improvement and Risk Management (QIRM) does not review temperature readings. Rather, QIRM reviews and reports whether the institutions are conducting temperature checks with the frequency required. It should be noted that temperature checks are conducted by the institutions only for Restrictive Housing Units, the Diversionary Housing Unit, Crisis Stabilization Units, and crisis cells. QIRM and Operations Headquarters Leadership receives the weekly Temperature and Sanitation Resource Information Management (RIM) Report. The RIM report includes the compliance rates for the percent of required cells checked daily, temperature readings for cells found to be out of temperature range, and actions taken to address out of range temperatures. QIRM uses the report to review compliance rates for number of temperature checks for the institutions visited by the Implementation Panel and any other institutions audited by QIRM. QIRM also assesses if actions were taken to address cells out of temperature range. QIRM's findings are included in compliance reports completed by QIRM staff.
- In order for QIRM to provide more up-to-date analysis statewide for all institutions, more staff will be needed. Please note there are currently 5 analyst positions allotted to the division. A request has been made for 5 more analysts as at least 10 analysts are needed to complete comprehensive audits and to assist in quality improvement efforts for all institutions. Operations will likely need additional staff and resources if the temperature of all dorms in each institution is required to be checked.
- QIRM conducted an analysis regarding whether Manning conducted the appropriate number of temperature checks. The results are attached. If the actual temperature readings are needed, RIM can provide that report.

Manning Temperature and Sanitation Check Compliance Rates for June 2019 – November 2019

Manning RHU Day Shift Temperature Check Compliance Rates June - November 2019

Manning RHU Night Shift Temperature Check Compliance Rates June - November 2019

HLOC Committee Member Visits as of December 12, 2019

Included in the Department of Corrections' (SCDC) December 18, 2019 letter to the House Legislative Oversight Committee (LOC). This information was provided in response to the following question in LOC's December 2, 2019, letter to the Department of Corrections: "44. Please provide information on all facilities toured by ad hoc subcommittee members during the study process and areas visited/processes seen by members during each tour."

In addition to providing the information in this document, SCDC provided the following response:

- Please see attached HLOC Committee Member Visits as of December 12, 2019

House Legislative Oversight Committee Member Visits to SCDC Institutions

Representative	Scheduled or Unscheduled	Date	Time	Institution	Areas Visited
Rep. Williams	Scheduled	6/27/2019	1:00 p.m.	Palmer Work Release	Warden (mission of institution), staff support, institutional classification manager, all living areas. Job site visit to Effingham Cannery McCall Farms. Meet with Plant & HR manager and ex-inmate who is currently hired as FTE at McCall Farms
Rep. Williams & Hegegan	Scheduled	7/2/2019	10:00 a.m.	Lee CI	Warden and management staff meet with the Representative in the wardens office and gave them an overview of the institution. Toured medical department and viewed the infirmary (hospice patients). Went to the East yard, Education talked to principal Ms. Diaz. Toured the Law Library. Conversed with staff. Talked to institutional program staff Ms. Hilton. West Yard vocational training brick masonry and carpentry shop. Back dock areas. and into Prison Industries- uniform section. F6 CBU, F4 Vera Program, F2 general population. On the way back to A building view the chapel. Then F7 RHU Academy of Hope (south side) spoke to inmates in the program. Stayed about 15 minutes. Exited RHU building. The tour was completed. The Representative held a press conference on the front lawn.
Rep. Hegegan	Scheduled	7/9/2019	1:00 p.m.	Evans CI	Warden office , program staff and AW with briefing overview of instituion. Current programs and upcoming programs, Prison industries veiwed harness company. Went to housing unit F4 (waxhaw)then continued on to education. Talked to the teacher toured classroom and comuter lab. Vocational training, barbering and carpentry programs which is in the process of being turned into a welding school. Returned to A building and stopped in opertations area. Finished in Warden's office the Representative posed for a picture with staff. The tour was complete.
Rep. Johnson	Scheduled	7/23/2019	3:00 p.m.	Camille Graham CI	Started in Warden's Conference room given overview of institution and staffing. List of all the programs currently operating at the institution. After about 20 minutes proceeded to the yard has classes going on stopped to view the classes. Went to Whitney B unit youthful offender dorm, viewed pictures. Zion housing unit prelease. Talked with staff and gave him an overview of the release program. Proceed to Blue Ridge MH dorm ICS side D and observed ICS inmates. Proceeded to R&E Q&A on processing of inmates upon arrival. R&E processing area where PREA, orientation and other intake . Proceeded back to Admin Bldg. and the tour ended.
Rep. Caskey & Caskey	Scheduled	7/25/2019	11:30 a.m.	Lee CI	Started tour at front gate. Director Stirling and Rep came through at same time. Talked to staff about the baggage and body scanners. Proceeded to the East Yard F2, F4, & F6. Reps talked to staff and inmates in each living area. Continued to PI uniform section. Conversed with staff and inmates about working area. Left and continued to West PI (mattress factory and recycling program). Next to vocational carpentry and brick masonry shop. Continues on to F5 to view the door system. Next to F3 A side inmates out in common areas, (showering etc.). F1 next MH A side due to Fac Mgmt. staff working on stair all inmates were secured in their cells. Continued on to Cafeteria and judge Clary, Caskey and Director were served spaghetti meal. Believe the enjoyed the meal. Went to Education the Reps meet with staff, talked to inmates, looked at law library and asked questions on what was needed. Talked with Daesai. Processed to Chapel and listen to choir practice. Returned to the administration bldg. and exited the institution.
Rep. Dillard	Scheduled	8/11/2019	3:00 p.m.	Manning Pre-Release	Reps. Jefferson and Williams canceled. Started at front gate continued to the A Building conference room had a brief overview of the institution. Proceeded to the Education building (brick masonry). Continued to Tunnel to living units 1-6. Proceeded to the cafeteria, the commissary and then the clothing closet. Ms. Dillard spoke to the inmate clothing closet operator. Finished out the tour at programs building. Rep Dillard spoke with front line and management staff.
Reps Clary & Caskey	Scheduled	8/25/2019	3:00 p.m.	and CI; R&E; Psychiatric Hos	Started tour in visitation room, proceeded to the infirmary, Gilliam, F1 & F2 ICS dorms, R&E building both sides and HLBMU dorm
Rep Clary	Scheduled	10/9/2019	3:00 p. m.	urning Leaf (Non SCDC Facilit	Visited Turning Leaf Turning Project in Charleston SC. The project focus/goal is to assist men recently released from prison to help them complete probation and stay out of prison. This a non SCDC facility
Reps Tallon, Clary & Caskey	Scheduled	10/28/2019	3:00 p.m.	land CI R&E and Inmate Rec	Visited R&E spoke with R& E Manager to discuss receipt of documentation to incarcerate an individual. The tour ended in the Inmate Records Office wher this process is finalized

House Legislative Oversight Committee Member Visits to SCDC Institutions

Representative	Scheduled or Unscheduled	Date	Time	Institution	Areas Visited
Rep Williams	Unscheduled	11/18/2019	3:00 p. m.	Camille Graham CI	Representative Williams was taken to Conference Room and given an overview the layout of the institution. He toured the cafeteria and Blue Ridge housing unit which where Mental Health and transitional inmates are housed
Rep Williams	Unscheduled	11/21/2019	2:00 p.m.	Manning Pre-Release	He toured the commissary, clothing closet, school, carpentry, brick masonry, visitation, control room, tunnel living areas(Ward 1-6) & Programs building. He spoke with staff and inmates in commissary, education, tunnel, Programs building & control room. Mr. Anderson
Rep Williams	Unscheduled	12/3/2019	1:00 p.m.	Broad River CI	Tour started with Prison Industries and Crisis Stabilation Unit. He talked with Staff and inmates. The tour ended in the Warden's office.
Rep Williams	Unscheduled	12/5/2019	3:15 p.m.	Perry CI	He spoke with Sgt. Roper in the Lobby, and was then escorted by Asst. Div. Dir. Lewis through Visitation on the way to the Yard. They went to the Mess Hall and observed feeding, and then went into the kitchen area where Rep. Williams spoke with several inmates. They then proceeded to Q-1 and Rep. Williams spoke with the CBU Coordinators as a group. His visit ended at approximately 5:35 pm.

Inmate with Earned Work Credit Job Spreadsheet

Included in the Department of Corrections' (SCDC) December 18, 2019 letter to the House Legislative Oversight Committee (LOC). This information was provided in response to the following question in LOC's December 2, 2019, letter to the Department of Corrections: "46. Please provide the following for each fiscal year 2015 through 2019: (a) Sentence length distribution for all inmates as of June 30; and (b) Number of inmates currently working and number of correctional officers supervising them."

In addition to providing the information in this document, SCDC provided the following response:
- Please see attached ASOF-Sentence Length Distribution
- Please see attached Inmate with Earned Work Credit Job spreadsheet.
- SCDC requests additional time to respond to the number of correctional officers supervising the inmates as there are many different working situations and we will need to draft a document responsive to this request.

Breakdown of Inmates in SCDC Custody with an Earned Work Credit (EWC) Job as of June 30, 2015 - 2019 and December 10, 2019

Code	Description	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Dec 10, 2019
2001	UNASSIGNED/UNEMPLOYED		1	1			1
2005	SENIOR BAKER	17	19	10	12	12	7
2010	SENIOR BOILER ROOM OPER	1					
2020	SENIOR COOK	45	28	19	32	17	18
2025	SENIOR CARPENTER	5	3	3	1		2
2031	PRE-RELEASE PROGRAM	8	15	30	16	23	28
2034	ADDICTION TREATMENT UNIT	244	168	128	124	142	163
2035	SCDC INM AD CONL REP	4	3	1	2	1	
2045	SENIOR ELECTRICIAN	9	8	6	5	7	6
2055	SENIOR GRADER	2	2	2	3	1	1
2060	SENIOR HEAT./A.C. OPER	31	30	34	34	34	28
2065	IND. GROUP/SECTION LEAD	86	96	98	118	102	106
2070	SENIOR INVENTORY OPER	9	4	5	6	5	3
2075	SENIOR MAINTENANCE OPER	13	15	18	17	15	15
2085	SR MATERIAL CUTTER/MARKER	3	1	2	2	2	2
2090	SENIOR PAINTER	1	1	1	1	2	2
2095	SENIOR PLUMBER	3	1			3	3
2100	PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL	31	27	27	21	24	9
2105	OFFICE RUNNER			2			
2110	SENIOR WARDKEEPER	11	8	4	1	4	2
2115	SENIOR SHOP OPERATOR	16	14	15	11	15	13
2119	LITERACY PROGRAM	3	1	1			
2120	SENIOR TEACHER ASST.	18	21	14	16	13	14
2123	LIBRARIAN/BOOKMOBILE OPER	4	4	5	3	4	2
2130	SENIOR WAREHOUSE OPERATOR	1	1				
2135	SENIOR WELDER			2	1		1
2140	HEAVY EQ OPER #1, SKILL				1	2	1
2145	HVY FARM EQ OPER#1,SKIL		7	1	4	1	2
2170	LITTER CONTROL PROGRAM	197	218	195	181	210	183
2175	SANITATION WORKER PLCL	114	110	74	76	61	57
2180	DOG HANDLER (SKILLED)	2	2	6	3	4	
2190	DRAFTER (PROFESSIONAL)	2	2	3	2	3	3
2195	QUALITY-CONTROL TECH	2	1	1	3	4	5
2200	SEWING MACHINE REPAIRER	1	2		1		
2201	SENIOR CANTEEN OPERATOR	4	2	4	3	2	3
2210	CIU PROGRAM	44	26	26	25	26	25
2500	WORKER ACTIVITY SPECIALIS	3		1			
2726	ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLER II	61	51	57	55	64	76
2900	LABOR CREW/WORK PROGRAM	999	848	711	561	525	520
2908	DESIGNATED FACILITY			8	3	4	
2920	COMMUNITY TRANSIT SERV	114	63	2			

Breakdown of Inmates in SCDC Custody with an Earned Work Credit (EWC) Job as of June 30, 2015 - 2019 and December 10, 2019

EWC Job		on June 30, …					Dec 10, 2019
Code	Description	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	
2926	HORTICULTURIST (GNHS)	26	31	22	26	42	43
2927	HORTICULTURIST (GRND)	204	201	146	133	165	148
3005	BAKER	88	78	84	78	59	64
3010	BARBER	187	174	179	154	152	166
3015	BELT LOADER			1	1		
3025	BOILER OPERATOR	5	5	5	3	3	1
3030	BOOKKEEPER	5	5	5	7	7	5
3035	BRICKMASON	22	1	2	3	14	33
3045	CANTEEN OPERATOR	51	53	51	55	50	51
3050	CARPENTER	47	41	21	11	19	20
3055	CHAPLAIN ASSISTANT	65	69	58	50	67	59
3060	CHIEF CLERK	40	43	46	41	47	40
3065	CLASSROOM LEADER	7	3	2	1	2	1
3070	COMMISSARY OPERATOR	50	46	45	38	50	54
3080	COOK	176	213	186	159	146	135
3085	SENIOR CUSTODIAN	67	73	70	54	74	72
3095	SR DINING ROOM OPERATOR	64	57	66	75	64	64
3100	DIP TANK OPERATOR	1					
3102	DOG HANDLER	33	31	28	23	12	10
3105	DRAFTER	4	5	5	3	2	2
3115	ELECTRICIAN	45	37	33	37	46	39
3119	AGRICULTURE SPECIALIST	40	40	37	34	32	30
3120	FARM MACHINE OPERATOR	1	1	1			1
3125	FURNITURE ASSEMBLER	30	32	28	31	24	30
3135	SENIOR GROUNDSKEEPER	55	66	40	25	22	21
3140	HAND TOOL REPAIRER	1	1	1			
3145	HVY EQ OPER#2 SEMI-SKIL	2	2	1		1	1
3150	HOUSEKEEPER	79	53	34	23	12	13
3160	INSULATOR	1					
3165	INVENTORY CLERK	46	32	24	23	27	35
3175	STEP DOWN-FACILITATOR		24	26	23	12	11
3180	LICENS TAG QUTY CTRL OP				1		
3185	LIVESTOCK CARETAKER	10	7	4	11	6	2
3195	MACHINE OPERATOR	644	691	674	621	646	587
3200	MATERIAL CUTTER/MARKER	6	3	3	2	2	2
3205	MATERIAL HANDLING EQ OP	117	161	158	154	113	103
3210	MEAT CUTTER	2			1	2	1
3215	MECHANIC	15	13	21	18	11	13
3230	MILKING MACHINE OPERATOR	2	1	3			1
3245	PAINTER	48	52	50	38	32	48
3250	PATTERN MAKER			1			

Breakdown of Inmates in SCDC Custody with an Earned Work Credit (EWC) Job as of June 30, 2015 - 2019 and December 10, 2019

EWC Job		on June 30, …					Dec 10, 2019
Code	Description	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	
3265	PLUMBER	43	55	51	52	48	47
3270	PRINT MACHINE OPERATOR	9	3	4	7	6	7
3280	RECREATION ASSISTANT	25	50	53	37	33	37
3285	ROOFER	13	21	21	20	26	25
3290	SAFETY SECURITY CLERK	4	2	2	1	2	1
3295	SECRETARY	1	1				
3300	SHIPP & RECEIVING CLERK	3		2		1	1
3305	SILK SCREEN OPERATOR	14	16	8	8	7	7
3310	STOREKEEPER	18	24	22	27	8	8
3320	TEACHER ASSISTANT	127	117	123	121	104	124
3325	TIER KEEPER	9	6	6	4	4	2
3330	TIMEKEEPER	26	14	8	6	2	2
3335	SR TRAY LINE OPERATOR	68	100	107	83	77	87
3345	UPHOLSTERER	15	33	20	12	7	10
3350	SR VEGETABLE PREP OPER	39	95	66	52	53	34
3355	WARDKEEPER	2,447	2,610	2,658	2,317	2,400	2,299
3360	SR WAREHOUSE ASST OPER				1	1	
3365	SR WASTE TREATMENT OPER	8	5	4	3	2	2
3370	WELDER	27	26	18	11	17	18
3375	LITTER CONTROL PG PART	19	18	20	22	29	30
3380	LANDSCAPE GARDENER	125	71	40	34	23	28
3475	LAMINATOR	1	3	3	3		
3485	PARA-PROF COUNS#1 SKILL	11	45	38	40	36	35
3490	HORT SPEC GROWER, INSID	38	50	36	23	24	29
3726	ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLER I	9	1	1			
5010	BARBER APPRENTICE	12	15	17	19	13	7
5020	BOILER OPERATOR HELPER	6	3	2	2	1	1
5025	BRICKMASON HELPER	25	13	5	5	12	7
5030	TITLE CHANGED TO 05360					1	
5035	CANTEEN OPERATOR HELPER	110	104	107	109	111	116
5036	TESA-TEACH ENHANCEMENT PR					15	22
5040	CARPENTER HELPER	48	33	26	26	15	11
5045	COMMISSARY OPER HELPER	39	34	36	32	34	30
5060	DAIRY HELPER	99	72	51	47	32	52
5075	DRAFTER HELPER		1	1			
5080	ELECTRICIAN HELPER	71	58	58	46	56	58
5082	AGRICULTURE HELPER	16	23	20	16	33	18
5085	FURNITURE ASSEMBLER HLP	2	1	1			
5090	FURNITURE REPAIR HELPER	2	1				
5100	HAULER	70	52	40	25	18	14
5105	HEAVY EQ OPERATOR HLPER	2					

Breakdown of Inmates in SCDC Custody with an Earned Work Credit (EWC) Job as of June 30, 2015 - 2019 and December 10, 2019

EWC Job		on June 30, …					Dec 10, 2019
Code	Description	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	
5115	INSULATOR HELPER	2		3	3	1	
5125	LAMINATOR HELPER	1					
5130	LAUNDRY HELPER	204	200	202	173	189	201
5135	LAUNDRY ROOM ATTENDANT	121	119	99	80	73	59
5140	LIBRARY HELPER	105	98	76	64	51	54
5150	LIVESTOCK CARETAKER HLP	22	10	1	2	1	
5155	LOCKSMITH HELPER				1	2	2
5160	MACHINE OPERATOR HELPER	2		5	2	1	1
5170	MATERIAL CUT/MARK HLPER	2	1	1	7	12	8
5180	MECHANIC HELPER	155	135	108	111	112	113
5185	MEDICAL ORDERLY	27	25	21	15	19	19
5200	OFFICE CLERK	43	43	36	37	42	51
5205	PAINTER HELPER	9	25	24	19	14	14
5210	PARA-PROFESSIONAL CONSL		2	2	3	2	1
5225	PLUMBER HELPER	28	25	24	32	30	27
5230	PRINTING MACHINE OP HLP	12	16	8	2	2	1
5235	RECEPTIONIST					1	
5240	RECREATION AIDE	234	225	144	80	65	65
5245	ROOFER HELPER	1		4	1	5	4
5250	SAFETY HAT CONTROL CLRK				5	2	2
5270	STOCK CLERK	10	13	14	10	9	7
5275	SUPPLY CLERK	6	6	5	6	9	10
5280	TEACHER AIDE	56	38	42	26	31	23
5285	TIER KEEPER ASSISTANT	1	1				
5290	TOOL CLERK	8	5	7	5	5	6
5300	TYPESETTER HELPER				1		
5305	UPHOLSTERER HELPER	20	18	23	26	29	24
5310	WARDKEEPER ASSISTANT	1,995	2,115	1,915	2,186	2,352	2,200
5315	WAREHOUSE ATTENDANT		1	2		1	1
5320	WASTE TREATMT ASSISTANT	12	14	18	16	16	16
5325	WELDER HELPER	16	10	13	11	15	9
5330	AUTO BODY REPAIR HELPER		1		2	1	1
5335	ELECTRONICS REPAIR HLPR		7	6	7	7	9
5350	CUST ATTDN VISITING ROOM	6	8	8	8	14	14
5355	ADMIN. RUNNER/MESSENGER	11	10	7	7	6	5
5360	FOOD SERVICE AIDE	1,231	1,230	1,088	731	792	858
5365	CUSTODIAN HELPER	194	183	152	215	262	273
5400	SPICE PROGRAM	56	54	56	19	43	27
5500	WORKER ACTIVITY HELPER	7	9	17	2		
5926	HORTICULT/SEMI-SKILLED	8	3				
7005	CLERK HELPER	16	15	15	13	16	10

Breakdown of Inmates in SCDC Custody with an Earned Work Credit (EWC) Job as of June 30, 2015 - 2019 and December 10, 2019

EWC Job		on June 30, …					Dec 10, 2019
Code	Description	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	
7010	CONSTRUCTION WORKER	93	106	64	75	73	69
7015	CUSTODIAL WORKER	1,404	1,436	1,375	1,473	1,459	1,385
7016	LIEBER RESTORATIVE UNIT					8	20
7026	RESTORING PROMISE MENTORS					22	31
7027	RESTORING PROMISE MENTEES					12	18
7030	FARM WORKER	40	45	33	37	50	47
7040	GENERAL WORKER	1,585	1,643	1,900	2,172	2,094	1,952
7045	HORTICULTURE TRAINEE	147	150	136	70	42	26
7050	INDUSTRIES TRAINEE	163	87	85	79	28	33
7060	LAUNDRY WORKER	63	45	44	47	58	62
7065	MACHINE OPERATOR TRAINE		7	9	6	5	4
7070	ROAD MAINTENANCE WORKER	1					
7075	RUNNER/MESSENGER	35	37	20	19	22	20
7080	SANITATION WORKER	58	51	34	22	28	29
7085	WASH RACK ATTENDANT	57	65	59	80	68	70
7090	AUTO BODY REPAIR TRAINE	14	9	1	12	21	9
7095	CONSTRUCTION TRAINEE	66	33	27	5	13	20
7100	ELECTRICIAN TRAINEE	1				1	
7105	ELECTRONIC REPAIR TRNEE	6	3				
7115	HEAVY EQ OPERATOR TRNEE	15	1	1			
7120	MECHANIC TRAINEE	58	31	26	14	17	18
7125	WELDER TRAINEE		15	18	11	9	13
7135	LANDSCAPE LABORER	262	278	241	181	157	127
7300	CHU-WORKER	21	34	35	40	27	22
7400	CHOICES MENTOR					2	1
7907	POSITIVE GROWTH & DEVELOP					41	60
7908	ACADEMY OF HOPE					19	39
7909	PEER SUPPORT SPECIALIST-P						21
99001	SUPER.REENTRY	2	2	1	3	3	1
	Total Inmates with EWC	16,707	16,667	15,608	14,786	15,057	14,588
	Total Jurisdiction Population	21,251	20,951	19,989	18,958	18,848	18,245